Robert Frank Futrell (1917–1999)

This history investigates and records the development of thought and doctrine within the United States Air Force and its predecessors. It tracks the themes and objectives of institutional thinking, describes the organizational framework, identifies individual thinkers and their ideas, examines the context of various conflicts, strategies and operations, and attempts to analyze the capabilities and limitations of air doctrine and power. In two volumes, it begins at 1903 and ends at 1984. It includes the disclaimer: The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Department of Defense or government.

Robert Frank Futrell was a senior historian at the Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center. He holds degrees from the University of Mississippi and a PhD from Vanderbilt University. During World War II he served as historical officer of the AAF Tactical Center. After the war he was a professor of military history and retired as a lieutenant colonel from the Air Force Reserve.… (more)

In this first of a two-volume study, Dr. Futrell presents a chronological survey of the development of Air Force doctrine and thinking from the beginnings of powered flight to the onset of the space age. He outlines the struggle of early aviation enthusiasts to gain acceptance of the airplane as a weapon and win combat-arm status for the Army Air Service (later the Army Air Corps and Army Air Force). He surveys the development of airpower doctrine during the 1930s and World War II and outlines the emergence of the autonomous US Air Force in the postwar period. Futrell brings this first volume to a close with discussions of the changes in Air Force thinking and doctrine necessitated by the emergence of the intercontinental missile, the beginnings of space exploration and weapon systems, and the growing threat of limited conflicts resulting from the Communist challenge of wars of liberation. In volume two, the author traces the new directions that Air Force strategy, policies, and thinking took during the Kennedy administration, the Vietnam War, and the post-Vietnam period. Futrell outlines how the Air Force struggled with President Kennedy's redefinition of national security policy and Robert S. McNamara's managerial style as secretary of defense. He describes how the Air Force argued that airpower should be used during the war in Southeast Asia. He chronicles the evolution of doctrine and organization regarding strategic, tactical, and airlift capabilities and the impact that the aerospace environment and technology had on Air Force thinking and doctrine… (more)