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Works by J. David Petruzzi

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The Civil War Trust’s outstanding maps are produced by Steven Stanley. He is a shining light in a sea of bad cartography. This book collects a huge number of custom-designed maps of the Gettysburg campaign. The emphasis is on “campaign”. The focus and strength of the book are its write-ups and maps for the sideshows, the skirmishes and smaller battles even the interested public does not know about. This works best for the mid-size battles of the campaign such as the battle of Brandy Station or the Second Battle of Winchester.

What makes the whole book difficult to follow, is the complete absence of campaign maps. There are no big picture/area maps that connect the locations of all the other maps. There also are campaign maps that show the progress of the corps and divisions across Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania. There are also no maps that show the locations of the armies at the beginning or the end of a battle’s day. Thus the six maps that cover the first day at Gettysburg are difficult to put into their proper context. Map coverage ends with the fight for Barlow’s knoll (and the flight through Gettysburg) at 5 pm on the one hand and the Confederate clear McPherson’s ridge at 5pm. Map coverage resumes on July 2, 4:30 pm, that is there is not a single map that covers the positions and movements of the armies for nearly 24 hours. The author’s love and attention is clearly not lavished on the main battle. Despite the huge number of Confederate battery markers for Day 3, the individual batteries are not labeled on the maps for Pickett’s charge (despite ample space). While this is not a book for the Gettysburg novice, the book could have been easily improved with a bit of editorship, care and critical thinking. Given their gap tooth nature, the strengths and losses graphics are hard to interpret and what Tufte calls a misuse of data ink. A simple table would have been more effective and freed up space for commentary and further maps.

The orders of battle, especially for the smaller engagements, are nice, but give no indication of their source. The authors list some of the key works about the strengths and losses at Gettysburg but do not connect them to their own numbers. It would have been great to know which numbers are based on consensus and which are disputed. Finally, they should have included an essay on the strengths and losses highlighting some of the numbers they present to provide guidance for rookies what to look out for. Overall, this is still a very valuable book to own but with a little bit of editorship it could have been a much better book.
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jcbrunner | Aug 31, 2013 |
With Lee defeated at Gettysburg and Grant victorious at Vicksburg, the Union could have won the war in July 1863 - if George Gordon Meade had not acted according to his character. It is true, many of his units were mauled in battle and he was faced with Lincoln's restriction of keeping his army between Lee's army and Washington. The South Mountain range further shielded Lee's forces from a vigorous pursuit. After all, the battle of Gettysburg only happened because General Heth exposed his forces beyond the South Mountain range. Finally John Imboden and Jeb Stuart both handed in stellar performances in leading the wounded, the POWs, the trains and the army back to Falling Waters, blocking all attempts of the Federals of inflicting extensive destruction.

Meade did not make good use of the road network. Instead of either mounting a vigorous push pursuit along the northern approach road from Chambersburg to Falling Waters or of cutting Lee off via Harper's Ferry, he sent his forces onto country roads. His disastrous cavalry corps commander Alfred Pleasanton further diminished the effectiveness of the pursuers by splitting up his cavalry forces into division-sized attacks which were too weak to break through the Confederate rearguards. A good part of Wittenberg's book is devoted to these costly but futile cavalry skirmishes that exhausted both sides but proved indecisive.

The Federal infantry was hampered by an absence of confident commanders. Most aggressive Union generals had been wounded or killed during the battle. Thus, the pursuit was under the direction of the plodding General Sedgwick - under orders NOT to bring on a general engagement. Union caution allowed Lee to retreat back to Virginia. Not attacking Lee in his entrenched position at Falling Waters was probably a sane decision. Otherwise a lost chance.

Wittenberg is a cavalry specialist, thus the book will be enjoyed most by those interested in the mounted arm. The movement of the infantry forces is only sketchily presented. On the maps, the Union movements are indicated at the corps level, to abstract for my taste. A real theater map would have shown the abundance of idle Federal forces.

The combination of the two included driving tours and Google Streetview allows neat armchair tourism of this beautiful remote area. Unfortunately, the Google Streetview ends in the middle of the road at Falling Waters (never reaching the Potomac Fish club). It is surprisingly difficult to catch a glimpse of the Potomac in Google Streetview due to the foliage and the sketchy coverage of the smaller roads.
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jcbrunner | Apr 6, 2011 |
Plenty Of Blame To Go Around
Eric J. Wittenberg and J. David Petruzzi

Many historians and much popular historical fiction blame Lee’s defeat at Gettysburg on Jeb Stuart’s absence, gone on a raid around the rear of the Army of the Potomac, leaving Lee without vital intelligence of the whereabouts of the Union forces until the battle was inadvertently started on July 1. The raid has been condemned as a joy ride, an attempt on Stuart’s part to refurbish his image after being caught by surprise at Brandy Station on June 9 and defeated at Upperville a short time later. Stuart was condemned in the Confederate army for his absence, starting on July 2, when Colonel Charles Taylor, Lee’s military secretary, was furious enough to want him shot. Stuart had his defenders; the controversy that started while the battle was still going on has continued to the present day.

Wittenberg and Petruzzi have very carefully and thoroughly researched Stuart’s ride, unearthing heretofore unknown sources (including one that caused the publisher, Savas Beatie, to literally stop the presses so that it could be incorporated into the book) to present a very well written, very thorough, very balanced examination of, not only Stuart’s ride, but also of Lee’s and Longstreet’s orders, which are at the heart of the controversy. The question really boiled down to: did Stuart obey his orders or did he gake unwarranted liberties with the discretion given him, ignore the good of the Army and set out on a joy ride to bolster a bruised vanity?

The book is extremely well written. It covers the skirmishes and two major battles, at Hanover and Hunterstown, that Stuart’s cavalry fought. It follows Stuart’s ride with enormous attention to fascinating detail, not just of the tactics involved but also of the very real, usually ignored problems of maintaining both men and horses in the field. I’m not a horse person, so I have only a vague idea of what is involved in maintaining the animals. The authors do a great service in pointing out just what was involved. Given the problems, the controversial capture and retention of the Union wagon train takes on a different light.

One of the chapters that was extremely interesting to me personally was that describing Stuart’s shelling of the Army barracks at Carlisle, PA, since I received my undergraduate degree at Dickinson College. The chapter is no better than others, but I enjoyed it more for obvious reasons. That said, it’s a dramatic story that I wish I had known at the time I was a student!

The last chapters are devoted to a thorough discussion of the controversy, with liberal quotations from both sides in the Confederate army and extensive discussions from historians, both those immediately after the Civil War and modern ones. The conclusion: as the title indicates, there is plenty of blame to go around. Yes, Stuart holds responsibility for making several tactical errors, but Lee--whom no one wanted to criticize for the Confederate defeat --does as well, as does Jubal Early, Beverley Robertson (a cavalry commander in Stuart’s division) and Marshall himself. In retrospect, this seems logical; it’s a rare occurrence when a single action is the only cause of a major event as complicated as was the Battle of Gettysburg.

The book is blessed with not only adequate but downright lovely maps, clearly showing routes and troop dispositions. There is one particularly fine map showing Stuart’s routes: the one he did take, the one he was supposed to take, and the suggested alternative, which accompanies text clearly examining the pros and cons of each one.

There are four Appendices: Appendix A gives the roster of Stuart’s command; Appendix B gives the Orders of Battle for the engagements Stuart fought; Appendix C gives the complete text of Stuart’s official report; and Appendix D is a Driving Tour of Stuart’s ride to Gettysburg.

A word about the last-named Appendix: it seems to be de rigueur these days to include walking/driving tours in books on Civil War battles. This one seems particularly well-done, with extensive directions and plenty of photographs to go along with the text. How valuable it is in enhancing the knowledge or appreciation of Stuart’s ride is impossible to tell without having done it. Still, it’s there for those with the interest in doing so.

This is a very fine addition to the literature on the Battle of Gettysburg. Highly recommended.
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Joycepa | 1 other review | Feb 15, 2009 |
Eric Wittenberg and J D Petruzzi have written a summary of Stuart's ride to Gettysburg and the ongoing debate since then about whether he was right or wrong and whether it made any difference to the outcome of the great battle.

While partisans of all sides will still find plenty of room to argue their conclusions (I think they've been much too lenient on General Lee, for instance) they'll be bound to admire the scholarship that Eric and JD have brought to the subject.

At a time when some Civil War luminaries have suggested that there is no more to be written (you know who you are, Gary) a book like this shows that there's always a chance that a fresh look and an intelligent eye can bring forth a worthwhile addition to any Civil War library.… (more)
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kawebb | 1 other review | Jun 15, 2007 |

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