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1steve.clason
Published November 20, 1787
Having in earlier papers explained the certainty that conflict would arise between the states should the union dissolve (or split into several confederacies, which is explicitely considered more probable), Publius/Hamilton in #8 begins to predict and warn against the consequences of separation.
The wars that will necessarily arise between the states in the absence of union will quickly lead, Publius argues, to the states creating standing armies in order to defend their property, despite the common awareness that nothing is more dangerous to the liberties of a people. "To be more safe," Hamilton argues, the people of the separate states would "become willing to be less free," and would invite not only standing armies but an executive robust enough to command them, a configuration creating "the same engines of despotism which have been the scourge of the Old World."
Conceding that the "new" Constitution does not "provide against" standing armies but rather leaves them "problematical and uncertain", Publius argues that objections to the Constitution on these grounds would be put aside by clear-thinking people who weigh that uncertainty against the surety of standing armies arising in the case of disunion.
Having in earlier papers explained the certainty that conflict would arise between the states should the union dissolve (or split into several confederacies, which is explicitely considered more probable), Publius/Hamilton in #8 begins to predict and warn against the consequences of separation.
The wars that will necessarily arise between the states in the absence of union will quickly lead, Publius argues, to the states creating standing armies in order to defend their property, despite the common awareness that nothing is more dangerous to the liberties of a people. "To be more safe," Hamilton argues, the people of the separate states would "become willing to be less free," and would invite not only standing armies but an executive robust enough to command them, a configuration creating "the same engines of despotism which have been the scourge of the Old World."
Conceding that the "new" Constitution does not "provide against" standing armies but rather leaves them "problematical and uncertain", Publius argues that objections to the Constitution on these grounds would be put aside by clear-thinking people who weigh that uncertainty against the surety of standing armies arising in the case of disunion.
2geneg
There is only one political entity on earth that should have a standing army -- the United Nations.
This is a very prescient addition to the Federalist. As you can see we have a very strong executive willing to go to war, sometimes at the drop of a hat. We as a nation should drop our standing army immediately and scale back all of our military to skeleton crews that can get an army of draftees up to speed quickly. Why have a standing army of you aren't going to use it. Armies don't work well in the MADD scenario, thus it makes no sense to maintain them.
This is a very prescient addition to the Federalist. As you can see we have a very strong executive willing to go to war, sometimes at the drop of a hat. We as a nation should drop our standing army immediately and scale back all of our military to skeleton crews that can get an army of draftees up to speed quickly. Why have a standing army of you aren't going to use it. Armies don't work well in the MADD scenario, thus it makes no sense to maintain them.
