I got a bit cross-threaded here

http://www.librarything.com/topic/58550

and here

http://www.librarything.com/topic/62142

and so to aid the confusion, decided to start a new thread with this post...

I have to decide whether to plant out my tomatoes. The growing season is short, if I plant them out too late, I'll loose out on some ripe tomatoes in the fall. If I plant them out too soon, there might be a frost which will kill the plant and I'll have no tomatoes at all. What is the rational thing to do? Let's say that the daily high temperature is a predictor of the subsequent daily low temperatures. I could wait and plant my tomatoes on the day the temperature reaches 70 F. I may not be certain that there won't be a frost, but that at temperature there is a only a small chance. If I was a braver, I might plant my tomatoes on the day the temperature reaches 68 F. At the temperature, there is a slightly greater chance of a frost, but the growing season would be several days longer and I'll get more tomatoes in the fall. If I were more cautious, I would wait until the temperature reaches 72 F, but then I would get fewer tomatoes in the fall. If I wanted to be certain that there would be no frost, I should wait until the temperature reaches 80 F, but then I would get no tomatoes in the fall.

This is a classic decision problem, with a single valued threshold, the temperature. I get to choose the threshold. All choices of threshold are rational, they depend on my relative appetite for risk and for tomatoes. There are two types of error. If I set the threshold too high, I can be certain of not loosing plants at the cost of loosing growing days. If I set the threshold too low, I will get more tomatoes at a greater risk of loosing the whole crop. (Technical Aside: If I know the appropriate probability distributions, I can turn the problem into an optimization problem by assigning costs to the two types of error and assessing the Bayes risk.)

Every decision to accept or reject evidence for some proposition follows the same pattern. There may not be a single threshold parameter like temperature, but the level of our skepticism has a similar effect. If we set our level of skepticism high, then we will be more unlikely to accept propositions that are false, but at the cost of rejecting propositions that are actually true. If we set our level of skepticism too low, then we are less likely to reject propositions that are true and more likely to accept propositions that are false. Our own level of skepticism is a balance between our appetite between risk and reward. Every choice can be rational, the only mistake we can make is using a threshold that is not optimal for our own particular preferences.

How does this relate to the "choose to believe" problem? I first came across this view of the problem in William James's Will to Believe. It is a sort of an updated form of Pascal's Wager in which everyone wins (in my version, James was steering us to one outcome). The question is -- where should you set your skepticism threshold when assessing the evidence for God. Well that depends on your appetite for the two types of errors you can make. If you set your threshold too low, you may end up believing in God when there is no God. If you set your threshold too high, you may end up disbelieving in God when he does in fact exists. Which error would be worse to make? If you make the first error, what are the costs -- what would it cost you to believe in God? If it is just accepting that God exists, the costs are probably very small. Belief may require you to work a little harder, but that work is at least finite. If you make the second error, what are the costs? Estimates of the potential loss of benefits of non-belief range from loss of eternal life to missing out on demonstrable health benefits. Where you set your own threshold depends on your appetite, and every choice is rational for someone.

Which God are we choosing whether or not to believe in?

rrp, your set-out of the problem is clear and logical and deterministic - too much so. It assigns to human thought processes the rational predictability of a robot, and people just aren't like that.

This "scepticism threshold" - though an elegant enough theory - is way too artificial. It will be set at different levels by the same person in different circumstances, on different days, in different moods. It is not an absolute predictor. You can liken a human being to a pane of glass - sometimes it's clean and the weather is sunny, and everything looks clear; other days it's dirty and the weather is murky and suddenly everything looks hazy and harder to see.

We are the sum total of ... our past, especially our childhood; our education, past and ongoing; our friends, past and present; our ever-changeable likes and dislikes; our fears - addressed, unaddressed, and subconscious; our attitudes, formed by all this and still changing; our needs, driven by all that and still changing; our culture, the times we live in, the media ... and this is not a complete list.

Your proposition - the question of whether or not to believe in God - is going to hit a different bundle of "reactors" in us from day to day, even from hour to hour, and while some of those reactors will be very constant and slow to change, yet others will be shifting all the time.

The fact is, a need for God, ultimately a belief in God, is driven by those inner reactors. And often they are woken by some unusual circumstances in our lives. Let's face it, we don't wake up each morning and say "Ok, now where will I place my scepticism threshold today?" Life just isn't like that. We are humans, not robots.

Belief in God is subject principally to the inner desire for the same. That can be awakened, yes, in unusual circumstances, but it is rarely if ever the result of a cold logical rational decision. If it were, then we - as putative Vulcan Spocks - would most likely come down on the side of non-belief, as that is the most LOGICAL decision, based on scientific evidence. The more we learn about the universe, the further God recedes, or rather evolves in our understanding to be something the mystics always knew : "... that which passes all understanding".

The benefits of belief come FROM the belief, if they exist. In other words, you don't believe to get the benefits, or your belief is not in the prime objective, but in the side issue. That is a breakdown in a priori logical reasoning - it just doesn't work, it doesn't hold up, it is flawed. Benefits - if they come at all - come BECAUSE of the other belief; that has to precede in the sequence of events. Otherwise it would be like believing in the benefits from exercise, without first believing that there is a thing called "health"; going for a jog each morning because you believe in the benefits, while at the same time smoking, over-eating, drinking lots.

You need to step back from this very reductionist, logical approach to something that is very human, somewhat emotional, and more than a little irrational. And the irrationality of some of our behaviours just doesn't matter!

(anyhow, long past bedtime here, I'll see any replies in the morning, DV).

Message edited by its author, Apr 17, 2009, 7:08pm.

#2

I know this feeble, "but there are too many choices" excuse. That's one of the benefits of doing it this way. You can consider the choice of believing in each God, Gods, Goddesses or whatever, one at a time. If you don't decide to believe in the first one, then move onto the second. If you do decide to believe in the first one, consider the second. Maybe, you will displace your first God, maybe not. If you don't know which one to start with, flip a coin.

Of course, it might not be a transitory process, in which case you will have fun relearning each religion as it comes around.

It rings alarm bells all over when someone suggests we adopt a "more than a little irrational" approach. What is the rational basis for that assertion? If there is none, why should I adopt it? That's the problem with any retreat from reason, it just isn't rational.

Say I took your advice, and took an 'irrational' approach and it worked. Well then the approach would have been the rational thing to do. Hence 'irrational'='rational' and we would all disappear in a big bang of contradiction.

VERY BAD THINGS happen when there is a retreat from reason. Don't go there.

Message edited by its author, Apr 17, 2009, 8:13pm.

>5 - recognising that there are other faculties as well as reason is not "a retreat from reason". Indeed relying solely on reason could be seen as a "retreat" from a holistic understanding of ourselves and our universe. We need both/and, not either/or.

>1 - "choose to believe" - I'm not sure whether I do choose to believe. I believe. For me it's not primarily about making decisions, or weighing evidence or propositions, or balancing the cost for or against, although when I do look at those things they appear to support my belief. If something catastrophic were to happen which destroyed my belief, then again I would not describe that as a choice - in that case I would no longer believe.

I'll second Jesse in #2 and go one better: "God" is so variously defined, that to say one "believes in God" absent a particular definition (which varies across and within sects and traditions) is virtually meaningless. The idea of "which God" is--at least for me--shorthand for radically different operations that might be glossed as "believing," not just objects of an otherwise consistent faculty of belief.

"and more than a little irrational"

I own up, I phrased that not how I intended. I intended to say and a little more irrational, which is very different in degree from what I actually said.

Now I've owned up, perhaps you could go back and get past that one phrase and respond to the rest of what I wrote?

"VERY BAD THINGS happen when there is a retreat from reason. Don't go there"

Like childbirth? Like hugging people who are distressed? Like phoning people on an impulse? Like using our intuition? Women - who use reason on many occasions when it's appropriate - "go there" all the time. It's not a crime. It doesn't result in VERY BAD THINGS.
#6 has some great stuff there about "being holistic", which could also be expressed as "being complete" or "being truly ourselves". And let's not forget the agonies endured by Star Trek's Mr Spock when he suppressed the human half of himself to focus 100% on logic. Mr Spock is a mythic figure, who could easily represent the modern male : all thought and action, with emotion and "irrationality" and intuition, suppressed. (Ok, that's a massive generalisation, there are some wonderful men around who don't fit that stereotype, but you know what I'm saying, I think?)

I think I am not getting my point across well. I am not saying that this is the way you should choose to believe. I am saying that if you did go thorough a decision process this way, this purely rational way, you could still end up believing in God. My argument is precisely against the sort of argument presented by rational atheists who say that we should "come down on the side of non-belief, as that is the most LOGICAL decision, based on scientific evidence". It isn't the most logical decision, because if you look very closely at a fully rational decision process, it's as I described. I am saying you can go through that fully rational decision process, using the most logical steps, and end up choosing to believe in God.

The key factor is your skepticism threshold. I know its a gross simplification, but it captures an essential set of values that everyone has to have. The point is that it is a value. It isn't derived rationally but, as you say, is in our nature and and in our nurture. It's an emotion.

Logic alone is only half human.

> 9

NOW I understand where you're coming from! Yes, I agree. My only point of departure from you, is that non-belief is the more "logical", "rational" choice, because that's the likelier result of cold analysis - to not believe; I think it less likely that you can use the same techniques (unemotional) to arrive at belief in God, whereas I get the feeling that you think this is possible?

Otherwise, I can agree with most everything you said there.

> 10

If that ! I'd like to think that we are 1/3 logic-reason, 1/3 emotion, and 1/3 action-will-intent. I suppose that logic-reason would be well employed as a kind of "regulating, critical" overseer, but without necessarily the last word...

Message edited by its author, Apr 18, 2009, 4:12pm.

#11

I am still missing my mark. My point was that non-belief is not more rational. You are kidding yourself if you think it is. Your choice is determined by where you set your skepticism level, and that is not a rational decision, it's a value decision.

Rationality comes in, not in the deciding part, but in the mechanism for reconciling, in the best possible way, your values and your decision. It's there to make sure you do make a good decision based on your values. Everyone can make a different decision, and still be rational.

I understand your point rrp, but you've shifted slightly there. You've moved from the a priori logic of "belief in God", to the post hoc justification of decisions / choices.

I have no quarrel with you on that basis - we all "rationalise" our decisions after the event. But as you say, the preceding choice or decision is made on the basis of our values, and those are formed from a whole amalgam of influences, very many of them emotional and therefore - presumably, in your book - "irrational".

As for this "scepticism level" you are so insistent on - I don't think this is a constant : as I said at length above (did you read that yet?), it is a shifting, inconstant thing, that could for example be removed completely during one conversation with a close friend.

Message edited by its author, Apr 18, 2009, 6:01pm.

No, my argument is not about justifying the decision, just about making sure the decision process is rational. To say it is rational is just to say it was a good decision, the right decision at the time, not that what you was decided is true or would be the right decision if you had to make it again at a later time. All decisions are emotional.

I doesn't matter if your "scepticism level" is constant or not. It doesn't represent a single thing, it represents our tendencies to be trusting or skeptical in various situations. Of course you would trust a close friend more than a complete stranger, just as your would trust an expert more than an amateur.

If we set our level of skepticism high, then we will be more unlikely to accept propositions that are false, but at the cost of rejecting propositions that are actually true. If we set our level of skepticism too low, then we are less likely to reject propositions that are true and more likely to accept propositions that are false.

Every choice can be rational, the only mistake we can make is using a threshold that is not optimal for our own particular preferences

The key factor is your skepticism threshold... it captures an essential set of values that everyone has to have. The point is that it is a value. It isn't derived rationally but... It's an emotion

I doesn't matter if your "scepticism level" is constant or not

Either I've misunderstood you, or you haven't really explained this "threshold" at all. In that first quote you seem to be saying it is something we "set", i.e. something comparatively fixed. By the end you're saying it doesn't matter how or even whether, it is a constant.

But this discussion seems to have gone on forever, and forgive me, it seems to be going nowhere, I think you just like to debate. Belief in God is not, cannot, be a logical, rational choice (how many people do you really think have ever taken up Pascal's Wager?). It is arrived at by a whole host of processes, events, values, emotions, and yes, reasons too. Whether the "decision to believe" can ever be coldly and logically justified either before or after the event, is entirely for an individual to decide. This particular individual has had enough of all this, is tired, is going to bed, and will leave this thread for others to join in and comment on.

You skepticism level is Comparatively fixed, but it can change with age and experience and possibly how tired you are.

Let me take a different tack then --- why cannot belief in God be a logical, rational choice?

Your argument that if we are to choose beliefs, it's rational to choose what we believe according to the benefits derived from those beliefs reminds me of the passage from Dale Carnegie's How to Win Friends and Influence People (though it may have been Norman Vincent Peale's The Power of Positive Thinking) where the author describes a woman in a mental hospital who believes that she's married to a prince and greets her doctor every morning with news of her latest delivery. The doctor and she go through a whole routine daily where the woman introduces the doctor to her newest son. The doctor, we're told, almost feels bad to point out to this lady that she's insane and that this is a form of psychosis. The lady takes so much joy in her belief that he's saddened to take that away from her.

From the argument that you're making, the woman is acting completely rationally in choosing her belief as she derives happiness from what she believes.

Message edited by its author, Apr 18, 2009, 11:07pm.

>4: I know this feeble, "but there are too many choices" excuse. That's one of the benefits of doing it this way. You can consider the choice of believing in each God, Gods, Goddesses or whatever, one at a time. If you don't decide to believe in the first one, then move onto the second. If you do decide to believe in the first one, consider the second.

There is an infinite number of potential gods and goddesses (for a value of potential other than "possibly existing" since that begs the question). I would die before I considered all or even most (or even a meaningful fraction, since infinity) of the posssibilities in this way. Unless there's a way to generalize, it doesn't seem like a workable process.

>17: From the argument that you're making, the woman is acting completely rationally in choosing her belief as she derives happiness from what she believes.

I don't know--I think we can assign values to other relevant factors, like her inability to make meaningful connections in the soi-disant "real world." Assuming they treat her well in the hospital and keep her well-fed and whatnot, I'm not sure her belief wouldn't be rational.

But neither is it clear a priori that happiness (particularly self-happiness, as opposed to say the greatest happiness of the greatest number) should be the goal of pragmatic truth criteria.

Message edited by its author, Apr 18, 2009, 11:17pm.

But that's not the argument that rrp is making (and I doubt that my #17 really addresses the point that he/she is making either, as I'm guessing that what rrp is going for is essentially a modified Pascal's wager.) Rrp is essentially arguing that if we can choose to believe certain things, then it's rational to believe those things that benefit us. In the simplest sense, then it's rational to believe whatever makes us happy (and witness the number of times that scientific studies show that "believers" are happier than those without faith.) As if the happiness derived from our beliefs affects whether or not those beliefs are true or not...

The Pascal's wager formulation reminds me of a trader I knew (actually a senior partner in the firm where I worked) when I was an equity options market maker. The trader worked in the WorldCom pit on the options floor. At the point that WCOM was trading around five or six dollars, the trader was long (effectively owning shares) of WCOM to the tune of something like a couple hundred delta (meaning that he essentially owned 200k shares of stock.)

As the trader explained it to me, he figured that if stock rebounded and went back to it's peak trading levels, he'd be an extremely rich man. If the stock continued to slide, he'd be out of a job. Using rrp's metric, it's then rational to "believe" that WorldCom will rebound. The trader essentially stated that he saw this as a free roll (max loss was that he needed to find another job, theoretically unlimited upside.)

I think we all know how that worked out.

The benefits that we might accrue from a belief don't alter the truth.

There is an infinite number of potential gods and goddesses (for a value of potential other than "possibly existing" since that begs the question). I would die before I considered all or even most (or even a meaningful fraction, since infinity) of the posssibilities in this way. Unless there's a way to generalize, it doesn't seem like a workable process.

Not to mention that Pascal's wager will work when formulated for most any religion that postulates an afterlife for accepting its tenets. Unfortunately, most of those that do are mutually exclusive.

Message edited by its author, Apr 18, 2009, 11:31pm.

Rrp is essentially arguing that if we can choose to believe certain things, then it's rational to believe those things that benefit us.

Yes, but you seem to be imply that rrp is saying that it's "rational to believe those things that benefit us" even if those things aren't actually true.

But that's not what I read rrp as saying. And I know for a fact that W. James is presenting an alternative account of truth.

As if the happiness derived from our beliefs affects whether or not those beliefs are true or not...

I'm confused by the "as if," but yes, that's the argument.

The benefits that we might accrue from a belief don't alter the truth.

Again with the question-begging. This is an assertion about epistemology, pace William James. It needs to be defended.

Not to mention that Pascal's wager will work when formulated for most any religion that postulates an afterlife for accepting its tenets.

It also works for hypothetical religions that postulate an afterlife for rejecting its tenets: it simply yields the opposite result.

Yes, but you seem to be imply that rrp is saying that it's "rational to believe those things that benefit us" even if those things aren't actually true.

I'm not implying that at all. It's the argument that rrp is making. As is confirmed by your next statement. That's the argument. It's a bullshit argument.

Again with the question-begging.

It's not question begging. The assertion that "the happiness derived from our beliefs affects whether or not those beliefs are true" at best leads to a completely subjective account of "truth".

In the spirit of our "rational" discourse on truth, I have to say that I'm very pleased to announce my engagement to Ms. Abby Blachly. We've been seeing each other for a couple of months now and have decided to tie the knot. If you've not received a wedding invite yet, please don't despair, we're still working on hashing out the invite list. The working list is as follows -

Tim Spalding

As it makes me happy to announce my engagement to Abby (and believe that Abby and I are getting married), Abby and I are engaged.

Bullshit.

Dammit, Spalding, you've disabled strikethroughs. How am I supposed to cross you off the invite list if I can't cross you off?

Bullshit.

This is supposed to be an argument? Once again, I'm faced with a baseless assertion.

Convince me that 20 years from now you and the rest of the planet will be happier for your having believed yourself to be married to Abby . . . and maybe I'll match your baseless assertion with one of my own. (Although, really, at this point I'm not really arguing for any particular epistemology, just against the idea that which one is the right one is clear and obvious.)

But my guess is that your belief in your engagement will ultimately lead to a net decrease in your overall happiness level.

I would like to fly, but the belief I can fly isn't going to make me very happy if I jump off a building, is it? I can admit this is the case without being wedded to any particular mumbo-jumbo metaphysics about reality. William James was a scientist. Pragmatism != relativism. It just doesn't, and never did.

I've been annoyed with the disablement of strikethroughs myself.

Message edited by its author, Apr 19, 2009, 1:23am.

Convince me that 20 years from now you and the rest of the planet will be happier for your having believed yourself to be married to Abby . . . and maybe I'll match your baseless assertion with one of my own.

Where has anyone mentioned a "net increase" prior to your post?

Well, first, let's be clear, any talk of happiness has always been a huge simplification of what rrp (and James) was talking about in >1: a complex calculus of costs and benefits when applied to belief. But if we redefine "happier" to mean "experiences a small moment of happiness in a sea of misery" then . . .

. . . that's a strawman argument I see no need to defend.

The point is that there can be a set of truth criteria which are not rooted in metaphysical realism and the correspondence theory of truth--not that a particular proposed set (proposed by you) of criteria needs defending.

Message edited by its author, Apr 19, 2009, 1:32am.

I guess that all it takes is a strawman to attack a scarecrow.

The point is that there can be a set of truth criteria which are not rooted in metaphysical realism and the correspondence theory of truth--not that a particular proposed set (proposed by you) of criteria needs defending.

That's funny. It's the first I've heard anyone bring this up at all. I could have sworn we were talking about how it's rational to hold beliefs that benefit us.

Edit: If you'll excuse me, I'm off to work.

Message edited by its author, Apr 19, 2009, 1:41am.

We seem to have passed through (or discarded) both logical positivism and logical negativism. Perhaps we could argue for a new category : logical optimism, as propounded by rrp?

The thread really doesn't have much to do with tomatoes. The title should be something like "Belief in God is practical" or "Why we should all be rice Christians."

There are two practical benefits cited.

(1) Supposed health benefits. I doubt that they exist. I do think there are real benefits in believing in something and in belonging to a community. Anomie and rootlessness are bad for you, according to most studies. However, to say that one should believe in something is not an argument for why one should believe in God. I can't prove that our lives are not meaningless or that we should care about each other, but I believe it ... probably on practical grounds.

(2) Loss of eternal life. This one is a real stretch. You have to believe that there is such a thing to begin with, and then you have to believe that it would be desirable, and then you have to believe that whether or not you believe in God has anything at all to do with whether you end up in this state.

People believe in God for several other practical reasons, which, IMHO, are more convincing than the ones rrp lists.

(3) Nonbelief leads to a certain amount of social censure, at least in the US, especially within families.

(4) For those who were raised in a religious tradition, breaking from it may involve a certain amount of pain.

(5) When a loved one dies, some believers can console themselves with the idea that the loved one isn't really dead, and in fact that one might see that person again.

(6) Believers often think that God is on their side in this world, so that if they believe and pray hard enough, God will answer their prayers.

(7) Some people say that their belief in God keeps them from doing bad things, and makes them more likely to do good things, for fear of God's wrath in the next world. I have real doubts about this. I suspect that religious belief is no less common among criminals, torture advocates, and investment bankers than among the population as a whole.

There are also good practical reasons for not believing in God.

(1) This one is strongly connected with #6 above. If you really think that God will answer your prayers, you are going to feel profoundly betrayed when he doesn't. This is a very serious problem that happens to believers all the time, and makes some of them extremely sad.

(2) People do a great many stupid and in some cases horrible things because they think that's what God wants.

(3) People who believe that this life is just a staging area may not value worldly existence very much, and therefore they may live lives of self denial. They may even become suicide bombers, with the idea that it's a quick way into paradise.

When I look at the pluses and minuses, it is far from obvious that belief in God is practical at all.

It is not rational to belief in something for which there is no evidence, just because it makes you feel good. I may as well believe in flying pigs that bring me presents. a) It makes me feel good, ergo, health benefits b) if they exist I get presents, c) if not, no harm done. But that does not make it rational. Faith by definition is not rational (read your Kierkegaard).

NOTE: edited to replace 'belief' by 'faith'.

Message edited by its author, Apr 20, 2009, 4:57pm.

Yes, but belief in God has a certain tradition, that Santa Pork doesn't.

;-)

Anyway, define "evidence". The only evidence I have for Black Holes is the theoretical discoveries of eminent physicists, but I still believe they exist. I have no PERSONAL evidence of them.

And not everything that works is rational anyway. For example, the placebo effect exists, it works, but there is no (as yet) rational explanation for it : to all intents and purposes, it shouldn't exist, but there it is ...

Wow, if we could only MAKE humans be rational, oh what larks we'd have. Oh, wait... Lenin and Stalin already tried that. Never mind!

#31 Evidence is any empirical observation that is supportive of a hypothesis or theory.

There is more evidence for black holes than just theoretical musings by physicists (actually if it were just that, there would be no evidence - see string theory for example. Theorists come up with new ideas every day, unfetterred by evidence.). Objects that match the expected properties of black holes have actually been observed.

Clearly, there are different levels of evidence for different hypothesis. It's not a black-or-white thing. For example, there is a lot of solid evidence for special relativity. It has been measured and confirmed many, many times. There is much less than evidence for the Higgs boson. Yes, it's existence is needed to rationalize current theories of elementary particles, so there is some indirect evidence, but no direct evidence.

Creationists often get this confused. For example the evidence that evolution is happening is overwhelming. When it comes to some of the specific mechanisms, or their relative importance, the evidence is a bit weaker, etc.

The placebo effect does have some explanations. It is clear that human bodies have self-healing abilities, and these can be enhanced by believing in them, which releases a different 'positive' mix of hormones than being negative about one's prognosis. But just because we don't have all the answers, doesn't make the placebo effect into anything mysterious, or beyond science. It just means it warrants more research.

Now, claims of the Bible (or other holy books) are so flagrantly in contradiction with empirical observations, internal logic etc., that it is far on the side of negative evidence that the Bible is some kind of Word of God. Leaving holy books aside, the existence of God is IMHO a tougher nut. To weigh the evidence, we first have to answer Jesse's question (#2), what God are you talking about? There are so many conceptions of God, that we need to specify which one we mean first. I feel the evidence for a benevolent, personal, omniscient, omnipotent God is extremely weak. Just look around you and all the sh@$#! that is going on. To put it in George Carlin's words: "This is not what the work of a benevolent, all-powerful God should look like. It looks like more the work of an office-temp with a bad attitude!"

The evidence for some more nebulous idea of God, some kind of all pervasive principle as the cause of the universe or its laws, i.e. some kind of deist conception may be better, but at the same time God seems to recede into nebulosity.

#32 The more I read about marxism and communism, the less rational it appears (except maybe some parts of it economic analysis). When it comes for example to Engel's ideas about scientific issues, they are as cuckoo as any creationists. This always happens when you put a 'rational system' (i.e. ideology) ahead of empirical ideas. In that sense, marxism is more a secular religion than anything scientific.

Scientists are empiricists, not rationalists.

Rationalism: The position that reason has precedence over other ways of acquiring knowledge. It is traditionally contrasted with empiricism, the view that senses are primary with respect to knowledge. (This is from the Cambridge dictionary of philosophy).

Scientific empiricism is a bit more sophisticated than that. a) we extend our senses by appropriate quantitative measurement devices b) we do use reason to see if our models and theories explain large classes of observations and are internally consistent. c) we make sure, through different types of measurements and observations that we do not fool ourselves. d) We repeat this process and get progressively closer to the truth (with small 't') of the particular phenomenon to be described.

Pure rationalists use only their reason which is dependent on what pre-conceived notions are in your mind. If these don't square with evidence, then you can reason just about anything, but it has no correspondence with the real world. In that sense even religions are rational, especially protestant Christianity, with its insistence on a rational reading of the Bible, The only religions that IMHO make any sense are the ones that keep some kind of mystic element.

Message edited by its author, Apr 22, 2009, 10:11am.

To catch up and clear up some questions. I am indeed proposing that if we can choose to believe certain things, then it's rational to believe those things that benefit us, even if those things aren't actually true.

Part of this comes down to the question what is a rational decision. (Note: this has nothing to do with the philosophy called "rationalism".) I am claiming, in concert with many others, that when faced with a binary decision, the rational course of action is to take the path that, when taking all current evidence into account, will on average accrue the most benefit. If there are better definitions of a rational decision, I don't know of them. The rational decision here is contrasted with an irrational decision which would be to decide on some other basis, for example by consulting a horoscope, consulting an oracle, flipping a coin, going on a hunch or because you are scared or subject to some other biasing emotion.

I gave an example of a rational decision process, choosing when to plant your tomato plants. I proposed that "choosing to believe" is a process to which you can apply a rational decision methodology. The conclusion is that it is rational to "choose to believe" if believing, taking all current evidence into account, will on average accrue the most benefit. Hence, it is irrational not to choose to believe.

Some other examples were given above. The case of the insane woman does not apply I think because the woman is not choosing to believe, she already does believe. But let's assume that each day she is faced with the decision to go on believing or not. Would it be rational for her to do so? Possibly, after all her choice is confirmed each day by the doctor who goes along with it, and is keeping her safe, warm and fed rather than on the streets.

The case of the trader does not apply either. The trader is not making a decision about whether to believe World Comm stock is going to go up or down, he is making a decision about whether to hold his position or not. It seems to me that he has made a rational decision to keep holding the stock as he expects a net benefit from doing so. There is a related example in Nassim Taleb's book The Black Swan. Taleb is asked what he thinks the stock market will do today. He thinks it will go up, but is betting it will go down, again because his expected gain is higher. As another example, suppose I offer, for a $1 bet, to pay you $1,000,0000 if you can correctly guess a number between 1 and 1000. You would be rational to take the bet even though you expect to pick the wrong number.

The "too many options" excuse came up again. Try as an analogy a trip to the book store. There are 10s of thousands of titles to choose from. You cannot possible go through them all to find out if one will suit you so you give up and go home without a book. Is that a rational decision? Or would the rational decision be to ask for a recommendation from the staff, or browse the shelf of best sellers? For each book you pick up, you assess would this book provide entertainment of greater value than its cost. If it's expected net benefit is positive, you buy it.

Message edited by its author, Apr 22, 2009, 4:07pm.

>35 I think I would concede that it is practical and advantageous to believe certain things that are not provable. (I don't think I would choose "rational" as a word that describes the decision to believe such things.)

I don't think it is in any way practical to believe that the earth is 6000 years old. I doubt that it is practical to believe in an afterlife. I am not convinced that it is practical to believe in the existence of God.

I'll respond to #35, though it may take some time before I do, as I'm rather limited in my online time at the moment.

Upon further consideration, I think I'm going to pass. I see no point in discussing things with someone who's declared the truth to be unnecessary. I find no reason to believe that anything he says is true.

I recuse myself from the conversation.

I don't know where you got the impression that I have declared that truth is unnecessary. Nothing could be further from the truth. I have proposed the application of a highly rational, scientific, evidence-based decision making process. That process relies on there being objective truths. If you find fault with my process or claim that anything is untrue, please let me know.

#35

I am indeed proposing that if we can choose to believe certain things, then it's rational to believe those things that benefit us, even if those things aren't actually true.

it's certainly not rational to believe something you know to be untrue, in fact it may not even be possible. If you even suggested it, then Spock would raise one eyebrow quite slowly while meeting your gaze without blinking, but would say nothing until you looked away, then would quietly murmur "Fascinating" before returning to his game of three-dimensional chess.

I am sure that if Spock didn't like my conclusion, he would try to fault my logic. If there is no fault with the logic, then the conclusion must be valid. But you have the conclusion wrong, I didn't say that you should believe things you know to be untrue. That would of course be silly, if you believe them you must think that they are true. What I said was it would be rational to believe something even if it wasn't true. Not the same thing at all.

It may be rational within your own mind to believe things you think are true although they aren't, but then you cannot expect anybody else to think of your choice to be rational, especially if they know that you have no evidence to back up your belief, or worse, find that there is actually evidence to contradict your belief.

You should always seek to find out if something is true before you believe it, based on external, falsifiable evidence, not believe something because you wish it were true.

If you do not do that, it is silly to believe something, even if you think it to be true, because you only think it to be true as a result of your deliberate choice to keep your knowledge limited.

Also:
"If there is no fault with the logic, then the conclusion must be valid."

This statement is not true: The logic can be correct, but if the premises are wrong, impeccable logic does not help you.

#40

I know what point I was trying to make, but I assume that you are not making the same point when you quoted me? So I can't work out what point you are making.

I believe that the point that yapete is making is that if one assumes that it's rational to hold any belief that benefits us, then one may rationalise any belief.

Message edited by its author, Apr 24, 2009, 5:28am.

I meant to say "argument" rather than "logic". A valid argument relies on its premises as well as its logic. I think my argument is still valid.

Let me try again using a little scientific abstraction. My argument is essentially this. If I choose to do X because evidence has shown that X will accrue me a net benefit, then it should be universally recognized that I have made a rational choice. Who can disagree with that?

One problem I think you are having is moving from the particular to the general. It is not generally true that, if doing X will accrue me a net benefit, then doing Y will accrue me a net benefit. I cannot use my argument to "rationalise any belief". I have to scientifically show the net benefit of Y, for it to be rational for me to choose to do Y.

What IS truth?

#46 yes.

BUT

and I'll say it again because it's a very big BUT:

You have to be very very careful about your evidence actually showing the benefit claimed of it.

Homeopathy cures colds - you take a homeopathic pill and within 7 days your cold gets better.

Evidence, obviously, that homeopathy has worked, it would, by your argument, be non-rational not to use it, surely?

Even though the cold will get better in 8 days if you do nothing, and 6 days if you have your mum's chicken soup, and 5 days if you take have this saline injection. And you won't even know you caught it if a month ago you had a vaciination that didn't seem to do anything at all ...

So once you have chosen to believe in a God, at what point can you be sure that you are believing and not just thinking you do? Do you just stand around waiting
for the good health, karma, etc... to start falling on you like summer rain? And if this doesn't happen is it because you weren't really believing or were you believing in an incorrect fashion, whatever that might mean? Or is it possible that the benefits you expected from believing are affected by a thousand other more tangible factors?

"Let me try again using a little scientific abstraction. My argument is essentially this. If I choose to do X because evidence has shown that X will accrue me a net benefit, then it should be universally recognized that I have made a rational choice. Who can disagree with that?"

Not I, for here you are talking about concrete actions based on known criteria. Your logic is impeccable.

Now, let's return to belief, shall we? Here, criteria are by definition "not known", so your belief depends not upon these supposed net benefits, but upon some set of criteria that - taken together with a certain emotional mindset or need - will lead you to believe.

And this is the major logical flaw in your whole argument. "The result of belief is net benefits, therefore the rational choice is to believe, to gain these net benefits".

Unfortunately the net benefits do not arise from the choice to believe, they arise from the act of believing itself. This act of believing is caused by other factors. It is these other factors you should be looking at (or for). Once you have isolated what they are, you can then set out to determine, "can they be chosen deliberately?"

If the answer to that is "yes, they can", then your argument holds up - it would be a rational thing to make that choice (those choices).

If the answer is "no, they can't" (as most people here think is the actual case), then there is simply no rational choice to make : you either "come to believe" or you don't, i.e. it's more of an emotional / spiritual / intuitive thing.

I agree, the argument depends on the truth of two premisses i) that it is possible to do X by choosing to do X and ii) that by doing X will accrue net benefits. Leaving aside the second premiss for now, you question whether it is possible to believe by choosing to believe. That is a very good question which leads to the other part of my argument, the "skepticism threshold" bit.

I would ask how you come to believe anything, say that the far side of the moon is not made of green cheese or that Elizabeth I was the daughter of Henry VIII. You believe these things because of various sources of evidence. These sources range through testimony of your teachers, journalism, books and other media; I doubt you have direct personal experience of either. You assess each of these sources with a varying degree of skepticism, some you trust more, others you trust less. I would say that how much you trust a particular source is a choice and also that the degree of trust depends on what you will do with the information. (If this is not true, if you have no control over what you accept or reject, then there is no point in discussing any of this. What you believe or don't believe is entirely determined by your environment and every belief is equally rational and irrational.) You might trust your sister the book critic more when she recommends a novel but less when she recommends the best method for solving an elliptic integral. You are presented with sources of information about God, you have some choice about how skeptical to be of those sources.

Where you set your skepticism threshold for each source depends on the cost of the two risks you face. The first risk is setting your threshold too low and accepting as true something that is false. You need to assess the personal impact of that loss. The second risk is setting your threshold too high and rejecting as false something that is true. Again, you need to assess the personal impact of that loss. The rational thing to do is select the skepticism threshold that minimizes your loss. If your expected loss from rejecting the evidence is higher, it would be rational to trust the sources, accept the evidence, and choose to believe. It would be irrational not to choose to believe.

Your argument would hold water for everything on earth or in the universe that can currently be detected ... but not God.

God is unprovable. So are ghosts. So are fairies. There isn't the evidence you need to assess. All you can do is to believe. Or not believe.

Whether you "choose to believe" or not, doesn't depend on any evidence. It just might, though, depend on the lack of it.

Therefore, belief in an unprovable God for which there is no scientific evidence, could best be described as irrational.

We've come full circle. And got nowhere.

Not at all. There is evidence. There is the testimony of those that believe. There are the texts. What scientific evidence have you seen for the proposition that Elizabeth I is the daughter of Henry VIII? I would guess none, yet you still believe it. You believe it because you trust the evidence that you have seen and heard, the testimony of those that told you and the texts you have read. That you trust those sources is a matter of choice. Yes, the evidence is important, but you have to choose how to assess that evidence. You choose to be more skeptical of some sorts of evidence than others, and with good reason. The case I am making is that you have a good reason not to be so skeptical of the evidence for religion. That reason is tied to the benefits of belief.

rrp, you made your original thread what seems like an eternity ago. It sounded then as if you were asking people for their opinions on this matter. But no, you had clearly already made up your mind, and despite the long hours spent on this discussion by many well-motivated people, you come around time after time after time, as if we had not said anything, with exactly the same points as you made back then.

Fine.

If you believe that one can "choose to believe" something unprovable in order to get benefits, well ok.

Fine.

I just leave you with this one final thought. If that's what think, then do it. DO IT NOW. Choose to believe. Don't waste any more time, just do it.

You are right, I did seek opinion, because it doesn't seem right to me either. The reason I come back is because the points made are unconvincing, at least I am unconvinced. I still was hoping you can point out where I have gone wrong.

If I am right, then no-one can justifiably ever claim that belief is irrational as you did in #52. We are not going around in circles, we follow the argument so far and then get short circuited by the emotional response that it must be irrational to belief because ... well, because it is. Examine the premisses, follow the steps and tell me, in a defensible way, where I go wrong.

If I am right, then no-one can justifiably ever claim that belief is irrational as you did in #52.

This, however, is somewhat equivalent to division by zero in mathematics. It leads to absurdity.

If we accept your argument, then all beliefs are rational. Whether it be believing that I'm married to a princess and begetting a new heir everyday or believing that Blachly and I are getting married (Speaking of which, have we picked out a china pattern yet, Abby?)

No, all beliefs are certainly not rational. I think you missed the bit that the belief had to have been scientifically proven to accrue benefits to the believer.

I think you missed the bit that the belief had to have been scientifically proven to accrue benefits to the believer.

Good luck with that.

I think I'll recuse myself from the discussion again.

Try this study

http://chronicle.uchicago.edu/050414/cac...

No. I'll pass.

Have fun with your bad self, brother.

"I think you missed the bit that the belief had to have been scientifically proven to accrue benefits to the believer."

LOL, you just blew your own argument RIGHT of the water !

I'm going to bed now, but in the morning I expect to find your list of sources for the scientific proof of the existence of God.

(wanders off to bed chuckling and giggling)

As you said, my skepticism level depends on the subject. On the subject of the existence of God, I'm afraid that personal testimony doesn't cut it. My understanding of the way the world works isn't going to be overturned based on someone else's feelings. And if there is physical proof that has withstood the scrutiny of scientific methods I don't know about it. As for Elizabeth I, my skepticism level is lower because her parentage doesn't violate any physical laws.

Oh I see, that can be interpreted two ways. But surely it's obvious in context. You must realize I meant "it must be scientifically proven that the belief accrues benefits to the believer."

#62

OK. You have chosen a high skepticism threshold for that testimony and are thus turning down the benefits of belief. If you are being rational, you must value something more than those benefits, but I am not sure what. Maybe you can tell us.

I think that believing something that I don't believe in will break my brain which is worst than whatever health benefits you had in mind.

I dunno why, but this whole thread reminds me of a conversation I once had while living in San Francisco. The conversation went pretty much like this -

I'd asked a friend of mine what it was that he'd liked about living in the particular neighborhood, North Beach, where we were both residing at the time.

"I really like being able to walk down the street and see everyone I know. I like the fact that on the my way to get coffee, I see twenty people that know my name and tell me how happy they are to see me. I really like the illusion of having all these friends."

"Walter," I asked, "does it bother you at all that you're talking about the illusion of having friends?"

"Oh, no," Walter said, "I figure that at least I'm smart enough to know that these people and I aren't really friends."

"Tell me, Walter," I said, "I know that you always tell me that we're friends, but is our friendship true friendship or just an illusion?"

He then got pretty upset with me. Though I'm guessing that may have been an act. Who knows?

Oddly enough, I've not heard from him once since leaving San Francisco.

Message edited by its author, Apr 24, 2009, 11:37pm.

> 63

Oh right - got ya, yes I interpreted your post the other way.

Well then, this will be easier for you - what are your sources for this scientific proof that certain beliefs convey health benefits?

(And we still return to this : "the benefits, if such exist, derive not from the choice to believe, but from the act of believing itself." Therefore your "rational" choice is irrelevant, unless the result of this choice is genuine belief. But you will have to demonstrate that someone, somewhere, who genuinely believes in God, made a "decision to believe" based on a rational choice. I've never met that person, but maybe you can find one. Good luck in your quest.)

> 66

Jesse, he has demonstrated the illusory nature of his friendship by not getting in touch with you. What happens if you demonstrate your true friendship by getting in touch with him? Does he / will he respond?

#65

If you are convinced that believing will break your brain, then you are convinced that believing will not accrue you a net benefit. The only question is then, on what rational grounds do you believe that believing will break your brain. Do you have scientific, experimental evidence that people who move to a state of belief, break their brains? Otherwise, your conviction may be irrational.

#67

The argument is

If I choose to do X because evidence has shown that X will accrue me a net benefit, then doing X is the rational choice, where X is "believe in God".

I think the logic is correct. There are however, two good objections on the table, both related to the premises.

1) It may not be possible to believe by simply choosing to believe.
2) The evidence that shows a net benefit for those who believe may be bogus.

I like the first one best. The problem however is this. If belief is not under willful control then your state of belief or non-belief is determined by something else, which can only be some other internal state such an emotion or value, or something external to you. In both cases, both belief and non-belief are irrational. So if this objection holds, to believe in God is irrational but also not to believe in God is irrational. In fact, all belief is irrational.

The second objection also deserves scrutiny. There is indeed scientific, experimental evidence which shows a correlation between belief and health (see for example http://chronicle.uchicago.edu/050414/cac....). However, one can certainly criticize any research methodology and use skepticism to undermine any scientific research. We would then be in the position of a chain of rational decision processes. First to decide, is there is net benefit of belief, second should I choose to believe. These of course, could be combined into a single compound decision where as before the rational thing to do would be minimize your risk (or some other measure). Depending on the outcome, belief could still be the rational choice.

"If belief is not under willful control then your state of belief or non-belief is determined by something else, which can only be some other internal state such an emotion or value, or something external to you"

Thank you! We've been trying to tell you this for DAYS.

"In both cases, both belief and non-belief are irrational"

That's an illogical conclusion. Emotions may be perfectly rational. And choosing to follow external stimuli is also not irrational.

Try again.

I am not sure what you mean by "emotions may be perfectly rational", but what we are talking about is belief not emotions. A belief is rational if its cause was rational deliberation. A belief is irrational if its cause was an emotionally response. If I believe I am going to win the lottery tomorrow because it makes me happy, you would think my belief irrational, even if I did subsequently win the lottery tomorrow. There has to be a causal connection between the reasons for a belief and the belief, for the belief to be rational, and the reasons for the belief have to be good reasons.

Say I hold a belief that is irrational, and on reflection I know it is irrational. If I cannot choose my beliefs, I am powerless to change my irrational belief. You could not hold me to account for holding an irrational belief, it's not my fault. You could have no expectation of me changing my mind, so presenting me with a rational argument would be useless. A rational belief which I hold through no choice is similarly nothing to be proud of. We would all recognize this and be entirely comfortable with all beliefs; they would be just like the weather.

No, any belief held involuntarily is by definition irrational. For a belief to be rational, it must be the result of a deliberative process in which the evidence is assessed and a choice is made. Rational beliefs are beliefs you choose to accept.

" A belief is rational if its cause was rational deliberation. A belief is irrational if its cause was an emotionally response"

A bit of a lazy generalisation, that. Hitler did some "rational deliberation" and published it under the title of "Mein Kampf". On the other hand, if I believe that my friend will benefit from my company when she is depressed, because we love each other and that's what friends do, then that's a rational emotional response.

"Say I hold a belief that is irrational, and on reflection I know it is irrational"

Then I would start to question that particular belief. You are making the classic mistake of equating "rational" with "thought", and "irrational" with "emotion". No. That's an argument men have used for millennia to put down women. They just don't correlate the way you are suggesting. For example, if I'm in the jungle and get a strong suspicion that a tiger is stalking me, then I will become very afraid, and probably climb a tree to escape. That's a rational emotional response. On the other hand, if I read that fatuous book The Bermuda Triangle and am impressed by the statistics on offer and I decide "it must be true", then that's an irrational deliberation.

"No, any belief held involuntarily is by definition irrational"

If you mean, for example, parents who brainwash their kids into accepting some cult or other, then that would be involuntary (for the child), and in that particular case would be irrational too. I'm not sure about the phrase "by definition" though. If you were hypnotised to stop some self-destructive life-threatening behaviour, then the belief you have as a result of the hypnosis would be involuntary but would also be rational.

In general though, "involuntary beliefs" implies that the believer had no choice in the matter, and therefore the labels "rational" and "irrational" do not apply.

I invoke Godwin's Law. Why Hitler or Gender Politics have anything to do with this baffles me.

Yes I do put rational and emotional causes in different categories. I don't think I am alone in that. You give a couple of examples of rational emotional responses, comforting a friend and climbing a tree to escape a tiger. I gather these examples are suppose to show that a belief is not irrational if its cause was an emotional response. I would call both causes of belief rational not emotional. Emotion may be the spur that causes you to comfort your friend, but your belief that your company is of benefit is a rational belief caused by reflection on the evidence (that she is your friend, that your company was of benefit in the past etc.). The emotional reaction comes first, the rational belief comes after. The same effect occurs in the jungle. You sense a tiger and fear causes you to climb a tree. You probably do this before you a consciously aware of a threat. After a while, you rationally reassess the situation, weighing the evidence. Is there a tiger or is there not? You probably factor in the two costs of the two types of error you can make. If you believe there isn't a tiger and there really is, you end up as dinner. If you believe there is a tiger and there really is not, you end up being late for dinner. Given the relative costs, you will cautiously set your skepticism threshold very low and accept as evidence of a tiger the slightest noise. (Thanks for that great example of a rational decision process.) Believing in the Bermuda Triangle is indeed irrational as it accepts an unreliable source as a good authority and fails to account for the available evidence. (What was the point there?)

As to the last part, I think you are a little hung up on the word irrational. By irrational I simply mean "not rational", so anything that isn't rational is irrational. I suppose you could use arational if you need a euphemism. I'd have no objections.

But this doesn't really move thing forward much. I stand by my assertion that if you cannot choose what you believe, then no beliefs are rational.

rrp: no beliefs are rational

For once we agree!

(OK- I know you prefaced it by "I stand by my assertion that if you cannot choose what you believe..." but it was such a good set up.)

Unfortunately, like so many things, we use the word "belief" with various connotations - including synonymous with "faith."

If we use Merriam-Webster's definition #3:
3: "conviction of the truth of some statement or the reality of some being or phenomenon especially when based on examination of evidence"

Then we can probably conclude that some beliefs - for instance a "belief" in gravity, I believe that gravity will still be in effect tomorrow and therefore it is not necessary to tie myself to the bed so as not to bump my head on the ceiling in the morning - are choosable and therefore potentially rational.

If we prefer the Compact Oxford's English Dictionary definition #1:
1. "a feeling that something exists or is true, especially one without proof" (which is how I think that most people here seem to be using it) then things run trickier.

I can conceive that I can "choose" to believe something that I can evaluate the evidence for or against (gravity, evolution, etc - scientific concepts in general).

I have no idea how people come to "believe" things where there is no (or no credible) evidence. THAT seems "irrational" to me. If I don't know about something - either through personal experience or through research - how could I possibly "believe" it?

Apparently it is possible...

In another thread (in Happy Heathens I think) - there was essentially a nature vs. nuture discussion of "faith" - as with most things there may be some component of each.

Perhaps some people CAN "choose" belief (of the "faith" variety) - and others of us find this unfathomable (and irrational *grin*).

"But this doesn't really move thing forward much"

Philosophy depends absolutely upon definitions. If the terms and definitions are weak (or inadequate), then progress is impossible as the participants spend the entire time arguing about what turn out to be "definitions". A problem must be stated in unequivocal terms, and its logic must contain no flaws. Unfortunately, all that has happened in this thread (and the previous one) is indeed, a discussion about definitions. And so, we can never move forward.

So, (and if I excuse your patronising me, I'm sure you will forgive me for doing the same to you), let us examine your proposition, element by element, and see what needs further refining or expansion. Let's start with your most recently refined form of the proposition :

If I choose to do X because evidence has shown that X will accrue me a net benefit, then doing X is the rational choice, where X is "believe in God"

Taking the core element here "belief in God", there are two terms here that require further refinement.

1. "Belief". This term is crucial to the whole discussion and is the single most important, to be clearly defined. Portia gave two useful dictionary definitions above, but also threw the word "faith" into the mix. Faith and belief are two commonly misunderstood - and thus often interchanged words - and we need to be clear here about which you mean in your proposition. My own distinction is that faith exists at a deeper, non-cognitive level than does belief, and is very much bound up with the emotions. Because it is not cognitive, it is not reinforced by thought, but has "to be worked at" as mystics say. Hence the regular attendance at church each week by "the faithful" to recharge their faith batteries.
Is your proposition talking about "faith" or "belief"? (Remember : as the existence of God is unproveable, then faith would actually be the more appropriate word to use here. However that takes it further away from the premises of your proposition, as 'cognitive choice' becomes far less relevant to faith).

2. "God". You spell the word with an upper case G. Is this to distinguish from 'gods'? What do you understand by 'gods'? What do you understand by (uppercase G) God? Is your use of G instead of g important to your original proposition? Are you in fact saying "I am referring to the Christian God and therefore spell it thus"? How, then, would you amend your proposition to include, for example, Allah, YHWH, Brahman, and The Tao? Or do you exclude these others from your proposition? If you do, then why? Have you already adopted a belief/faith position of your own that you exclude them?
Or, do you use the word "God" as a kind of linguistic and semantic shorthand to include all these others too? If so, then you have left it to us to make that assumption, when it was not originally stated.
If you do NOT include all the "others", then again I would ask why? Do you assert that your proposition does not apply to believers of other faiths who also have their gods? In which case, your proposition needs a large sub-clause, stating that it (irrationally) only applies to the Christian God.

3. "Choose". This word has already been argued extensively. Clearly - from your statements to date - you are using this word in a cognitive sense, not "emotional choice" or "instinctive, gut-reaction choice". Very well. Then the wisdom or otherwise of this word relies absolutely on 1. above. If you meant "belief" rather than the arguably more appropriate term "faith", then indeed "cognitive choice" is the right term to discuss.
Then let's discuss it: "I believe in gravity". I believed it before it was ever taught to me, from my experience as a small child, of dropping things and seeing them fall. The phenomenon which I now know as gravity, has always existed in my experience. I do not understand the complex physics of relativity, but that doesn't mean I don't understand what happens when objects of different densities fall at various points on this planet's surface. I have seen it, I can predict with 99.999999% confidence what will happen on each occasion I test it. This isn't belief. It's knowledge. I don't need to understand the theoretical physics to know what gravity is.
"I believe in William Shakespeare". This is reasonable : we have the published Folio, monuments in churches in Stratford-on-Avon, contemporary eye-witness accounts, and I have seen many productions of the plays. This knowledge is different from gravity, subtly. It is a corpus of evidence and I would be going against a whole world of academics, historians, literary experts, archaeologists, genealogists and the like, to not believe in Shakespeare.
"I believe in Woodstock". This is dodgier ground. What is / was "Woodstock"? It was a large rock festival held in NYS in summer 1969 - this is unarguable as there is huge evidence, including film and thousands of eye-witness accounts from attenders and performers and organisers and support personnel. But, it is also a myth. The "Spirit of Woodstock" has been summoned up many times to encapsulate the hippie ideals - a vibe of peace and love, also applied to other projects. How did this myth arise? Initial interviews with attenders leaving the festival site spoke of it as a "disaster" : failure of food and water supplies, sanitation, endless rain, long delays, no toilets, even deaths (more people died at Woodstock than at Altamont, though non-violently). Yet shortly afterwards Joni Mitchell - who wasn't there - wrote her song "Woodstock" (we are stardust, we are golden, and we've got to get ourselves back to the garden), it was widely covered, everyone began to speak of Woodstock in quasi-mystical awe, and a myth was born.
How did we "choose" to believe this modern myth? Did we in fact choose, or did we simply read countless apparently authoritative articles that reinforced it, and - not being there ourselves - found no rational basis to disbelieve?

4. "evidence" - what evidence? You need to quote your sources so we can assess this independently.

5. "Net benefits" - what do you mean by "net"? Is there a "gross benefit" which is reduced by some factor or other not defined? Or do you mean that there is a "cost" to belief which has to be offset against benefits? "Benefit". What do you understand by benefit? What precise benefits? Are they quantifiable? If so, it would be useful if you would please quantify and define them.

Once these terms and definitions have been clarified to provide everyone with a broadly similar understanding of precisely what this proposition is, then, and only then can we start talking about what is "rational". (If you doubt this, then may I recommend Wittgenstein as a useful source as to why it is so important?)

#66, 68

Tid, you missed the point of Jesse's story: If we believe in things because they make us feel better, and 'accrue scientifically proven health benefits', according to rrp, but deep down know that they are based on an illusion, we are just phonies and are fooling ourselves (just like Jesse's 'friend'). It really is a bit pathetic to do that.

In the end, we have to be true to what we really belief on the evidence that presents itself to us and make sense in the context of our whole Weltanschauung. It is NOT rational to belief in something just because it accrues some kind of benefit, when we know that we are probably just fooling ourselves. I don't think it makes us feel better either. Religion may make some people feel better, exactly because they really belief this stuff in the first place!.

rrp is putting the cart in front of the horse.

Another point (to rrp): All these studies about religion being good for your health are a) highly questionable (see below), b) based necessarily on statistics.

b) first: Being based on statistics, this does not mean that as an individual I accrue any benefit from believing stuff that makes no sense to me, just because some university study shows that religious people are on average 1.2% happier or something. Myself, I am extremely happy with my questioning agnosticism. It makes life a great adventure for me. Accepting some bronze age middle eastern text to run my life or tell me how the world works, when there is a whole universe of exquisite mystery out there, would make me feel extremely miserable.

a) What exactly makes people feel better when they have religion: I wager that community has a lot to do with it, a circle of friends, kindred spirits, that kind of thing. But you don't need religion for that.

> 77 - I didn't miss the point of Jesse's story, but it did touch my heart and I was simply 'detouring' briefly to ask if she had applied the principles of true friendship to this strange character, and if so I genuinely want to know what happenend !

But I don't want to drag the discussion too far away from #76 as it took me the best part of two tiring hours to formulate, and I want rrp to read it in its entirety lol.

5. "Net benefits" - what do you mean by "net"? Is there a "gross benefit" which is reduced by some factor or other not defined?

The government taxes your gross belief benefits, of course. Just as they tax everything else. ;D

Stolen from another thread:
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/...

Quote from this article:
"It doesn't matter so much what a person believes in," she says, "but how consistent and cohesive their worldview is."

The point is that being happy with yourself comes from being true to yourself. Some people do this with religion, some without.

"One of the most powerful critics of the new science of religion is Columbia University psychiatrist Richard Sloan, who surveyed hundreds of published studies on the benefits of religion and found many of them rife with methodological sloppiness. In his 2006 book, "Blind Faith: The Unholy Alliance of Religion and Medicine," he argued that researchers, who were often personally religious, appeared to be seeing what they wanted to see, not what the evidence showed."

#76

Brilliant! If I didn't agree with most of what you said, I would suspect another smoke screen. Are you sure we shouldn't start with what does "mean" mean? I absolutely agree that we must have a mutual understanding of the language terms we use to have a meaningful exchange of ideas. But I thought, maybe naively, that refining our understanding of terms like "rational" and "belief" was what we were doing.

But to take your last point.

"Once these terms and definitions have been clarified to provide everyone with a broadly similar understanding of precisely what this proposition is, then, and only then can we start talking about what is "rational"."

I would then assume that you no longer stand by your assertion(#52) "Therefore, belief in an unprovable God for which there is no scientific evidence, could best be described as irrational" as you admit to not sharing the same understanding of what "God", "evidence" and "irrational" mean.

#77

I enjoyed that article, thanks.

I think I pointed out in #70 the possible objection that "The evidence that shows a net benefit for those who believe may be bogus" and gave an answer to that objection. The answer is that you have to apply a compound decision, first as to whether the evidence is good and then whether to believe. It would still be rational to accept as true that compound proposition. The first part is perhaps easier than the second as it is purely a scientific question, but as we are unlikely to be able to do the research ourselves, we have to decide on the degree of trust we will ascribe (applying our skepticism threshold) to the various testimonies and reports of evidence. As far as I can tell, one of the results in the article would lead one to the conclusion that it is at least as rational (in terms of health benefits) to be a "most pious Christian" as a "convinced atheist".

Message edited by its author, Apr 27, 2009, 1:35pm.

"I thought, maybe naively, that refining our understanding of terms like "rational" and "belief" was what we were doing"

Unfortunately not - we were all arguing from our own corner instead of defining our terms, which is now where I want to move to. And we haven't even started on "rational" yet ...

"I would suspect another smoke screen"

I would be obliged if you would keep personalities out of this. And I'm not aware that I've used any smoke screens; on the other hand if you have evidence for this, please bring it forward, and let us pick over the semantic minutiae in what I've said.

"... assume that you no longer stand by your assertion(#52) "Therefore, belief in an unprovable God for which there is no scientific evidence, could best be described as irrational" "

No, that was "Devil's Advocate", I thought you saw that? I was simply using your own arguments back at you, trying to highlight a logical flaw. Obviously I didn't succeed.

Will you now define your terms, and bring forward the evidence you alluded to (I'm not saying the evidence is wrong, I'm just waiting to see it)?

In particular, I'm fascinated to see your response to point 2. above, i.e. an elaboration of the term "God" in your modified proposition?

From what I've understood of his arguments, he first wanted to make the argument that *if* the evidence supports the conjecture that belief in God is good for you, then all the rest of it. But most of us really didn't want to play that game.

Then he changed it to this sliding scale of skepticism thing. In either case, I don't really think rrp wants to debate the merits of the evidence.

#83 Tid,

In #50 you agreed with this statement,

"If I choose to do X because evidence has shown that X will accrue me a net benefit, then it should be universally recognized that I have made a rational choice."

I am not sure if you are now not sure about the meaning here. Do you understand the meaning and do you still agree? If you are and do, that would be good because we could leave "choose", "evidence" and "rational" behind and move on the the core puzzle about belief.

#84

The "skepticism thing" is the core of my argument (and William James's). If you didn't get that bit, you didn't understand the argument.

"In #50 you agreed with this statement,

"If I choose to do X because evidence has shown that X will accrue me a net benefit, then it should be universally recognized that I have made a rational choice."

rrp, don't twist! I agreed with that statement on the basis that X was something concrete and provable and corroborated by evidence, not with your proposition about "belief", which will be evident if you go back and read it again.

But now, further on from there, I'm tired of arguing and I have seen that the argument is because of uncertainty about terms and definitions. So, now I want to end that uncertainty.

I don't want to talk about the definition of "rational" until we've got the other terms straight. "Choose" I think we understand, (except in relation to whether beliefs can be "chosen"), but what's more important is whether you mean "belief" or "faith".

"Evidence" is not a term we need to define, all we need is for you to present the source for the "evidence" you refer to in your proposition.

The crucial terms (to me anyway) are "belief / faith" and "God". Then we can move on to "choice", then on to "rational / irrational".

"If I choose to do X because evidence has shown that X will accrue me a net benefit, then it should be universally recognized that I have made a rational choice."

So I think you are saying that the truth of this statement depends on what X is. Is that right? Because I would argue that it doesn't matter what X is, if X accrues me a benefit, then I should do it, whatever X is.

"So I think you are saying that the truth of this statement depends on what X is."

Not "what" in a quantifiable sense, but "what" in a qualitative sense. If X is a provably evident belief, then it is rational. However, if X is more akin to "faith" (i.e. to do with "God"), then (1) I want to see what the "evidence of net benefit" is, you still haven't said, and (2) the whole question of "choice" is once again open to question.

For some reason, you won't define your terms about "God", "belief" and "faith", and you won't cite the "evidence of benefit". This is the Sophists' game : answer a question with a question, rather than answer. Why won't you answer?

-87 Absolutely. Rape accrues the rapist a net benefit it some terms (dominance, revenge, offspring, what have you) especially if they don't get caught. That doesn't make rape a rational choice, and even if you would argue that rape can be a rational choice in some instances (a way for low status males to pass on genetic material, for example), it doesn't make rape a good idea.

It is just as rational, in a coldly analytical sense of the word, to cheat, lie, and murder in certain situations. However most people also use a common understanding of human decency to factor rationality. That understanding of human decency varies between people, so that one person might think it perfectly rational to torture suspected criminals while others think it the height of irrationality.

For that reason there is no simple, mathematical mode of calculating "net benefit" in a way that satisfies everyone. Are you only counting benefit to yourself? What about harm or benefit to society, to ideals, to the planet?

I think it is clear the most people believe that they act in a rational manner, so both religious and irreligious people will reason that their beliefs are rational. Rationality is not therefore particularly helpful in distinguishing between them.

If I choose to rape because evidence has shown that to rape will accrue me a net benefit, then it should be universally recognized that I have made a rational choice.

How can that not be true? It is a separate question whether there is good evidence, and it is a separate question whether there is a net benefit, but I cannot see that the syllogism is wrong.

Robert

#88

I know you are anxious to get to the meat of "belief", but all I am trying to do is, as you asked, make sure we understand the various words in that statement (which doesn't contain belief). We should deal with "belief" when we have all the other terms squared away.

"If I choose to do X because evidence has shown that X will accrue me a net benefit, then it should be universally recognized that I have made a rational choice."

So you do not think this statement applies for all X. I think we should certainly add the qualifier (which is almost taken as given) that X is something which is possible both to do and to choose to do. If we add that qualifier, do you agree that the statement is true?

#89

I think you have a very good point. That something is a rational choice does not mean that you should take that choice. There is always a moral dimension to our actions that does and should affect our choices.

There are two ways, I think, of answering your objection. The cleanest is to separate the dimensions of rationality and morality. It may be rational for a psychopath to choose to murder, but it would certainly be immoral. The second, more interesting way, is to wrap morality into "net benefit". It would certainly be credible to say that it was to your benefit to act in accordance with your moral values. Choosing to do something immoral would then not bring you a net benefit and so would be irrational.

Unfortunately, as rdurick points out, both solutions leave us with the very unpleasant truth that it might be a rational choice for a rapist to choose to rape. If there is a better way of defining "rational" we should probably adopt it.

Message edited by its author, Apr 27, 2009, 8:08pm.

Then he changed it to this sliding scale of skepticism thing. In either case, I don't really think rrp wants to debate the merits of the evidence.

Of course he doesn't... He's already argued that it's completely rational to disregard truth.

If choices people make are based on perceived benefits(something they want) which they are aware of before choosing and a rational choice accrues us a "net benefit" how is it that anyone can possibly make an irrational choice? Why would anyone deliberately choose the opposite of what one wants? It seems to me a choice can be judged irrational only in terms of a change in perceived benefits after the choice is already made. In this case every choice is rational at the time its made.

See #45 and #56...

The idea of scientific proof is also something of a canard in the discussion, as rrp has declared the "actual truth" to be otiose to rational belief. As such, there's absolutely no need to prove that belief leads to happiness in actuality. The belief that belief leads to happiness is self-reifying and the proof unnecessary according to rrp's argument.

Jesse, he has demonstrated the illusory nature of his friendship by not getting in touch with you. What happens if you demonstrate your true friendship by getting in touch with him? Does he / will he respond?

Of course he will. I doubt it will lead to "true friendship" though. I've kind of been there/done that with the imaginary friend thing. I got over it.

Who need imaginary friends when I've got Abby Blachly? Sweet, sweet Blachly.

Message edited by its author, Apr 27, 2009, 11:39pm.

"I know you are anxious to get to the meat of "belief", but all I am trying to do is, as you asked, make sure we understand the various words in that statement (which doesn't contain belief). We should deal with "belief" when we have all the other terms squared away"

You are totally absolutely and irrevocably (it seems) stuck in some stubborn mental paradigm where you are able to read and understand what people have said, but then you simply ignore it in order to return to your circular argument out of which you are apparently unable to step, repeating it over and over like the crows of sunset cawing to their nests. And stupid stupid stupid me, who should have stopped banging my head against your brick wall long ago and left this utterly pointless discussion.

I have already said many times that "belief" cannot be shuffled out of the argument "until we have all the other terms squared away". "do X" cannot equal just anything in the universe you care to name and still be made the object of the proposition. What X is, is one of the most important parts of this thread, because we all know now, it stands for "belief". And belief cannot be put into an equation of logic as if it were the same thing as a loaf of bread or a red T shirt or dogs with three legs.

Belief is not something you do. It's not an action. How many people can remember doing something, following which, they believed something they didn't believe before? This is where you have it wrong, have had it wrong right from the get go. And if you do not agree with this, if you persist in maintaining that belief is an action, then there is no more discussion between us, we will never agree, and there is no further point to this. I'm now very very tired, and I am doing what I should have done days ago - I'm leaving this discussion. If you see me back here, you have my permission to shoot me in the head.

I would have liked to know if you meant "belief" or "faith" (you didn't answer my question). I would have liked to know what you meant by "evidence" (you didn't answer my question). I would have liked to know what you meant by God (you didn't answer my question). I would have liked to know if you are actually a believer in some kind of god. I would have liked to know if you are a Christian of some kind. I would have like to know if you are an agnostic. I would have liked to know if you an atheist. I would have liked to know why and from what personally held belief (or not) you started this whole discussion. I would have liked to know something - even a little - about your own personal views. But you have told us nothing about yourself, and I now realise, you never will. You are hidden behind a wall of words, obfuscation, sophistry, revealing nothing. This is just an empty, dry, cognitive exercise to you, meaningless now to me, and I've had enough.

Goodbye, and shoot me dead if I appear in here again. (I will not see your or anyone else's responses to what I've just said, sorry about that).

#95

Well that's a shame. There was some good stuff there.

It can be very frustrating getting to the point where "terms and definitions have been clarified to provide everyone with a broadly similar understanding of precisely what this proposition is" (#76).

I don't think you read and understand what I said in 91 (something you accused me of). It is indeed central to the argument what X is, or rather what properties X must have for the statement to be true. It is central to the meaning of the word "rational" when applied to an action. You say belief is not something you do. I said the statement didn't apply if X was not something you can do. Why not just take that option? When could then go back to discuss whether belief is or is not something you do.

#92

"rrp has declared the "actual truth" to be otiose to rational belief"

The whole point here is to discover what "rational" means. Specifically, is it correct to make such statements as "belief is irrational". We can use "rational" arguments to show that it is "rational" to believe things even if they are not the "actual truth". This shows that you have to be very, very careful when you use to words like "irrational" and "belief" together. You can never be sure of your ground, so caution is the best option. It could well be that "belief" is "rational" and that "unbelief" is "rational", or maybe it's the other way around. Until we all understand what "rational" and "belief" mean, we will never know.

Message edited by its author, Apr 28, 2009, 8:20am.

Until we all understand what "rational" and "belief" mean, we will never know.

We have, however, decided that the truth has no place in the conversation, except as a possible counterpoint to your belief.

The truth is central to any conversation. No conversation is possible with a tacit understanding of the truth. But the truth can be a little tricky, especially when tied to the concept of belief.

It is true that Rafael Nadal is currently ranked higher than Roger Federer in men's tennis, thus arguably the "truth" is that Nadal is the better tennis player. If Federer is about to play Nadal in a final, would it be "rational" for Federer's coach to encourage him to believe that he is the better tennis player? Would it be "rational" for Federer to believe that he is better than Nadal during the game?

It is true that Rafael Nadal is currently ranked higher than Roger Federer in men's tennis, thus arguably the "truth" is that Nadal is the better tennis player.

Uh, no. Arguably, the truth is that that Nadal is currently ranked higher than Federer.

If your criterion for whether or not it's rational to believe you can beat someone is whether or not you "believe" you're a better player than them, I'd love to play some Hold 'Em with you at some point.

What does it mean to be a better tennis player other than being ranked higher? What other criteria would you use to determine who is better?

Why would I need to decide that at all?

And why would you believe it to be "irrational" to play a better player regardless? The race doesn't always go to the strongest.

I'm sure, however, if you just have enough faith, you'll make your three cards to a flush to beat my set on the flop. Just believe, rrp.

I didn't say it was "irrational" to play a better player, I asked was it "rational" for Federer to believe that he is the better player. Do you think he has a better chance of winning if he believes he is a better player? I am less familiar with the psychology of poker, but in tennis skill certainly plays a huge part, but the state-of-mind of the player does too.

"I am a better player" and "I can win this match" are not equivalent statements.

May I just say, rrp, that for someone that's not advocating belief, you sure spend a lot of time advocating belief.

Of course they aren't. That wasn't the question. The question was -- if Federer believes he is the better player, does he improve his chances of winning?

And you've asserted that it does, thereby begging the question.

It's obvious Federer doesn't believe he's the better player, because he cries when he loses and then loses again.

Perhaps if he could convince himself to believe in his superiority despite the obvious evidence to the contrary he might win. Is that what you're saying?

Personally, if I were Roger, I'd work on my backhand.

*Jesse, I owe you a beer.*

98> rrp, although I would hope that truth is central to any conversation, I thought that the preservation of truth values was central to this one. The important truths here are about how truth values are preserved or not.

Am I wrong?

Robert

And I'd like to ask a question of you, rrp, that was actually posed to me in a private message... Why is so important to you to "rationalise" belief?

#108 "Perhaps if he could convince himself to believe in his superiority despite the obvious evidence to the contrary he might win. Is that what you're saying?"

Yes. I'd go further and say that the truth of that proposition, applied to all tennis players in general, can be experimental tested. In fact, that experiment has probably already been done in other areas of human performance.

#109

I am sorry, I didn't understand your point about preserving truth values. Please elaborate.

#110

I believe in reason. I'd like to persuade myself that that belief is rational.

#111 How do you measure "belief?"

With a Belief-O-Matic or something similar (but more rigorous). You do whatever it is psychologists do when they design experiments like this.

And because they have a Ph.D. or something scientific sounding after their names, you "believe" everything they say. You don't ask yourself what's in the black "Belief-O-Matic" box? Is that what you mean by "believing in reason" because it sure doesn't sound reasonable to me.

Either you really don't understand how the scientific method works or you're just f*cking with us. I'm pretty sure it's the latter.

I do indeed understand how science works. The scientific method, however, is hard to pin down and no one knows precisely what it is so I can't claim to precisely understand it. The metric I would use would be the standard one, does the research pass the standards of the relevant science. In this case that would be psychology. If there is relevant research at the psychology department of a reputable university or similar institute, preferably repeated at another institution, that would be good enough for me. If you don't accept that, most other results of science would be questionable.

Even then, I would never "believe everything they say". Like all such evidence, it would have to pass through my skepticism filter. I am more likely to accept a research result from MIT than Bob's Friendly University of the Occult.

The Belief-O-Matic is, of course, a joke.

So to go back to my question, which has neatly been sidetracked.

If a tennis player believes he is the better player, does he improve his chances of winning? This seems entirely plausible to me. It is, with the right experimental design, rigorously testable. I suspect that something similar has already been tested and confirmed. So who could object?

Again, you're begging the question with your "experiment"... It's just as plausible that belief follows the ability to win rather than otherwise.

I believe in reason. I'd like to persuade myself that that belief is rational.

Obviously you're trying to persuade yourself that belief is rational, which sort of gives the lie to your assertion that you're doing anything other than propagating belief.

#116

Jesse, you again avoid the issue. Is the proposition plausible and experimentally testable, or not?

Of course there is a causal connection between ability to win and belief in the ability. The question is -- is it plausible there is a causal connection the other way.

Your "Begging the Question" is irrelevant.

I didn't understand your point in #117 at all. Please resend.

For evidence, a very quick bout of googling turned up this book on Performance Under Stress that seems to be possibly relevant. This paper also might be relevant. Both a refer to "optimism" not "belief in ability", but I can see a path between the two.

Message edited by its author, May 1, 2009, 4:58pm.

Jesse, you again avoid the issue. Is the proposition plausible and experimentally testable, or not?

I'm not avoiding the issue. I'm arguing with the validity of your experiment.

I didn't understand your point in #117 at all. Please resend.

Can we please drop the absurd pretense that you're doing anything other than arguing in favor of belief?

"I'm arguing with the validity of your experiment."

Are you arguing that any experiment that demonstrates that "a tennis player who believes he is the better player improves his chances of winning" cannot be valid? Please make the case.

"Can we please drop the absurd pretense that you're doing anything other than arguing in favor of belief?"

Sure, I can absolutely say that I am arguing in favor of belief in reason and in anything that is rational.

111 re 109> I was thinking in terms of propositional logic wherein there can be, among other things, true propositions regarding false propositions. Validity of an argument depends on preservation of truth value rather than on truth. In material implication, for example, pTrue implies qFalse is false.

Robert

If you mean like --

The statement "If A then B" is true if A is false.

-- then no. I truly am interested in the validity of the argument I posed. I want to find out if both A and B are true and that there is a valid inference from one to the other.

Rrp, if I wished to speak to someone who felt that what was "actually true" were not important, I'd call my ex-girlfriend.

Believe whatever you want to believe, pookie.

Just don't let the truth interfere.

Stay gold, rrp, stay gold.

I think you are missing a point here. What is "actually true" in these instances is not certain. In the case of the tennis, one could argue that the "best" player is the one who wins the next series of games, not the one who won the last series. So, despite the evidence to the contrary, it is just possible that Federer is the best player. And as it is to his advantage to believe it, believing it is the rational thing for him to do.

In the original case, belief in God, what is "actually true" is also not certain. It is possible that God exists. There is evidence that God exists. You may be as skeptical of that evidence as you are of the evidence that Federer is the better tennis player. However, it is to your advantage to believe God exists. Therefore it is rational to accept the evidence and believe that God exists, just like it is rational for Federer to believe he is the better tennis player. (Note: Before you jump on the point again, I did not say that you should believe God exists, just that it would be rational for you to do so, if you so choose.)

However, it is to your advantage to believe God exists.

I'm sure it is, Pookie.

Tim, have you modified the TOS for that troll thing yet?

therefore it is rational to accept the evidence

?

It's rather stunning how often your own language undercuts your own points.

#126 -- #59
#127 -- #1

Message edited by its author, May 2, 2009, 5:27pm.

Ok, let's see if we can organize the argument here. As usual, it is not at all clear what we are arguing about.

Facts versus beliefs: That Nadal currently outranks Federer in the men's tennis rankings is a statement of fact. We may believe the fact, but I think we are here discussing "beliefs" in a narrower sense, meaning conclusions not derived from collections of empirical facts. (Of course, one can have all sorts of epistemological concerns about how one can validly derive conclusions from collections of empirical facts, but we all do anyway.)

Belief in the Christian God (CG) is, I think, belief in this narrower sense -- belief derives from a leap of faith rather than a conclusion from factual evidence.

Now suppose we have the following fact. (This is just a supposition. I don't think this is a demonstrated fact.) Suppose that we find that believers in CG have consistently better health than those who do not believe in the CG.

We could then construct two (2) arguments for belief in CG.

Argument 1: The better health derives from the direct action of CG in improving the health of believers, and therefore is factual evidence in support of the belief. This is an interesting argument, and might lead to all sorts of empirical experiments to see just how CG affects health. Is the effect stronger for Protestants, Catholics, Orthodox, or Mormons? What are the specific differences in human tissue that result in the health effect? Does it work the same in strong magnetic fields? However, I do not think this is the argument RRP is making. I think, he (she?) is making an argument having NOTHING to do with the truth value of the statement that CG exists.

Argument 2: It is practical to believe in CG because believers have better health. I think this is the argument that RRP is making.

We can call the choice to believe "practical" but I think it is a real abuse of the term "rational". I think we should reserve the term "rational" for the process of resolving truth statements via reason. Admittedly, people use the word "rational" to describe all sorts of pragmatic behaviors, but, I think that's bad for our discussion, because it robs us of a word to associate with deriving truth based on reason.

Having defined belief and rationality in the ways described above, we see that belief is inherently irrational. You have to make a leap of faith to believe. I do think that people make leaps of faith for practical reasons all the time. People believe what the want to believe to help them get through life.

BTW, it is not clear that the health justification, even if it were demonstrated to be true, is sufficient to show that belief in CG is practical. You have to weigh the downsides, which are quite significant.

My own preference is to believe things that aren't contradicted by factual evidence. The belief that the Bible is literally true and inerrant is contradicted by all sorts of factual evidence, of course, including internal contradictions in the Bible. However, for some people, belief in the inerrancy of the Bible is extremely practical, because it allows them to banish doubt about what they should believe, and for them doubt is very troublesome.

However, I do believe things for which I have no empirical evidence whatsoever, basically for practical reasons. I believe that my life has meaning, or can have if I work at it hard enough. I believe that I should care about other people worldwide. I believe that most reported scientific facts are honest representations of what reliable people observe, i.e. that there is not a concerted conspiracy to report lies. (I really don't have the means to independently verify most claims of scientific fact these days. For example, it is beyond my ability to do a radioisotope dating of the age of the earth.)

I think it is true that having beliefs gives one better health, despite the effort required to make the leap of faith, because anomie is bad for your personal morale. I think we could demonstrate this empirically.

Message edited by its author, May 3, 2009, 12:22am.

#127 -- #1

Which, in and of itself, completely underscores your method of argument. Assume your position and refer back to itself to justify itself. Hello, circular reasoning.

By your own statement, you are trying to rationalise a belief in things that aren't actually true if you stand to gain from the belief. That's not belief. It's merely self-serving dishonesty (Who cares about the truth? What do I get?). And it runs throughout your posts.

I'm done with the discussion.

Message edited by its author, May 3, 2009, 4:27pm.

#130

Jesse, it is clear you gave up on the discussion a while back. Your last few posts have not added anything substantial, you haven't attempted to refute any of my points or make any counter arguments, you have simply made weak attempts at ridicule.

It is clear to me that you haven't read what I wrote, you are simply experiencing an emotional reaction to something you think I wrote. In #126 you accuse me of being a Troll for suggesting "However, it is to your advantage to believe God exists." That suggestion is entirely appropriate for a forum on "Pro and Con (Relgion)". In fact, there is evidence to support it as I have pointed out several times (in #59 for example). You have chosen to ignore those pointers. In #127 you accuse me of undercutting my own argument because I said "it is rational to accept the evidence" when accepting evidence was the core of my argument as laid out in the original post. If you had any substantial response to my arguments, you would use it. You don't, so all you have left is weak taunts and ridicule.

#129
#129

Well there is a little there I can agree with, but most of it shows you aren't following the argument.

You would like to restrict the word rational to "the process of resolving truth statements via reason". That won't do. We all use the word rational for actions too. You would like to use practical instead of rational for actions. I certainly approve of practical things but rational means something different, it means supported by reason. So, to be clear, we may indeed be arguing about what "rational" means.

There are rational actions but not all actions are rational. Involuntary or emotional reactions are not rational. To be rational, an action must be willful, it must be intended, it must be the result of a choice to act. The choice is the key. Choices are either rational or irrational. A rational choice is one that takes into account all the available and relevant information. But a rational choice has to have another aspect, it has to have a goal. A choice is rational not only if it takes into account all the available and relevant information but also because it maximizes the expected benefit against the goal. My choice is not rational if, after careful examination and consideration, I choose the best banana when what I wanted was an apple.

A very important consequence of a choice is that it is subsequently tested against reality. It matters whether I choose correctly or incorrectly. My aim is always to choose correctly, and to do that I apply the best tool I have which is reason. The future is always uncertain to some degree, and so there is never a guarantee that the rational choice will turn out to be the correct choice. However, if I do take into account both my goals and all the evidence, then I have an expectation that the rational choice has the best chance of being the correct choice.

Now, your "process of resolving truth statements" is a process that involves choices and those choices can be either rational or irrational. The most common consequence of these choices is that they will be held to account by a later encounter with reality when they will be labeled as either correct or incorrect. The goal of our choice is then correspondence to reality. A rational choice is a choice that both takes into account all the available and relevant information and that goal. The result of our choice is a belief. If the choice was rational, the belief is rational.

Beliefs are never "conclusions not derived from collections of empirical facts". All beliefs are the result of a decision in a "process of resolving truth statements". There are always reasons for a belief; no one ever believes something for no reason at all (except perhaps in the case of mental illness, but then the illness is the reason.) There are always degrees of belief. Some beliefs are held with a high degree of certainty. We call that knowing. Some beliefs are held with less certainty.

All beliefs are held with a "leap of faith". Even when we think we know a fact, we went through a "process of resolving truth statements" and made a choice to accept the fact as true. Take for example the fact the Nadal currently outranks Federer in the men's tennis rankings. How do you know that? Did you look it up on-line for example? That would require you to trust the source of information, which might be wrong. You assessed the available and relevant information and made a rational choice. I am sure you didn't interview either Nadal or Federer or anyone who was at all their games to compile all the scores to check that the rankings are correct. There was a limit to the efforts you went to to collect the evidence. At some point you took "a leap of faith" and decided to accept the evidence. Everything you know is due to such "leaps of faith".

How big a "leap of faith" you need to make in any situation depends on the quality of the evidence. Only a small leap of faith is required when the evidence is strong. When the evidence is weaker, a larger leap of faith is required. How large a leap of faith you are prepared to take in any given situation depends entirely on your goals and on how your choice will be tested against reality. This is the most important point I am trying to make.

The key concept here is the consequences of making an error in your choice. There are two types of error you can make. In the first you choose an action when the correct choice was not to take that action. The second error is to choose not to take an action when the correct choice was to take the action. In terms of choosing to believe, the first error is accepting something as true when it is false, the second is rejecting something as false when it is true. Both types of errors have consequences. What size of leap of faith you are prepared to take depends on the relative cost of those consequences. If you are in the jungle and think you hear a tiger and have to choose whether there is really a tiger, the cost of the first error is that you are late for dinner, the cost of the second is that you are dinner. In such circumstances, you should be prepared to take a large leap of faith; you should accept even weak evidence that there is a tiger. If you a research scientist deciding whether your results are valid, you should be prepared to take only a very small leap of faith; you should accept only the strongest evidence. The science of decision theory tells us that there is a rational way of choosing where to set our threshold, we should minimize the expected consequences of making an error.

Framing the "process of resolving truth statements" as a process of rational choice does not "rob us of a word to associate with deriving truth based on reason". It makes that process more rational, it highlights what we mean by rational.

Finally, back to the original proposition. I have deliberately avoided making explicit which God is under consideration for belief (to the irritation of some, sorry Tid) because the rational thing to do is to consider them all. We should indeed try to find out if the health effect is stronger for "Protestants, Catholics, Orthodox, or Mormons" and "What are the specific differences in human tissue that result in the health effect". We should subject this choice to rational scientific inquiry to improve the chances that we minimize our risk. We should make a rational choice.

The argument is that when deciding whether to believe in God, we should adopt a rational approach and pick a leap-of-faith threshold that minimizes the expected consequences of making an error. If we make the first type of error we accept the evidence for God, but there really is no God. In what way will our choice be tested by reality and what will be the consequences? You must decide. If we make the second type of error, we reject the evidence for God, but there really is a God. In what way will our choice be tested by reality and what will be the consequences? Again you must decide. I have pointed out that at least one consequence of the second type of error is that you will miss out on some health benefits. The rational thing to do is to assess the consequences of the errors and set your threshold appropriately. I am asserting that it is rational to take a large leap of faith because that minimizes the expected consequences of making an error. It is irrational not to believe in God.

rrp, how is your idea anything other than Pascal's Wager? It's hardly anything new, and hardly "rational." It's just a guess.

Troll.

And yes, rrp. I gave on the discussion at the point where you stated that you don't care what's actually true.

Go figure.

I gave on the discussion at the point where you stated that you don't care what's actually true.

Well, perhaps those of us who are willing to accept such a position as, perhaps not correct, but a legitimate philosophical stance, can now continue the discussion in peace.

#133

It has more of the flavor of William James's Will to Believe than Pascal's Wager. And why is it hardly rational?

132
"A very important consequence of a choice is that it is subsequently tested against reality"
How does this apply to either statement, "I choose to believe in God" or "I choose not to believe in God."? If the rationality of a choice is at least partially based on some objective criteria after the choice is made then the judgement; "it is irrational not to believe in God" is based on incomplete evidence unless you can elaborate on the specific consequences of that choice and prove that they are detrimental to the chooser.

#138

I wasn't able to completely parse the question. Please elaborate.

In post 132 you state:
"The argument is that when deciding whether to believe in God, we should adopt a rational approach and pick a leap-of-faith threshold that minimizes the expected consequences of making an error."
If the expected consequences of the choice "I choose not to believe in God" are unknown(which I believe to be the case) then I think its unfair to say that choice is irrational. The leap-of-faith threshold is based on the expected consequences, if I understand you correctly.
The health benefits you mention are a possible positive consequence of the choice "I choose to believe in God." This is not the same as saying that the lack of health benefits is a negative consequence for the choice "I choose not to believe in God", especially for those who are already healthy or have other means of attaining health benefits.
My point is that, by your criteria, no rational decision can be made regarding the two choices "to believe" or "not to believe" because not all of expected consequences are known. I'm not sure you could even reasonably guess at the consequences.
Additionally, I would like to know how your argument would apply to the choice, "I choose to believe in something other than God" (maybe the "truth" of science or something) if that choice results in similar benefits to the choice "I choose to believe in God"

#140

"My point is that, by your criteria, no rational decision can be made regarding the two choices "to believe" or "not to believe" because not all of expected consequences are known."

Not at all, in fact quite the opposite. You are never, and will never be in possession of all the data. You have to base any decision on incomplete data; you do it all the time. The only thing you can do is make a rational decision based on all available and relevant data. My argument is that, given the relative cost of the errors, sufficient relevant data is available to indicate that those that believe in God accrue sufficient benefits to make it rational to choose to believe. The data that show that belief is of benefit compared to non-belief, show at the same time that non-belief has less of a benefit than belief. It is a binary choice. If it is rational to believe, it must be irrational to not believe.

"Additionally, I would like to know how your argument would apply to the choice, "I choose to believe in something other than God" (maybe the "truth" of science or something) if that choice results in similar benefits to the choice "I choose to believe in God""

I would be most happy to consider the scientific evidence for that. We would be on much firmer ground discussing the relative merits of various pieces of scientific research. But, of course, I would want to apply the same rational decision process (skepticism thresholds, costs of error etc.)

141
I think I understand your point but I don't think everyone would agree with your assertion that "sufficient relevant data is available." I don't think you are claiming that belief in God will guarantee health benefits for the believer. So at best there is the possibility that you may have health benefits by believing. There must be some other relevant data on which to base the decision. Otherwise I can claim that the choice, "I choose to believe in clean living(which I'll define as not drinking or smoking, exercising and eating healthy)" is far more rational than the choice "I choose to believe in God" as far as health benefits are concerned. One's health is not based entirely on one's belief or non-belief in God. So if I can gain the possible tangible benefits from believing in God from a different belief(clean living) then there must be some other "relevant data" that makes the choice "I choose not to believe in God" irrational. This is why I don't believe the rationality of the choices are binary. Either choice can be rational depending on the individual. I thought this was the argument you were making when you stated in your original post from this thread "Where you set your own threshold depends on your appetite, and every choice is rational for someone."
Certainly, from the perspective of someone who has already made their choice, the opposite choice would seem irrational.

#142

If the benefits from belief in God and clean living are additive, it would be rational to do both. The rational choice is the combination that gives the best net benefit.

It does, of course, depend on your values and what you consider to be a benefit. Peoples tastes differ. Is it rational for a masochist to choose pain? If you don't value good health, then it would not be irrational for you to pass up the chance for better health. However, for people in general, choosing pain and rejecting a chance for better health is irrational.

143
I don't think you can claim that health benefits are additive in this case without being quite specific about how belief in God can make a healthy person healthier. If, for instance, we agree that LeBron James is a healthy person and, for our purposes, does not believe in God in what way will belief benefit him? Will he jump higher, have more endurance, etc... and if so how can you attribute this to belief? If, as you say, the best net benefit results from a combination of rational choices then it should be possible to "balance the books" by negating the "debit" of one belief with a "credit" from another. I think health benefits can be obtained in this way without having to belief in God. In other words, I can be healthy without believing in God so what other "relevant data" make "I choose to believe in God" the only rational choice?

Experimental evidence would show that benefits are additive. I think that LeBron James is already a believer and so is already benefiting. If you had two choices to get the benefits, i) train as hard every day as LeBron James to achieve his level of fitness or ii) believe in God, in which case would the net benefit be highest? Which would be the rational choice? For sure, if you can get a higher net benefit by some other method, that method would be the rational choice for you.

Edited to correct myself. The rational choice, of course, is the one that minimizes your risk, not maximizes your benefit. I forgot to factor the risk of injury LeBron James faces every day in training and in competitive play.

Message edited by its author, May 4, 2009, 6:50pm.

Can you detail the experimental evidence? If LeBron James is enjoying an additional benefit from believing, how is it quantifiable? At any rate, I don't think you can argue that its possible to be in very good health whether you believe in God or not so the question remains; what other "relevant data" make "I choose to believe in God" the only rational choice?

I think that is a little like saying that some smokers don't get sick from smoking so what other "relevant data" makes giving up smoking the rational choice.

Searching out some more evidence, this looks a good resource.
Latest Religion and Health Research at Duke University

Message edited by its author, May 5, 2009, 8:17am.

And those abstracts show a mix of positive and negative data for a relationship between health and religiosity. There is nothing there (or in the field at large) that is proof positive of a beneficial impact of religion, especially if you control for the social aspect of religious attendance.

147
I disagree; choosing not to believe in God does not lead to life threatening cancer or any other illness for that matter as smoking has been shown to do. If there is no other "relevant data" then I don't think you can conclude that "I choose not to believe in God" is irrational.
148
A lot of good research it looks like; some to the point, others inconclusive. None of the studies implies that "belief in God will improve your health." May I suggest a more apt premise would be "I choose to believe in something" is rational while "I choose not to believe in anything" is irrational. Especially in the case of the infirm which most of the mention case studies are centered around. Also, here's a study that supports an opposing view, http://moses.creighton.edu/JRS/2005/2005...

#150

The degree of benefit is only relevant when calculating your risk. I think your argument above was

Doing X is shown to improve health.
Person A is healthy.
Therefore they do not need to do X.

where X is "believe in God".

My response was to ask -- is the same argument true if X is "stop smoking"? What's the difference? In both cases, doing X improves health so it is rational to do and not rational not to do.

#149 and #150

When assessing the evidence here, the rational thing to do is to use the same procedure, that is minimize your risk. There is certainly some reputable evidence that shows that belief has a benefit. You can either accept or reject the conclusion based on the available evidence. You can certainly form your own opinion as to the quality of the evidence, but you should not stop there. You should go on to factor in the losses you face by making a mistake. As before, you are at risk two ways. You risk not acting on the conclusion and hence not getting the benefits if the conclusion is true and you reject the evidence. What do you risk if you accept the conclusion and it is not true?

151
The argument is
Doing X may improve health.
Doing Y has been strongly linked to improved health
Person A is healthy.
Person A does Y
Therefore they do not need to do X.
where Y is clean living(to include to quit smoking if smoking)
where X is "believe in God".

Your argument seems to be "You should believe in God because you have nothing to lose and maybe something to gain so cover your bets." I believe if you are making this argument after already having made the choice, "I choose to believe in God." then any argument to the contrary seems necessarily irrational. My point is that before the choice is made, a rational case can be made for either choice depending on your individual viewpoint. In fact, I thought that this was the point you were trying to make in your original post when you stated "Every choice can be rational, the only mistake we can make is using a threshold that is not optimal for our own particular preferences." I don't really have anything else to add to the subject.

Clean living and belief in God are more like insurance than repairs. You buy insurance for you car, not because it is wrecked but because of the risk of a wreck. You quit smoking, not because it you are sick, but because it will reduce the risk that you will become sick. Once you quit smoking you don't decide that eating well is now unnecessary. Each action is extra insurance against falling sick or against being sick longer. Your "Therefore they do not need to do X" is a false assumption.

It is true, however, that results of this type involving human subjects are by necessity general; they lump together individuals and draw a statistical conclusion about people in general. Individuals will respond in different ways depending on their genotype, phenotype and life history. I always make this point when my spouse wants me to diet. There is no experimental evidence that someone of my precise genotype, phenotype and life history has benefited from dieting, so why should I do it. In fact, I think I am going to extend that to all medical and health related actions; I will demand experimental proof that someone identical to me has benefited from the action before I take it.

>152 "What do you risk if you accept the conclusion and it is not true?" In the case where the conclusion is that the Christian God exists, you risk quite a bit, in fact.

1. Suppose I adopt the belief just for insurance, because it might help. I suspect that it would work kind of like a placebo: Unless my belief in the CG is complete and strongly felt, it really wouldn't have any effect.

2. Most people who adopt belief in CG change their behavior as a result. Belief in CG is associated with some behaviors that are quite deleterious either to the individual or to the society as a whole: Giving big chunks of money to phony TV preachers, for example, is usually only done by people who believe in CG. Belief in CG is also positively correlated with trying to save the Holy Land from heretics, snake handling, giving up drinking and dancing, becoming celibate, and voting for Republicans. So there are some significant potential downsides here. Another one, BTW, is having God disappoint you by not answering your prayers. That can be a real downer, I hear.

3. Of course, you could decide to believe in CG and not change your behaviors ... or perhaps you would only change your behaviors in ways that don't reflect the downsides we have listed. But this would invalidate all of the studies that show a health effect deriving from belief in CG. You'd have to have a whole new set of studies that show that for the believers in CG who do not do adopt any of the deleterious behaviors sometimes associated with belief in CG (and of course there are many believers in this category), the supposed health effects are still present. And the existing studies are ambiguous already.

4. You'd also have to show that the health benefits of belief in CG are really associated with belief itself, and not just with certain habits of mind that are themselves associated with belief. Otherwise, the practical thing to do is to adopt those habits of mind, without going to the effort of sincerely changing one's beliefs, which according to most reports is not all that easy.

So, in sum, RRP has given a very poor argument for why one should start believing in God. Similarly, if one already believes in God, I think the supposed health effects are not a very good reason to continue to believe -- although I will concede that there are many other good reasons for holding on to one's faith.

Message edited by its author, May 6, 2009, 2:21pm.

You are wrong. Placebos work. Subsequent choices (snake handling, voting Republican etc.) are not entailed by the first choice and so are completely irrelevant; their risk can be considered independently. (Besides, don't most believers in the CG vote who can vote for a Rebublican vote for a Democrat?)

It is true that more research would show whether it is the belief or the behaviors correlated with the belief that bring benefit. However, while we wait for the results of that research, you have to make a decision based on the available and relevant information. Based on that information, the rational choice is to minimize your risk and believe in God.

Placebos work if you really believe in them. They don't work so well if you only try to believe in them. I think my argument established pretty well that the available research is *not* relevant, because it describes a population that does have the other characteristics, i.e. not just belief in God but a whole set of behaviors that go along with it.

I think I left out the main downside however. I think it is an extremely bad practice to start believing in things because it is to our personal advantage to believe in them. How many horrible crimes have been committed because people adopted a belief that was personally convenient?

belief in God {is} more like insurance

Against what?

Acts of God. ;P

#157

That people who believe do other things as well is a given. The question is which of those things are relevant to the health benefit that is observed. We don't know and won't know unless and until it is experimentally tested. Until then, all we have to go on is the one thing that was tested, that is that they believe. It is very easy to dismiss any and all testing on humans if you insist that you won't believe any result that doesn't control all the human variables. If you control for all variables, you only get sample sizes of one because we are all individuals.

Your second point, however, is much more substantial and should be taken very seriously. I think the best way of handling it is to say that the people who have done that in the past most often get their comeuppance. It is then clear that they made a mistake in calculating their net benefit. We should definitely learn from their mistakes.

#158

In this instance, clean living and belief in God are like insurance because they protect against random events that might occur in the future. They both reduce the risks of bad health.

I meant to add, perhaps it is time to add belief in God alongside healthy eating, exercise and not smoking as our definition of clean living.

Message edited by its author, May 6, 2009, 7:17pm.

I meant to add, perhaps it is time to add belief in God alongside healthy eating, exercise and not smoking as our definition of clean living.

You been reading a lot of the old Reader's Digests, eh?

"I meant to add, perhaps it is time to add belief in God alongside healthy eating, exercise and not smoking as our definition of clean living."

Clean living should also include not eating ground glass and lip syncing hymnals we don't remember at the Church of Hedged Bets

The Church of Hedged Bets I know is a purely rational faith.

The God of chance favors no one but He does appreciate a smart gambler.

Rational gamblers maybe.

Smart, rational gamblers? Those who know when to hold 'em, know when to fold 'em, know when to walk away, and know when to run (as eloquently expressed by Kenny Rogers in the sacred hymn, "Rime of the Ancient Gambler")? :D

Seems to me that the whole proposition comes back to the issue of "Can we choose to believe or not," which we had threads on already. I could sit around all day and try to make myself believe in the existence, justice, and divine efficacy of Maat, but I don't, in fact, believe in her. C'est la vie, I guess. Fortunately, I'm also a non-smoking, clean-living vegetarian, so I'm hoping that will do me some good, somewhere along the line. :)

Edited to add: I'm not being snarky. Rather, I simply don't see how trying (and most likely failing) to make oneself believe a particular thing, is going to help one to be healthier. If anything, I would think that it would make a person very unhappy and frustrated, which would be quite unhealthy. I don't see how or why honest, cheerful, optimistic non-belief would be any more unhealthy than honest, cheerful, optimistic belief. My guess is that it's the honest, cheerful, optimistic part (along with a strong sense of community and friendship) that provides the benefit, rather than the belief itself, or the specific religion that is adhered to.

Message edited by its author, May 7, 2009, 2:53pm.

I think the Church of Hedged Bets would welcome Maat.

#166

There are actually some studies that would seem to indicate that "belief" may actually lead to worse performance. The basic mechanism of the experiment is to offer a test to people and ask them to rate their own performance on the test.

Those who performed poorly consistently had a more optimistic assessment of their performance than otherwise. One interpretation offered for the results is that people who believe that they are doing well have no reason to try to improve their performance.

#166

Rationality requires choice. If you can't choose your beliefs, no belief is rational. To believe would be irrational and not to believe would be irrational.

It seems possible that you cannot choose to believe (in a God) but that you can choose not to believe (in a God).

Message edited by its author, May 7, 2009, 4:45pm.

No. If you are offered a choice between X and not X, it's no longer a choice if you can't pick X. You have to take not X. You can only choose either or you can't choose either.

But that's not the choice. You *are* either X or not X and offered the chance to change. You can change from X to not X but you cannot change from not X to X. I'm offering that as a hypothesis. I don't know that religious people can choose to reject their religion purely based on some intellectual argument, but I'm pretty sure it can't work the other way.

No again. If I am a believer, and I am reviewing the evidence, I need to be able to choose to believe, to continue to believe, to be able to choose to not believe. If I cannot willing make that choice between belief and non-belief, I am not choosing not to believe.