Based on the American experience in Vietnam, surely someone can proscribe what we should do in Afghanistan now.

I offer this question in particular to LamSon, who is our resident Vietnam pro.

I would like to add that LamSon and his wife gave my wife and I the great pleasure and privilege of dining with us on their trip through our region recently. Their charm, erudition, and kindnesses bowled us over and leave us truly indebted to them. Thanks again folks.

There is a lot to this question, but I offer the following in IMHO. It would be nice to hear from OldSarge, since he has the viewpoint of a recent combat veteran.

I edited my original response because I felt it was rambling before, hopefully this will be more clear.

There is a lot to this question, but I offer the following in IMHO. It would be nice to hear from OldSarge, since he has the viewpoint of a recent combat veteran.

I see some similarities with Afghanistan and Vietnam. Both had populations that were either rural or urban, with little in between. Both had governments of questionable stability and probable corruption. The rural people had ties to the land, family and village. The government was hundreds of miles and a world away. Both had a long history of conflict before the US got involved.

In Vietnam the rural folks had no reason to trust the government.
1. Appointed provincial leaders were corrupt and ran the provinces like mini-kingdoms.
2. They didn’t see the government as protectors, but another entity they had to deal with. At night the VC came and demanded money, food and labor and during the day US and ARVN forces would come through and harass them about giving aid and comfort to the VC.
3. There seemed to be little understanding of the importance the people attributed to their land. Many people had never been more than a few miles from their village. However, one plan to remove the VC support base in the villages was to move the people, from their ancestral lands, into compounds, called strategic hamlets.
4. The search and destroy method of fighting the war by the US side did not generate a lot of trust. Many of the villagers were between a rock and a hard place; they had to support and oppose both sides at the same time in order to survive. An offshoot of this was the US response to small arms fire from a village also, no doubt, alienated people as well. Opening up with M-16s and M-60s and calling in jets with 500 lb. bombs and napalm is not the way to win the 'hearts and minds'.

The rural people needed to see and believe that the central government cared about them and could protect them.
1. Without this they would continue to sit on the fence and cooperate with whoever was in the village at any given time.
2. During the war the Marines operated in the northern provinces of South Vietnam. They developed a Combined Action Program (CAP) were Marines and a Corpsman would stay in a village and work with the Popular Forces (PF). The Marines provided training and the PFs provided intimate knowledge of the area. The following quotation, which sums up the way the program worked, comes from the website http://www.capmarine.com/:

”The Marines and Corpsmen of the CAC/CAP units attempted to isolate the people of select villages from the ravages of the war. CAP villages were no longer targets of the indiscriminate Search and Destroy mentality so prevalent during the Vietnam War. We shared the risk of living in the villages 24 hours a day, thereby earning the love and respect of thousands of our villagers who simply wanted to survive a war they didn't want."

They worked together to keep the village safe for development projects, like schools. The CAP teams also provided medical care for the people in the village. Years after the war, many villages still had memorials to honor the Marines who died defending their village. This idea seemed to work, but wasn't supported by the powers that were (Westmoreland).

A similar thing needs to be done in Afghanistan.
1. This time we need to hold the central government to a higher standard. Yes, they are a sovereign nation, but if we are going to spend time, money, and lives it can’t be done to support a government that no one will ever support.
2. We need to initiate a CAP-like program to create the personal connection with the villages and work with local forces to ensure safety. Schools and medical help must be provided.
3. Image management

All the assistance must be seen by the people as coming from the central government and not the US. Afghan forces must be seen as taking the ‘lead’ with US in support. If not, the villagers will be on the fence again, supporting the Taliban by night and US/Afghan forces by day.

Lastly, the US needs to avoid talking about lights at the end of the tunnel and mission accomplished. This was the story before TET 1968. We want our burgers, fries, and coke in 90 seconds and our wars done in 90 days. It takes time to overcome years of tradition and mistrust. No doubt it is going to take time but we need to finish what we started.

I found these books to be a good look at the CAP activities in Vietnam: Our War was Different by Albert Hemingway and Combined Action Platoons by Michael E. Peterson

**I would like to thank Ur and his wife for a wonderful evening talking about books and reading. Unfortunately the time was to short.

Message edited by its author, Nov 4, 2009, 11:09am.

LamSon,

Many thanks for the thoughtful response on this.

If the US gov't. gave more thought to implementing the strategy you suggest and less to just increasing manpower by 40-60K, the results might be different than what is happening.

If I am not mistaken, I believe at this point in time we have no Afghan policy. Rather, it is 'under review.'

Ur
>"we have no Afghan policy. Rather, it is 'under review.'"
I agree.
Granted that I can be a cynical person: I don't think there will ever be an Afghanistan policy, or Iraq, or Iran...
The topic under review is not how to deal with Afghanistan, but rather how to deal with it in light of the next election cycle.

I think this is the common point to which ALL policy debate has descended; how will it impact the next election.