Hitler's First War: Adolf Hitler, the Men of the List Regiment, and…

This book provides an interesting interpretation of Hitler and his experience in the First World War. In particular, the author claims that Hitler, contrary to the standard narrative, was not an especially brave front-line soldier in the First World War. He documents how Hitler spent most of his time in the relative (compared to the trenches) safety and comfort of a rear-area headquarters, how Hitler fortuitously missed some of the deadliest fighting that his regiment engaged in because he happened to be away either on leave or in hospital, and that Hitler was a loner, spending his free time reading and making sketches rather than sharing a beer with his comrades. In particular, he claims that Hitler's two Iron Crosses resulted from the fact that he interacted regularly with high-ranking officers at the headquarters who could recommend such awards, rather than any particular bravery on the battlefield. Most of the soldiers in his regiment appear to have considered Hitler one of the "rear area swine" because he spent most of his time at headquarters and rarely ventured into the front lines. This narrative challenges the standard line (apparently taken from Hitler himself in *Mein Kampf*) that his cameraderie with his fellow soldiers in the trenches formed the basis of his political awareness and principles.

Perhaps even more controversially, the author presents evidence that Hitler had not formed any particular political ideas (including anti-Semitism) by the end of the war, and even, for a brief time, supported the Soviet-style government that temporarily gained power in Bavaria. He notes how Hitler's description of this period of his life in *Mein Kampf* is uncharacteristically vague, as if he had something there to cover up. The book still leaves the genesis of Hitler's later political ideas and dynamism somewhat unexplained, but it does appear to shatter the myth that Hitler's experience in the First World War was the crucible that forged the future Nazi. ( )

In approaching this close examination of the relationship between Hitler and the Bavarian 16th Reserve Infantry Regiment, one has to be a little surprised that no one has done such a study to date. However, it’s not because the material wasn’t there and Weber proceeds with a systematic dismantling of war legend that Hitler created for himself. The bedrock reality being that while Hitler seems to have been a respectable soldier, his role as a regimental dispatch runner meant that he was anything but a front fighter, and he put forth a lot of effort to retain this sinecure. This is not to mention what the limitations of the man’s own personality meant for his ability to bond and socialize.

Actually, Weber's argument is that Hitler’s estrangement from the trench-war experience contributed to his infuriated inability to comprehend Germany’s loss. This is particularly since the man had a knack for being away from his regiment when the going got tough, at least between 1914 and the very end of the war. It would almost be farcical if one didn't know what was to come.

In tandem with this close examination of Hitler’s personal military career within the context of his regiment’s history, Weber also has some doubts about some of the conventional wisdom that has arisen about what the experience of the Great War in the trenches meant for post-war Germany. The short version is that Weber doesn’t find a widespread radicalization of personal sensibility or political outlook, meaning he doesn’t accept argument that the trenches created the prototype of the so-called “Volksgemeinschaft” (unity of community) that Nazi ideology esteemed; certainly not in the ranks of the Bavarian reserve infantry. As far as can be traced Hitler’s fellow soldiers mostly retained the primary identities with which they started the war once they returned to civilian life, nor did they become men for whom war had become a way of life.

The proof of this for Weber is that in the first Bavarian elections after the war the parties that had been dominant before the war remained dominant. If anything radicalized Bavarian politics it’s the brief existence of the Bavarian Soviet government, the experience of which left a residue for the parties of the radical right to exploit. It’s largely this milieu that created Hitler, who even at this late date seemed to be a personality in flux.

This brings me to my main problem with this book; at a certain point you have to deal with the issue of when does Hitler, the unpleasant slacker, become Hitler the dynamic political leader. The impression that Weber leaves one with is that the circumstances of the break-up of the European empires and economic collapse is what made Hitler; it all can’t come down to contingency though. Perhaps the question begged is that while the trenches really weren’t Hitler’s political school, the HQ of the 16th Bavarian RIR was, and that this is where the man learned the skills of manipulation that served him so well in the future. ( )