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On China by Henry Kissinger
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On China (edition 2011)

by Henry Kissinger

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Member:edwinbcn
Title:On China
Authors:Henry Kissinger
Info:Allen Lane (2011), Hardcover, 608 pages
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On China by Henry Kissinger

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Henry Kissinger's reputation remains controversial at best today, but many consider one of his most profound achievements in foreign policy to be the opening of China in the 1970s. Few, past or present, could dare to approach the depth of his expertise in this area.

The first few chapters of the book cover a broad outline of Chinese history up to the early 20th century, and ventures an explanation of the nature of their relations with other nations - primarily as tributary states, as all challengers were played off against each other, or were eventually absorbed. One metaphor that stood out was his usage of wei qi, better known in the west by its alternate form, go. The great game of politics is not like a decisive battle, as in chess, where all of the pieces are visisble and strengths can be calculated easily. Rather, it is a constantly shifting array of multiple factors, which can be negotiated only by a skilled professional.

The meat of the book concerns the latter part of the 20th century. The inner machinations and major players of the enigmatic government, from the charming Zhou Enlai to the paradox of Mao, to the reformer Deng Xiaopeng, and outlines of some of the modern day leaders too. The ups and downs of China's relationship with the world, particularly with the US, are explored with good detail and piercing analysis.

One of the main criticisms that can be made about the book - and the author - is his adherence to Realpolitik, at the very real detraction of moral issues. His almost neutral reaction to the events of Tienanmen Square is a bit shocking, but still interesting nonetheless. His criticisms of Mao are far too understated to be considered a form of mere diplomacy.

The end of the book offers a pragmatic but optimistic view of the future of Sino-American relations. These two nations have the power to shape the world for the better, if they both want it.

All things considered, this is an extremely valuable look at the situation, and of paramount interest to anybody interested in international politics. Recommended. ( )
  HadriantheBlind | Mar 30, 2013 |
Excellent book by a master. This is an outsiders view of recent Chinese history and politics, and very valuable. It is not a history of China, it is a history of US perceptions of China, and I think very perceptive and well done. ( )
  RobertP | Aug 30, 2012 |
Excellent - especially the historical introduction. Gives a new meaning to China's politics and shows how very predictable in a positive sense they have worked over the past decades. Chinese politics are profound, far-sighted and much less aggressive than I imagined. Goes a long way to prove that long-term politics is positive and that the fast turn-over in western democracies is ambiguous to say the least. Perhaps it is not such a bad thing after all if Africa looks more to China than elsewhere for political allies - and does not hope too much on empty promises of those only out to make a quick buck. Isn't it fascinating that Kissinger did most of his diplomatic stuff with China when he had just turned 50? ( )
  Wilhelm_Weber | Dec 19, 2011 |
Kissinger’s Ignorance about China

China is a complicated large country with a long history and civilization entirely different from Western ones. Chinese leaders, especially communist ones, are usually profoundly shrewd and avoid being seen through by others. The top leading group, in particular, is a black box. Its operation is tightly kept confidential. However, for an autocracy like China, one cannot understand it without understanding its leaders. No wonder Western China watchers are frustrated in understanding China.

However, as a well-experienced and informed diplomat and politician who helped Nixon achieve rapprochement with China, Kissinger must be in a better position to see through Chinese leaders, since he has times and again had talks in private with all Chinese leaders from Mao till now. I, therefore, read through his book On China, in order to find some insight in Chinese leaders and the reality in China behind the curtain of thorough confidentiality. However, I am greatly disappointed that Kissinger gives distorted images of and misinformation about China and Chinese leaders, especially Chinese madman Mao.

Having personally experienced Mao’s tyranny, my greatest worry concerning China is the potential emergence of another madman like Mao when China grows into a rival to America. The disaster that he may cause to Chinese and world people will be much more serious than Mao’s great famine and Cultural Revolution.

Kissinger, however, compared China’s rise now with that of Germany before World War I and believes if the state leaders then had known the consequence of the war, they would “have recoiled” from confrontation. So will China and America in the future, he concludes. Kissinger forgets World War II, which is much more relevant. Madmen Hitler and Tojo Hideki started the war because they were callous killers and their mad calculation made them believe they would win the war. Tojo was especially mad. He attacked America when compared with the giant of US economy, Japan’s was a dwarf.

Like Hitler, Mao Was a Callous Killer
In a speech on August 10, 1959, Mao gave the reasons why there was no Hungarian Rebellion (referring to the Hungarian Revolution in 1956) in China, saying that since the communist takeover “more than one million counterrevolutionaries have been killed. Hungary has not killed any counterrevolutionary. For the elimination of more than one million of the 600-odd million people, I think we shall shout hurrah for that.” The counterrevolutionaries referred to in his speech were mostly unarmed civilians put to death in peacetime. The terror lies in his pride and joy in the killing.

Mao’s Two Fits of Domestic Madness with Heavy Death Toll
Mao’s mad campaign the Great Leap Forward giving rise to a death toll of 20 to 40 million people is now well-known the world over. Frank Dikötter gives an astonishing, riveting, magnificently detailed account of it in his book Mao’s Great Famine.

Mao’s second fit of domestic madness the Cultural Revolution is even more famous. It was at first hailed in America as a campaign with lofty ideal. There were no statistics of the death toll and the number of victims. People who personally experienced it like me know that the number was enormous. People outside China now know the evils of the campaign when the truth has come out, but Mao’s misunderstood image as an idealist remains in the minds of quite a few people.

Mao’s Fits of International Madness
Mao told Soviet leader Khrushchev that he would fight a nuclear war to eliminate capitalism all over the world even if half of Chinese population–300 million then– died in the war. Taking into account of China’s poor economy and backward weapons then, Mao was much madder than Tojo Hideki. However, when I was studying in a university in Anhui, China in 1958, there was hot enthusiasm for communism among the students there. Some of my close classmates talked about Mao’s words and said in private (not openly to please Party cadres) that they admired Mao that he represented Chinese people in saying that we Chinese were willing to make the greatest national sacrifice for communism. Mao was able to make quite a few Chinese people as mad as him because elements of Maoism are deeply rooted in China’s popular culture for infection of his madness. That is China’s most serious problem.

You cannot believe that unless you have personally experienced it. At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, I was amazed to see students even those in prestigious universities turned into mad Red Guards overnight and later discipline-abiding workers turned into rebels promptly.

Kissinger mentions that twice Mao brought the world to the brink of nuclear war in the two Taiwan crises in the 1950s, but he admires Mao’s shelling “diplomacy” and regrets that Mao’s “brilliant achievements” were not “balanced against the global impact of the crisis”. He invented China’s ‘traditional” “empty city stratagem” to gloss over Mao’s repeated fits of madness.

Kissinger Ignores Mao’s Export of Revolution
He says, “Mao was too much of a realist, however, to pursue world revolution as a practical goal. As a result, the tangible impact of China on world revolution was largely ideological and consisted of intelligence support for local Communist parties.” He quoted what Mao said to Snow in 1965 to prove that.

Though a well-informed diplomat, he regards as not “tangible” all the following Mao’s enthusiastic world revolution activities that were reported by media then and have been revealed now by people personally involved, so that Kissinger omits all of them except item 1:
1. Mao transferred 50,000 experienced troops with weapons to increase Kim Il-sung’s troops to 231,000 for invasion of South Korea and sent troops to fight against America to preserve North Korea’s communist regime.
2. Mao trained and armed Vietnamese communists, sent lots of military advisers to help drive away France and establish communist North Vietnam, and provided aids worth billions of yuan to help them take over South Vietnam.
3. Mao helped Khmer Rouge rise to power in Cambodia in 1975. Mao’s “ideal” of “purifying the society” inspired Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot, resulting in the Killing Fields. Kissinger omits that perhaps because Thomas Walkum said on Toronto Star on June 30, 1997, "Let's try Kissinger along with Pol Pot," and some Americans such as Professor Edward S. Herman held similar views.
4. Mao provided substantial aids to communists and guerillas all over the world in spite of China’s own economic difficulties.

Mao, an Idealist?
Throughout his book, Kissinger strives to sell Mao’s image as an idealist. His trickiest advertisement is that he says that of Mao’s four titles: the Great Teacher, Great Leader, Great Commander and Great Helmsman, Mao told Kissinger Mao only wanted to keep the title of “Teacher” as if Mao was a loving teacher. Mao persecuted people but that was the punishment given by Mao the strict teacher for purifying his pupils, Kissinger hints.

However, Mao was not a loving but a cruel tyrannous teacher whose teachings you were not to trifle with. Non-acceptance of or doubting any of his teachings or instructions was a crime. One would be severely punished even if one revealed it in one’s diary. In 1970, Zhang Yihe, a common clerk then but a well-known writer now, wrote in her diary upon Mao’s promotion of his wife Jiang Qing the Chinese saying “When a man becomes immortal, even his hens and dogs become immortal, too”. She got a sentence of 20-year imprisonment for that. When I was in Shanghai then, persecution and imprisonment for dissent in people’s diaries were common phenomena.

Mao’s Cruel Persecution of Dissidents
People know well that in 1957 Mao coaxed intellectuals into criticizing the Party and then labeled 550,000 intellectuals as rightists to persecute in order to silence voice of opposition. However, they do not know very clearly that more than 3 million people were persecuted as rightists in 1959 because they aired their opposition to Mao’s mad Great Leap Forward in order to prevent the disaster it would cause to China. They failed to stop Mao’s madness and at least 20 million people died due to Mao’s madness. Red Guard’s and rebels’ cruel persecution of innocent people and Party and state cadres is well known now, but quite a few people believe that it was over by 1969 when lots of Red Guard had been sent to the countryside. In fact, persecution did not stop.

In 1970, quite a few young dissidents including some Party members openly said that Mao’s Cultural Revolution deviated from Marxism after they had diligently studied Marxist classics. Mao carried out a nation-wide One Strike-Three Anti Campaign and according to official figure, by November 1970 arrested 280,000 dissidents labeled as “counterrevolutionaries”. Those young dissidents were brave and wanted an open debate with Mao, but Mao “purified the society” by cruel torture, imprisonment and execution.

Zhang Zhixin was a typical case. The tortures and death penalty she suffered and the cruelty of the Campaign can still be found on the Internet. My father was framed-up and arrested as a counterrevolutionary then. He told me that he heard noise of torture everyday when he was detained in a detention center in Shanghai for more than one year.

It is very clear that Mao’s “ideal” was not to “purify the society” but to establish his absolute authority. However, a man cruelly realizing such an “ideal” is normally regarded as a tyrant instead of idealist.

America’s ignorance about China
As a brilliant diplomat, in writing his book, Kissinger certainly consulted lots of American China experts’ writings. The plenty misinformation about China and failure to give information about present-day China and its leaders and people in his book reflect their ignorance too. I have no intention to find faults, but have to point out some to rouse American people’s awareness because the misunderstanding resulting from such ignorance may have catastrophic consequence.

Kissinger makes much of Chinese fondness for playing wei qi to "explain the conceptual way the Chinese think about problems of peace and war and international order". That is absurd as very few people have shown much interest in national wei qi competition or even know how to play it. I am a wei qi enthusiast, but have found it very difficult to find people to play with in China from the time when I was young till now when I am 70. However, Chinese chess, a game similar to Western chess, is traditionally the most popular game. One can find people to play with everywhere in China even among illiterates.

Kissinger says that there were no official records of foreign envoys coming to Chinese court to engage in negotiations nor did Chinese emperor hold “summit meeting” with other heads of state but foreign envoys came to be transformed and heads of state came to present tribute to “recognize” Chinese emperor’s “overlordship”. In fact, there were negotiations for treaties by which China was humiliated and forced to give tribute of precious metal and silk to other states, for example, the “Chanyuan Treaty” in 1004 and the notorious “Shaoxing Peace Treaty” in 1141.

As for summit meeting, on pages 6018–6020 of the official history entitled The Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government, Emperor Taizong of Tang met King Jieli of Tujue (the Turkic Khanate) and concluded a treaty with him in 626. That was quite an interesting event as Emperor Taizong who was quite sure that he could defeat Tujue’s one million invading troops then, gave Jieli gold and silk in order to make Jieli arrogant and unprepared so that he could conquer Tujue later. Three years later, his troops conquered Tujue.

Emperor Taizong was the greatest emperor and his Reign of Zhenguan, most famous in Chinese history. Ignorance of him after reading Chinese history is like ignorance of Napoleon Bonaparte after reading French history.

America Not on Alert
American brilliant political scientist Samuel P. Huntington predicted in his well-known book Clash of Civilizations possible clash between Islamic and Western civilizations but America was not on alert. It failed to make thorough investigations when traces of Islamic terrorist attack were found months before 9.11. That reminds me of Pearl Harbor.

Will America fail to be on alert a third time when the scenario of the clash between American and Chinese civilizations described by Huntington in his book becomes a reality?

Kissinger begins his book by stressing China’s traditional cosmology with its emperor as the pinnacle of a universal political hierarchy and all other states’ rulers serving as vassals and says understanding China’s role now must begin “with this basic appreciation of the traditional context”. However he fails to mention that when China was strong, its emperors fought quite a few wars to subdue China’s neighbors. In addition, he glosses over Mao’s enthusiastic pursuit of leadership in world revolution, which was precisely a development of that cosmology. He mentions two recent books advocating sinocentric cosmology, but despite their being bestsellers, he treats them lightly, saying they are criticized in the Chinese press. If Americans believe him, they will not be on alert.

Deep-rooted Maoism, Rich Soil for the Emergence of another Mao
To prevent Kissinger’s book from giving world people a false sense of security, I have to make people see the possibility of the emergence of another Mao. As a profound understanding of Chinese culture and political system is indispensable for that, I have to give a short description and analysis though they are the topics for a special book.

If future Chinese leaders remain Confucianist-Marxist and pursue harmony in the world, China’s rise will be beneficial instead of troublesome to the world.

In his book, China’s singularity is a major topic, but Kissinger is ignorant about that. China’s singularity first of all lies in its always having a dominant ideology for 2,000 years. Its third and longest dominant ideology Confucianism was thoroughly denounced in the May Fourth Movement in 1919 and criticized along with Lin Biao when ignorant of that, Kissinger mentioned it to Zhou Enlai and got furious response.

During the Cultural Revolution, a new generation of talented intellectuals with moral integrity emerged and there was renaissance of Confucianism among them. Those in Shanghai joined Jiang Zemin’s Shanghai faction and served Jiang in carrying out a silent peaceful coup d’état they have planned for a long time, to substitute intellectuals’ dominance for uneducated workers’ and peasants’. Jiang’s Three Represents marks the success of the coup and develops Marxism to justify China’s pursuit of capitalism adjusted by Keynesian macroeconomic control.

Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao have added Confucianism to Jiang’s new Marxism and stressed harmony in order to overcome the conflict arising from the yawning rich-poor gap resulted from such capitalism. They are also trying to establish Mencius democracy of “putting people first”. However, their Confucianism-Marxism, though dominant at present, has a very short history and takes time to be so well established as to prevent the emergence of another Mao.

Another ideology, Maoism, the dominant ideology in Mao era, has its key elements such as egalitarianism, personality cult, sinocentric cosmology, enmity against intellectuals and cruelty in fighting for its goal deeply rooted in Chinese popular culture. Those elements prevailed in lots of peasants uprisings in Chinese history and in Mao’s mad pursuit of leadership in world revolution and Cultural Revolution.

According to a survey in 2008, in 40 cities including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Wuhan, families who had Mao’s statutes or portraits for worship accounted for 11.5% of the total number of families there, exceeding by far those who worshiped Buddha, God of Wealth or local god of the land.

Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought are in conflict with Confucianism-Marxism, but they remain guiding ideology in Party’s and state’s constitutions and Mao remains China’s great leader in spite of the criticism of his errors.

With such rich soil for Maoism, the emergence of another Mao is quite possible in the future.

China’s Political System and Art for Being an Emperor
China has a long history of autocracy. In China, there have never been any definition, codes or rules whatever about the power of a top leader whether he has the title of emperor or not. In fact, even if there are some codes or rules, there is no institution or mechanism to enforce them. This makes a top leader’s position precarious.

In the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Periods (770–221 BC), it was quite common that the sovereign power in a state was usurped by a powerful courtier, resulting in the demise of the ruling family. Seeing that, Han Fei (281?–233 BC), a Legalist master, wrote his famous Legalist classic entitled Han Fei-tzu to teach sovereigns the strategy, tactics, tricks and intrigues to maintain a top leader’s position and authority. As such strategy etc. is vital for top leaders, it were later further developed and called the art for being an emperor (diwangshu in Chinese).

Han Fei taught sovereigns to control their subjects by law, hold their officials in awe, use power, tricks and intrigues to control them and award and punishment to make them perform their duties properly. In order to maintain the awe and play tricks, He gives the advice that a sovereign must keep a distance from everyone else including his family members, relatives and officials and trust no one. That is certainly not a good way and a sovereign will thus have no friends and lead a lonely life. The constant pressure, sense of insecurity and loneliness may well drive a sovereign mad.

Qin Shihuang adopted Legalism as the dominant ideology and Han’s ways to maintain his iron rule. However, there is a great problem in Han’s art: When a sovereign dies, he has no close powerful courtiers to ensure smooth succession. That was precisely the case with Qin Shihuang. In his will he wanted Prince Fusu to succeed him, but his eunuch Zhao Gao and Prime Minister Li Si replaced it with a fabricated will to have a weak prince succeed him and Prince Fusu killed.

The failure of succession and people’s uprisings against the cruel Legalist rule caused Legalism to lose its dominance and be negated since the fall of Qin Dynasty. Around 134 BC, Emperor Wudi of Han substituted Confucianism for Taoism as the dominant ideology. All the later dynasties exploited Confucian stress on loyalty and filial duty to consolidate emperor’s position and ensure succession. In spite of that, usurp of emperor’s power or throne was still quite common in Chinese history. For example, Wang Mang (45 BC–23 AD), Dong Zhuo (?–192), Cao Cao (155–220), Sima Zhao (211–265), Liu Yu (363–422), Zhao Kuangyin (927–976), etc. usurped power or throne and those who usurped power not throne mostly passed the power to their sons and enabled them to usurp throne.

Through further development in more than two thousand years of political struggles, the art for being an emperor now consists of the art, strategy, tactics, techniques, tricks, intrigues, etc. to win the throne, recruit talented assistants, create bondage with them, rule the empire satisfactorily, maintain the emperor’s position, ensure smooth succession, etc. Great emperors wisely applied the art in establishing their dynasties, making the empire prosperous and ensuring smooth succession. One of the most well-known examples was that of Liu Bei, the founding emperor of Shuhan Dynasty, characterized by, among other things, establishing close affectionate bondage with talented generals and officials, but tricks and intrigues are still indispensable in their political struggle. However, there is no special systematic book like Han Fei-tzu on later art. One has to find it in China’s long history. Liu Bei’s story can be found in the well-known fiction The Romance of Three Kingdoms, which has been satisfactorily translated into English.

As Confucianism had been thoroughly denounced since 1919, when Mao became the sovereign of the CCP’s autocracy, his position was as precarious as Qin Shihuang without Confucian loyalty to rely on. It is a pity that Mao adopted Han Fei-tzu’s instead of the later much better art for being an emperor to establish and maintain his absolute authority. That was why he rehabilitated Qin Shihuang who until then had been condemned for 2,000 years in Chinese history, and openly advocated Legalism in his later years. However, Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin’s personality cult greatly threatened Mao’s authority. Mao faithfully abided by Han Fei-tzu’s principles and took preemptive actions to remove his close friends and chosen successors Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao when he suspected that they had grown too powerful and might have usurped his power.

CCP’s Core System Facilitates Emergence of Mad Leaders
When Mao Dynasty ended and Mao’s successor was removed from power, Deng Xiaoping tried to set up a system of collective leadership to prevent the reemergence of Mao’s autocracy that had brought disasters to China, but that system did not work. Zhao Ziyang’s memoirs gives a vivid description that when Deng and other powerful elders had retired from the politburo, their successors in the politburo were top leaders only in name, but had no real power and became puppets of the elders.

Moreover, Deng found the collective leadership ineffective in adopting hard measures to suppress Tiananmen Protests and maintain the Party’s rule. It caused him to make the unpopular decision of the massacre himself. He realized that China’s political system since the communist takeover had been a core system with a core having the absolute authority like the emperor in a feudal dynasty but without hereditary succession and believed that such a system should be maintained. That was why when he had promoted Jiang Zemin to succeed him as the core of the Party leadership, he exhorted Jiang, “When Mao was alive, he had the final say and when I am alive, I have the final say. I will not rest at ease until the time when you have the final say.” Obviously, by “final say” Deng Xiaoping meant that the core should have absolute authority like Mao and Deng.

According to Zhao’s memoirs, in making a major decision, Deng Xiaoping consulted with other elders when Zhao was in office. However, after the Tiananmen Massacre, Deng began to act as the core and heeded no other elders’ views. When all the elders and quite a large majority of officials became conservative after Tiananmen Massacre, Deng Xiaoping conducted his famous Southern Tour to reinvigorate the reform alone. All others had to obey his instruction and Deng Xiaoping typically played his role as the core who has the power above all others and even above law and Party and state constitutions like Mao.

When Jiang Zemin has established his absolute authority as the core, the Party’s core system finally became mature.

In such a core system, in order to become the core and maintain the position as the core, one has to master and apply the art for being an emperor elaborated in Han Fei-tzu or Jiang Zemin’s art that is similar to Liu Bei’s and Emperor Taizong’s, which is even more difficult as there is no special systematic book on it.

A madman is much more interested in Han Fei’s art of tricks and intrigues than normal people. With tricks and intrigues, he has a better chance to gain the position of core. Therefore the probability that a future core applies Han Fei’s art must be greater than Jiang’s. With the rich soil for mad leader in China, by application of Han Fei’s art such a madman can easily become an absolute monarch and make China mad.

What is most worrisome is that in China’s core system, when the core is mad like Mao, no one can control or remove him!
.
Democracy, the Only Way Out
Only when there is real democracy in China can the emergence of another Mao be prevented and can another Mao be timely removed if he does emerge. Therefore, only then can Chinese people have a bright future and China’s neighbors and America rest at ease at China’s rise.

However what can Western countries do? They certainly are unable to impose democracy on China as they are doing now on Libya. First, they have to reinvigorate their economy and improve their people’s living standards. With examples of prosperity in their democracies, they can attract Chinese people to learn from their democracies.

Second, they shall keep on disseminating their ideal of democracy by every possible means among Chinese people. They shall continue to denounce China whenever it violates human rights. It seems not effective, but it indeed works. That was why those who persecuted dissidents recently ordered their victims not to contact foreign journalists.

On the contrary, in his book, Kissinger admonishes US current and future administrations to “substantially” balance “long-term moral convictions with case-to-case adaptations to requirements of national security”, i.e., in disseminating American values of democracy and human rights, they shall avoid offending China or they shall even turn a blind eye to the emergence of another Mao in China in order to prevent confrontation and achieve “co-evolution”. By so doing, America will fail to be on alert again and may suffer a third time perhaps much more severely.

As a legal translator, I always follow development of Chinese politics and legal system closely especially when I worked as chief editor of a China law website last year. I find that there have been some memoirs and fictions reflecting the evils of Mao era, but few books on contemporary China based on personal experience and profound knowledge of Chinese culture, history and classics to enable people to understand what contemporary China really is from Mao era till now.

Victims Do Not Want to Write about the Trauma They Have Experienced
However, those who suffered the unheard-of cruel persecution in Mao era do not want to recall their traumatic past due to the unbearable pain of such memory. Previously, I myself did not want to talk about my sufferings when I met old classmates and friends though what I suffered was nothing compared with other much more serious cases.

Moreover, serious books on the history will certainly expose the Party’s despicable past and will of course be banned in China.

However I often worry that those who experienced and witnessed Mao’s tyranny in their prime of life and know Chinese culture, history and classics well are all old like me. If we do not write down what we know now, there will be no records of that important part of Chinese history and people will not learn lessons from it. Therefore, I decided that I should exploit the freedom of expression in Hong Kong and the freedom of publication in the United States to write down and publish what I know. I hope that my writings will inspire other people to do so too.

Having read Kissinger’s book, I realize the urgency of the job. As I am 70 now, I shall strive to write all I know before I die so that people both inside and outside China will fully know the truth and will not be affected by the misinformation provided by the Party’s misleading propaganda or by those who appear to be China experts but are really ignorant about China. ( )
1 vote chankaiyee2 | Oct 19, 2011 |
Kissinger looks back on the history of China and the 40 year relationship which he and Richard Nixon engineered. He concludes by pointing to the potential possibility of the two preeminent nations forging an era of global peace. There are other possibilities, but Kissinger seems to imply that the preferred possibility might just work as the alternatives are unacceptable to the interests of both nations. ( )
1 vote cjneary | Aug 20, 2011 |
Showing 1-5 of 8 (next | show all)
Kissinger chooses to ascribe huge insight to virtually everything Mao says.
added by mercure | editFinancial Times, Chris Patten (May 27, 2011)
 
Henry Kissinger will always remain a controversial historical figure. But this elegantly written and erudite book reminds us that on one of the biggest questions of the post-World War II world his judgment was right, and showed a long-term vision that few politicians of any country could match today. Unless, of course, Hillary Clinton is even now on a secret mission to Tehran.
added by mercure | editTaipei Times, Rana Mitter (May 22, 2011)
 
Henry Kissinger in China was always a gratingly and irritatingly smug presence, but Henry Kissinger "on China" is madly baffling.
added by mercure | editThe Guardian, Jasper Becker (May 21, 2011)
 
An epic and, in some places, surprisingly moving book (...) on China
added by mercure | editFinancial Times, Simon Schama (May 20, 2011)
 
Mr. Kissinger’s fascinating, shrewd and sometimes perverse new book, “On China,” not only addresses the central role he played in Nixon’s opening to China but also tries to show how the history of China, both ancient and more recent, has shaped its foreign policy and attitudes toward the West.

(...)

Lurking beneath Mr. Kissinger’s musings on Chinese history is a not-so-subtle subtext. This volume, much like his 1994 book, “Diplomacy,” is also a sly attempt by a controversial figure to burnish his legacy as Nixon’s national security adviser and secretary of state. It is a book that promotes Mr. Kissinger’s own brand of realpolitik thinking, and that in doing so often soft-pedals the human costs of Mao’s ruthless decades-long reign and questions the consequences of more recent American efforts to press human-rights issues with the Chinese.
 
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To Annette and Oscar de la Renta
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Societies and nations tend to think of themselves as eternal.
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Societies operate by standards of average performance. They sustain themselves by practicing the familiar. But they progress through leaders with a vision of the necessary and the courage to undertake a course whose benefits at first reside largely in their vision.
The basic direction of a society is shaped by its values, which define its ultimate goals.
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Henry Kissinger disseca estratégias diplomáticas da China Favoritar
12/11/2011 - 08:50 | O Globo
Sobre a China, de Henry Kissinger. Tradução de Cassio de Arantes Leite. Editora Objetiva, 576 pgs. R$ 54,90
Por Williams Gonçalves
Com despretensioso título que revela a peculiar falsa modéstia do autor, “Sobre a China”, o último livro de Henry Kissinger, poderá ser agora lido em português. Os leitores brasileiros interessados em conhecer mais o país que avança aceleradamente para se tornar a principal potência mundial e os que se interessam também pelas negociações diplomáticas que aproximaram esse país dos Estados Unidos terão a imperdível oportunidade de satisfazer sua curiosidade nesse surpreendente livro de difícil classificação. Misto de História, de memórias, de reflexão estratégica e de análise política, “Sobre a China” traz revelações muito importantes para a compreensão da política mundial contemporânea.

Obras inspiraram aproximação de EUA e China

Dois livros foram fundamentais na carreira acadêmica e política do talentoso professor de Harvard: “Um mundo restaurado: Metternich, Castlereagh e os problemas da paz — 1812-1822” e “Armas nucleares e política externa”, ambos publicados em 1957. No primeiro, Kissinger defende que, em um sistema internacional multipolar, a paz somente pode ser alcançada mediante o equilíbrio de poder; no segundo, ele sustenta que a doutrina estratégica de defesa havia de se adaptar à existência dos arsenais nucleares. 

Teria sido a leitura desses livros que levou o presidente dos Estados Unidos Richard $a convidá-lo a ocupar a função de Conselheiro para Segurança Nacional. Conselheiro até 1972, Kissinger converteu-se em Secretário de Estado em 1973, ocupando esse posto até 1976, nele permanecendo mesmo após a renúncia do presidente em 1974, sob ameaça de impeachment.

Esses dois livros contêm as ideias básicas que inspiraram a audaciosa reviravolta estratégica promovida por Nixon de iniciar um diálogo diplomático com a China em 1969, depois de 20 anos de silêncio profundo. Kissinger, humildemente, atribui ao presidente a excep$sagacidade de perceber que a aproximação à China constituía a chave que abriria a porta para a saída dos Estados Unidos do atoleiro em que estavam metidos no Vietnã. Seu mérito teria sido apenas o de negociar com os chineses, mantendo-se sempre fiel à concepção estratégica de Nixon. 

O êxito da grande manobra teria sido fruto da coincidência do plano de Nixon com as ideias alimentadas pelos estrategistas chineses de sair do isolamento em que a Revolução Cultural havia colocado a China e, ao mesmo tempo, de enfrentar a ameaça de um $ataque soviético. Tanto norte-americanos como chineses, orientados pela lógica da realpolitik, segundo a qual as razões de Estado situam-se acima das diferenças ideológicas, davam-se conta de que, para a realização de seus respectivos objetivos nacionais, convinha deixar de lado as divergências e se concentrar nos pontos comuns e fundamentais de entendimento. 

A capacidade de saber discernir com clareza a contradição principal e o aspecto principal da contradição é, para Kissinger, atributo reservado a poucos. Pertence, por assim $, a inteligências especiais, situadas em patamar elevado. As da planície permanecem enredadas em debates sem fim sobre coisas como a súbita transformação do inimigo comunista em aliado ou com incidentes como o da Praça da Paz Celestial. Homens excepcionais como Metternich, Castlereagh, Nixon, Kissinger, Mao Tsé-Tung e Zhou Enlai têm o talento para promover uma mudança radical na geopolítica mundial e inaugurar uma nova ordem internacional. 

Mao Tsé-Tung torcia pela eleição do direitista Nixon

A excepcionalidade de Mao Tsé-Tung, Zhou Enlai e Deng Xiaoping se explica pela magnificência da História e da cultura chinesas. Por isso, quase metade de “Sobre a China” é dedicada a apresentar essa História e os aspectos singulares da cultura do antigo Império do Meio. Os líderes chineses são herdeiros de um Estado-civilização que produziu um pensador da estatura de Confúcio e que elaborou uma forma própria de lidar com os homens e com as coisas do mundo. Como Kissinger sublinha no prólogo, em qual outro país o governante pode reunir seus generais antes de iniciar a campanha militar e “invocar princípios estratégicos de um episódio ocorrido mais de um milênio antes”, como Mao o fez antes de as tropas chinesas se lançarem contra os indianos em outubro de 1962? Naturalmente, só um país de cultura rica e requintada, que criou seu próprio jogo de intelecto — o wei qi (jogo de peças circulares). Equivalente ao conhecido jogo de xadrez, que objetiva a vitória final mediante o xeque-mate, o wei qi é, diferentemente, um jogo de campanha prolongada que ensina a arte do cerco estratégico, ou seja, a artimanha de tirar o inimigo do combate sem confrontá-lo, apenas levando-o à posição de isolamento.

O encontro de Nixon com Mao em 1972 foi, portanto, a reunião dos representantes de dois países excepcionais que, tal como aquele de Metternich e Castlereagh em Viena, em 1815, determinou mudanças de amplo alcance na estrutura do poder mundial. A China, que havia sido dominada e submetida a toda espécie de humilhações pelos ingleses e pelos demais ocidentais por todo um século, até recuperar a autonomia e a dignidade sob a liderança de Mao e do Partido Comunista, voltava a ocupar o lugar a que estava habituada desde havia muito, aquele de Estado central nas relações internacionais. Segundo Kissinger, destacado ator e cronista do processo político-diplomático que culminou nesse encontro histórico, o diálogo permanente que os novos líderes políticos de Estados Unidos e China têm sabido manter constitui a chave para a paz mundial. 

Enfim, o autor, que é capaz de reproduzir diálogos espirituosos — como aqueles com Mao, em que Kissinger se surpreende quando seu interlocutor revela que torcera pela eleição de Nixon, por nutrir simpatias pelos direitistas, ou quando se lembra de sua amizade com Chiang Kai-shek —, já não se mostra muito criativo quando o tema é o futuro. Talvez um tanto inebriado pelo que julga sua grande obra, não leva muito em consideração a grave crise por que passam os Estados Unidos, e continua apostando que o país e a China exercerão a liderança no mundo, à frente de uma Comunidade do Pacífico.

*WILLIAMS GONÇALVES é professor do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais da Uerj
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"In this sweeping and insightful history, Henry Kissinger turns for the first time at book-length to a country he has known intimately for decades, and whose modern relations with the West he helped shape. Drawing on historical records as well as his conversations with Chinese leaders over the past forty years, Kissinger examines how China has approached diplomacy, strategy, and negotiation throughout its history, and reflects on the consequences for the global balance of power in the 21st century. Since no other country can claim a more powerful link to its ancient past and classical principles, any attempt to understand China's future world role must begin with an appreciation of its long history. For centuries, China rarely encountered other societies of comparable size and sophistication; it was the "Middle Kingdom," treating the peoples on its periphery as vassal states. At the same time, Chinese statesmen-facing threats of invasion from without, and the contests of competing factions within-developed a canon of strategic thought that prized the virtues of subtlety, patience, and indirection over feats of martial prowess. In 'On China', Kissinger examines key episodes in Chinese foreign policy from the classical era to the present day, with a particular emphasis on the decades since the rise of Mao Zedong. He illuminates the inner workings of Chinese diplomacy during such pivotal events as the initial encounters between China and modern European powers, the formation and breakdown of the Sino-Soviet alliance, the Korean War, Richard Nixon's historic trip to Beijing, and three crises in the Taiwan Straits. Drawing on his extensive personal experience with four generation of Chinese leaders, he brings to life towering figures such as Mao, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping, revealing how their different visions have shaped China's modern destiny. With his singular vantage on U.S.-China relations, Kissinger traces the evolution of this fraught but crucial relationship over the past 60 years, following its dramatic course from estrangement to strategic partnership to economic interdependence, and toward an uncertain future. With a final chapter on the emerging superpower's 21st-century world role,'On China' provides an intimate historical perspective on Chinese foreign affairs from one of the premier statesmen of the 20th century"--… (more)

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