don't get me wrong, dennett is a brilliant philosopher. however, this book is more aptly titled, 'Consciousness Can Be Explained'. dennett has provide a wonderful precis to a philosophy of mind, but falls short insofar as he has only illustrated the subjunctive stance that consciousness is explainable. what the explanation is is another issue entirely. ( )

Dennett's ideas are interesting, and even fascinating at times. Unfortunately, his writing becomes garrulous and difficult to comprehend.

Maybe I need a better grounding in, and a wider exposure to, metaphysics before trying to finish this book. Or maybe metaphysics isn't something I want to really explore.

Appropriately, though, Dennett addresses Descartes' "theater of the mind" early in the book, and frames his thesis as a contest between cartesian dualism and materialism.

Alper's The God Part of the Brain explores some of the same philosophical questions, but is written more accessibly. Dennett's work on consciousness is a more generalized approach to the nature of human perception and, as such, is abstract in the extreme--not to mention highly technical. ( )

Daniel Dennett shows us why we're stuff doing stuff. ( )

Consciousness exists in a very different way from what we're used to think; it's not a substance, neither a smaller person in our brain who run all the rest.
Dennett tells us that it's more like a software (some knowledge in informatics will help): less real than mere matter, more concrete than an idea.
Dennett perspective is intelligent and sound. He understands that our doubt on the matter comes from our fear that dispelling consciousness will give away our ideas of responsability and moral behaviour. There's no need for that. (He dedicated one more book on the argument, 'Freedom evolves', but here it is a short explanation -> http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/incpages...
Read ”Some observations on the psychology of thinking about free will”, 2007)
It could take more than one lecture to grasp completely all the argumentations and the implications which contrast with our common sense. Though, all the effort pays well.
Some things may have been explained better, but in the end Dennett's perspective is crystal clear.
Philosophy at its best. ( )

(posted on my blog: http://davenichols.net/consciousness-...)

I wish I had read this book many years ago, though after having read the book, I have to question whether my conscious self illusion had developed enough to know how handle the arguments Dr. Dennett presents. From the opening chapters, this book is a candy store for thinkers. Make no mistake, it is deep and will require concentration from most any reader. The rewards, like any good read, are worth the effort as Dennett makes a profound and intensely engaging argument about his philosophy of mind, consciousness, and self. He makes extensive use of the idea of Virtual Machines, software, and AI-style capabilities in building his model of mind.

Dennett opens up in Part 1 with an exploration of the groundwork for his theory, offering the reader some soft (but quickly advancing) concepts of hallucinations, 'mind stuff', and phenomenology (which he abstracts into heterophenomenology for use later). This section skirts some of the more basic philosophical arguments (of which there are general if not specific agreements) in favor of offering challenges to intuition and 'seems to be' type thinking.

In Part II, he breaks down his theory of Multiple Drafts as a more reasonable (and often, direct affront to) the traditional Cartesian Theater arguments. To put this simply, Dennett's theory argues against the firm existence of a Central Meaner (audience in the theater, ultimate decider, aka soul or top brain dog) while presenting his Multiple Drafts idea. He supposes that consciousness arises, not due to the presense of a specific observer/decider, but instead as the reflective consequence of multiple contributions to the mental state. These 'drafts', as he refers to them, are temporary versions of introspective narrative which are only true until they get edited (and these edits take place in a decentralized manner based on many factors). Because the information used to develop the self-narration comes from numerous sources whose functional-chains are often specialized and multifaceted, and because one cannot determine between two types of rewriting (Orwellian, which involves revisionist history, or Stalinesque, which includes more real-time 'made-up' explanations treated as if factual), the Multiple Drafts theory seems to satisfy these issues, as well as solve many of the problems of the tangibility and determinism found in the alternative theories.

The final Part of the book explores the numerous objections likely thrown up at this theory, and offers extended discussion of why Multiple Drafts both fits the evidence and offers the scientific advantage of being testable and falsifiable. Using many thought exercises and scientific studies of brain-damaged or abnormally-acting people, Dennett argues that the idea of quale (a rival explanation in the Cartesian Theater model) doesn't fit the evidence, is self-contradictory, and cannot be reduced in a meaningful and testable manner.

The most fascinating discussion in Explained is Dennett's thoughts on the creation and indoctrination of consciousness. His theory is basically the following: early creatures gained advantage by taking traditional basic instincts and abilities (like fight-or-flight, verticle symmetry detection, etc) and making them more active and available. Rather than only being called for under extreme conditions (or more specifically, only available when the instinct itself notices stimuli it is both equiped to notice and for which it 'cares'), an 'always-on' mentality allowed greater observation and more information collection. This lead to stronger, more efficient means of distributing observation-based data and acting upon instructions that are more likely to be advantageous. Primates in particular got especially good at saccade (visual jumpiness that allows the eye to observe more points in its line-of-sight, thereby, collecting more data), which likely increased our ability to protect ourselves and to find food. Shortcuts were created in the brain at this point which began to lay the foundation architecture for the language to come later.

Early pre-language hominids likely used some audio mechanism to communicate very basic information in a one-directional sort of way. 'I'm looking for food' probably elicited no direct response, though it would have been a data point considered by anyone in earshot. At some point, this stopped being simply one-way, and a question/answer process evolved. 'I'm looking for food' might lead to 'I have a lot of food'. The asker, however, was likely unable to ask and then answer himself, leaving an efficiency gap to be filled. Later, a sole homo sapien likely started the process with a question, but no one else was around to answer. However, a surprising thing happened: he answered himself. 'I'm looking for food' might have been answered by his own voice (or perhaps internally) with 'Try the bush by the big rock.' Not consciously aware of self-talking (as we would define it), but in a 'I just asked about X' and 'I received an answer about X'.

While the process was inefficient, having had to be formulated, passed out the vocal chords and mouth, and received back in the ear and reprocessed, the invaluable addition of consulting one's self quickly became an advantageous Big Trick (Dennett's idea that social evolution can take place very quickly if a specific action or ability could be both possible due to genetics and available to learn from others who themselves would have developed or learned the Trick). From this point on, humans developed an efficiency we now call an inner monologue (although Dennett is careful to say that this is not just a textual 'spoken' monologue, but instead a multi-faceted creation from multiple heterogeneous contributors) which didn't require (but in many of us, still is exhibited as) vocally 'talking to ourselves'.

From this point on, the reader can infer that consciousness came about, not through a guided Observer or Meaner, but through the chaotic, pandemoniac contributions of various brain-functions and sub-functions. Consciousness is more of a bucket of interaction where subroutines can pay attention to both hardwired areas of interest (pain receptors looking for pain in the hands, for example) but also have the ability to contribute to areas of temporary interest (those same pain receptors might offer a concept of pain to the bucket in response to the information that a fire is near before a narrative leading to a hand being placed in the fire can be acted upon).

Dennett also contends that consciousness may well be taught to children (as a meme set) rather than inherited in a traditional genetically-driven manner, and consciousness is only made possible by our ability to use and understand language (at least the sort of consciousness as humans know it to be). 'Words do things with us' he titled one chapter. Dennett does argue that we have to be genetically predisposed to be able to be conscious, but that consciousness itself is only one possible arrangement of the various brain functions available to a human. One quote he uses really boils this down in a way that is both enlightening and haunting, in the words of Helen Keller:

"Before my teacher came to me, I did not know that I am. I lived in a world that was a no-world. I cannot hope to describe adequately that unconscious time of nothingness...Since I had no power of thought, I did not compare one mental state with another.'

This review vastly oversimplifies Dennett's discussion and leaves out dozens of key points and sub-elements which make this book a very deep and rewarding read. Highly, highly recommended for the very curious mind, but I'd advise taking this book to a quiet room for a few days and really allowing yourself to disengage some of those constantly vigilant 'demons' of expectationalism and open up your mind (and self) to ideas you may never have dreamed could be true. Believe Dennett or not on these theories, this book will make you think deep and carefully reconsider many things you took as given in your own head. Five stars. ( )

A detailed and extensive reexamination of consciousness. You may not agree with all of it, but it will certainly make you think. ( )

Consciousness Explained is a hard, but very rewarding, book. I first read it five years ago, and thought I mostly got it, but on reflection, I realise now I probably didn't. After recently getting through Dennett's equally fascinating (and hard) "Darwin's Dangerous Idea" I read it again. It's properly sinking in now, and I think I mostly have it. I think.

If you're considering reading Consciousness Explained, I recommend having a look at Darwin's Dangerous Idea first; some of the ideas Dennett expounds there, particularly on the nature of algorithmic progression, are extremely useful for getting a handle on Dennett's central theme in Consciousness Explained. Dennett's views in each are really quite closely related. However, the "intuitive gap" (i.e., the distance in credibility between what Dennett proposes and how things "seem" intuitively) is huge in the case of consciousness, but comparatively small for Evolution. To wit:

Consciousness: Intuitively, there's a "central meaner" in the brain sitting in a "Cartesian theatre" enjoying the son-et-lumière. Dennett says this is an illusion, and there is no "narrative centre" of consciousness at all - in not so many ways, consciousness itself is an illusion; an aggregation of multiple sensory inputs and outputs of the cerebellum, all of which are performing their own functions independently of each other. "BUT AN ILLUSION TO WHOM?" you want to scream. It just doesn't seem to make sense.

Evolution: Intuitively, the universe seems designed. It seems impossible that it could be the result of blind, unintelligent operations. Darwin says that this is nevertheless the case, through the algorithmic mechanism of reproduction, mutation and natural selection of multiple organisms performing their own functions independently of each other. This isn't such a stretch, especially as the notion of a designer of the universe is an even more problematic idea, when you give it a moment's thought.

And that's precisely the point. Dennett argues persuasively (as, of course, many have before him) that a Cartesian theatre is just such a preposterous idea as a designer of the universe. Once you've ruled it out, all you are left with is the mechanical functions of the brain (unless, with Roger Penrose, you want to say "Quantum Mechanics did it!"), so you don't have any choice in the matter: the only question is how to build these mechanical, independent operations up into something which can function like consciousness. Like evolution, an aggregation of algorithms can be a "crane" which can achieve more than a simple algorithm. And so on. When you account for the actual - heterophenomenological, if I may be so bold - quality of consciousness, you notice it's incomplete, it's bitty, it's missing stuff: it isn't quite the widescreen, 7.1 THX certified surround-sound audio-visual experience we think it is, which is all grist to Dennett's mill.

Dennett is open that this is an opening salvo rather than a complete theory, and I am very interested to find out where this has all led. To my mind too much time is spent on stimulus and response - qualia, visual images and the like - which ought to be comparatively easy to explain in terms of multiple drafts - and not enough time is spent explaining how on Dennett's theory a human being, who only *seems* to have consciousness, can create clearly intentional objects, such as this book review, or more critically, a book as coherent and persuasive as Dennett's. It is difficult to analyse this sort of intentional action without a "central meaner" to be putting the view. I think Dennett's view might be able to be developed in this direction, but to my mind insufficient resource was put into this endeavour.

As he does in Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Daniel Dennett courts controversy and seems to pick intemperate fights with his competitors, and you do wonder whether a few straw men aren't being erected. Certainly, there is the odd cheap shot, but that adds to the entertainment value - the idea of fully grown philosophers drawing handbags at forty paces is one which appeals to me, and Dennett's views on his major competitor John Searle have this quality.

But John Searle should perhaps take some comfort: Dennett may at times seem abrasive, but he surely doesn't *mean* to be.

If you know what I mean. ( )

This book revises the traditional view of consciousness by claiming that Cartesianism and Descartes' dualism of mind and body should be replaced with theories from the realms of neuroscience, psychology and artificial intelligence. What people think of as the stream of consciousness is not a single, unified sequence, the author argues, but "multiple drafts" of reality composed by a computer-like "virtual machine". Dennett considers how consciousness could have evolved in human beings and confronts the classic mysteries of consciousness: the nature of introspection, the self or ego and its relation to thoughts and sensations, and the level of consciousness of non-human creatures.

Not an easy read, but rewarding.

Deep, hurmorous, eclectic, and convincing---my favorite kind of philosophy. ( )

Dennetts views on qualia are rubbish but the rest is fantastic - a great synthesis and also original. ( )

One of the most wrong headed books on consciousness. At times Dennett reminds me of Gates and Clinton on the witness stand. ( )

Explains nothing.

I really tried sticking with this book but finally lost interest around page 436 (with only 32 pages left to go!). ( )

Mini-review: This is not a book about NLP, and I doubt that the author has ever heard of NLP. Yet his thesis of the ‘mechanism of mind’ and of the how consciousness might work is, in my opinion, another significant piece in the jig-saw that links the NLP model with what might be called ‘more mainstream’ philosophy and, perhaps, ‘psychology’ though this book is definitely in the former class. ( )

Dennet deconstructs and refutes most theories of human consciousness. He then proposes some models which can explain some facets of human consciousness. He does not explain the core mysteries of consciousness. This book is essential for anyone who would like to better understand human consciousness. ( )

In Consciousness Explained, Daniel Dennett makes the best and most persuasive case for the materialist solution to what used to be called the “mind-body" problem. For the materialist, the problem has three related parts: 1) Logical--how could a seemingly nonphysical sort of thing, consciousness, be logically consistent with a world consisting only of physical matter? 2) Metaphysical--assuming we solve the first problem, then HOW exactly could a physical thing or process such as a living brain simply “be" or “cause" or “give rise to" consciousness? And 3) Epistemological--how could we ever KNOW (except perhaps in the case of ourselves) which physical things or processes were also conscious? (How could we ever know that a particular robot or computer was conscious, for example?)

Dennett’s solution is radical and sounds almost preposterous at first: consciousness--if we define it as independent of functional or behavioral states or dispositions--does not really exist! Thus it has been remarked that the book should really be titled “Consciousness Explained Away" (an intended criticism which I suspect Dennett is secretly and humorously proud of, as it gets his view exactly right). Dennett addresses the “zombie problem"--the thought experiment where we think we can imagine a zombie (or a sophisticated computer, perhaps) that outwardly exhibits all the signs of consciousness without actually being conscious--as a sort of mistake. We believe we can imagine such a thing, but really we cannot, or the concept makes no sense. In the same way, Dennett notes, earlier exponents of the “élan vitale" theory of living creatures--that creatures were alive in virtue of possessing some additional special substance or property--would simply be confused if they had purported to imagine a thing lacking élan vitale mimicking, or outwardly imitating, a living creature. We now believe there is no such thing as élan vitale: some things are certainly alive, but they are alive merely in virtue of behaving in certain ways--being able to reproduce, for example, or exhibiting certain complex patterns of movement or physical change. So it is with consciousness. Thus, for Dennett, to behave in all ways “as if" one is conscious is simply to be conscious. There is no additional question or problem. (Whether robots or computers could ever be conscious is therefore an empirical question which could go either way. It might be that an artificial brain made of metal and plastic could never be conscious in the sense in which some science-fiction authors have assumed, but this would simply be due to limitations of physics. It may just turn out that organic, carbon based “computers" such as our brains are the only efficient mechanisms--in a human sized brain space--for producing conscious sorts of behavior.)

Against Dennett, it might be objected that his "eliminativist" position just gets things wrong from the beginning. We know there is such a thing as consciousness, distinct from and in addition to any sort of outwardly observable dispositions. And we know it directly and with certainty. It just seems obvious, so goes the objection, that, in Thomas Nagel’s well-known formulation, we could know everything there is to know, scientifically and empirically about, for example, the brain and behavior of a bat, but that wouldn’t tell us what it is actually like to BE a bat. Of course, Dennett would simply reject this. In a sense, the dispute seems unresolvable, and it is initially difficult to see what further “work" or “progress" (as a philosopher would say) could be done or had by either side to clinch the issue. What I think is clear is that for a consistent materialist, Dennett’s theory is really the only game in town. Whether this is ultimately a plus or minus for the plausibility of materialism, is another question.

This book gets an additional star due to the fact that it is the only published work of philosophy which contains the name of your humble reviewer in the index. ( )