Europe's Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914? (2004)

An excellent and readable account of the summer of 1914, although I found the title somewhat annoying, as we have had plenty of summers since 1914, but a small quibble. David Fromkin explains the complex web of events very clearly and concisely. He also sums up the action after a few chapters, useful if you haven't quite followed things or missed something. I am no expert on these events but for me he gave the latest research and thinking and often summarised previous or alternative ideas around disputed ideas. The story is told in a clear time-line and it was an interesting and even gripping tale, well told. ( )

3873. Europe's Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914?, by David Fromkin (read 7 Apr 2004) Mainly because I was so impressed by Fromkin's A Peace to End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East 1914-1922 (read 28 Jan 1996) and In the Time of the Americans FDR, Truman, Eisenhower, Marshall, MacArthur -- The Generation That Changed America's Role in the World (read 18 Feb 1996), I read this new book by him (though with a title like that how could I not read it?) It is on a subject on which I have read much, including Sidney Bradshaw Fay's two volumes (in 1968) and Luigi Albertini's three volumes (in 1986). This book is easy to read and is not reluctant to arrive at conclusions, all of which I liked. He says there were two wars: Austria's against Serbia, which von Berchtold and Conrad wanted, and the war on Russia, which Helmuth con Moltke, the German Army chief of staff wanted. While the book is not well footnoted, it is still pretty persuasive. A great book on an endlessly fascinating subject. ( )

Very interesting book on the events leading up to the start of WWI. After reading this book you will understand that many of the causes that lead to the eventual rise of the Third Reich had their genesis prior to the start of the WWI. The authors style is a bit off, but that was really the only down side. A must read. ( )

Very interesting book. Fromkin basically concludes that the assassination of Franz Ferdinand provided the pretext everyone needed to proceed with the Great War they all wanted. (As an example, he notes that Vienna started drafting the memorandum-plan to crush Serbia two weeks BEFORE Sarajevo.) Fromkin does place especial blame on Germany's General Helmuth von Moltke. Yet they all wanted war. As Teddy Roosevelt said in 1897, "No triumph of peace is quite so great as the supreme triumphs of war." (JAF)

I enjoyed Europe's Last Summer. Fromkin does a good job of elucidating a good deal of information with a clear analysis of a very complex set of events. The conventional wisdom, for a long time, was that the murder of Franz Ferdinand, with the complicity of some in Serbia, set the stage for the Austria's attack which, through the interlocking sets of alliances in place at the time, cascaded into a full-scale European, and world, war. Fromkin disagrees. He argues that the key point to grasp is not that there was one war that started small and escalated into something much larger, but that the conflict in 1914 consisted on two wars, intertwined and started deliberately, but separate. The first was Austria's war on Serbia which Austria was spoiling for in order to forestall the growth of any greater pan-Slav solidarity in the Balkans under the Serbs. As Fromkin argues:

"...as we now know, Austria-Hungary did not care whether Serbia was guilty of the murders or not. If anything, members of the imperial court came close to welcoming the assassinations. The government of Austria-Hungary...used the events of June 28 as an excuse for doing what it planned to do anyway. Better yet, the assassinations provided an opportunity to secure the support of Germany, which was vital to the success of Austria's plan to attack Serbia."

The second war was that of Germany against Russia, a war that many Germans expected, and devoutly hoped for, to staunch the growing strength and challenge of Russia and to maintain German power and authority in Europe. But Germany had to make itself look like the victim, and it did so by maneuvering the Austrians to the point where Russia mobilized and then Germany could take the defensive posture of mobilizing itself.

Germany was a country of contradictions:

"An advanced country inside a backward governmental structure, broadly humanist yet narrowly militarist, Germany was a land of paradoxes. Outside observers saw it as the coming country, the land of the future, while its own leaders believed that its time was running out. It was dazzlingly successful, but profoundly troubled, powerful but fearful to the point of paranoia. It was symbolized by its ruler, who was both physically and emotionally unbalanced. Located in the heart of Europe, Germany was at the heart of Europe's problems."

Add to this the pressure of the Prussian military elite who saw war as the only way to maintain their way of life, and the belief of Moltke, chief of the Great General Staff that, "war was inevitable and the sooner the better". Moltke believed that time was on the side of the Russians and so a preventive war should be initiated as soon as possible. In fact, in assigning blame, Fromkin puts a lot on Moltke and others in the German foreign ministry who deliberately sabotaged the directions of the Kaiser which were much more pacific and which, if followed, might have defused the crisis. Fromkin on Moltke:

"It is an arresting thought that, to the extent that any individual did so, this modest, unexceptional and indeed rather ordinary career army officer started the Great War, and thereby ushered in the twentieth century, with all its horrors and wonders."

One of the striking characteristics of the history of events from the murders of Franz Ferdinand and his wife to the advent of war, is just how very few people were involved in the decision-making in any of the countries. For astute observers, the tensions were certainly there and one could have expected war at some time, but in the summer of 1914, it is small wonder that, in retrospect, the war seemed to drop out of a clear blue sky. Interesting also to note that Kaiser Wilhelm and Franz Ferdinand were, by all accounts, difficult and mercurial men, but they both supported peace. The Kaiser's basic error, in reaction to the murder of his friend Franz Ferdinand, was to agree to give Austria carte blanche of German support in its dealings with Serbia, something that those angling for a larger war used to good effect in manipulating the Austrians.

Could it have been stopped? Fromkin is doubtful. As he notes, it takes two to make peace and only one to make war, and in the summer of 1914, there were two wars brewing: Austria versus Serbia and Germany versus Russia (which also required dealing with France). As he notes, "It was no accident that Europe went to war at that time. It was the result of premeditated decisions by two governments".

And in the final ironies, after all of its preparations and machinations, the Austro-Hungarian army was crushed by the Serbians and then they joined the wider conflict: "They moved to the Russian front and were crushed there too." Fromkin quotes Keegan in noting that by December 1914, the Hapsburg Empire had lost 1, 268,000 men out of 3,350,000 mobilized. Austria fought on under German command in a struggle just to survive, never mind the dreams of conquest in the summer of 1914. And after the debacle of the battle of the Marne in September, 1914 when some thought Moltke had snatched defeat from the jaws of victory by withdrawing, the Kaiser sacked 33 German generals and Moltke himself lost his job.

This is good history and well-worth reading.