I enjoyed this book to start -- I enjoyed the fact that the author, seemed to at least, spoke the truth about Obama's foreign policy and presidency -- he made a lot of promises to get elected and kept none of them, staying with the status quo instead.

I stopped listening to the book when the author said the only way to get out of the Middle East and it's hold on the US is to do more digging for oil and fracking here, completely downplaying renewable resources. Anyone who believes we need to continue out dependance on fossil fuels, I stop listening to.

Adrianne ( )

We readers who are not policy wonks but remain interested in foreign affairs develop an understanding of American interests through information from our favorite news sources and our knowledge about history and culture. Based on these accumulated facts and opinions, we draw our conclusions and shape our view of what America ought and ought not do.

If we’re lucky, though, an author comes along who presents us with a thorough and compelling reexamination of our foreign policy which challenges our previous and more shallow understanding. The depth of the author’s presentation of the issues stands apart from the more common, fast-paced news and analysis. This was the case, for example, with Thomas Friedman’s From Beirut to Jerusalem and Robert Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts. Vali Nasr’s The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat now joins this list.

The title encapsulates intriguing themes pursued by Nasr. Is American foreign policy, indeed, in retreat. And if so, to what extent, and is this a good or bad thing. Has America become a dispensable nation, and what might the consequences be.

Since 9-11 America’s engagement with the world has been focused primarily on the Middle East with America assuming reactive (e.g., counterterrorism) and preemptive positions (e.g. claims of nuclear arms in Iraq and now, most ominously, perhaps in Iran). One could argue that the first position is understandable but the second was and is seriously damaging to America’s long term interests. With questionable benefits fighting for years throughout the Middle East, America is exhausted financially and its desire to spread democracy quickly via largely military means has lost momentum. A preoccupation with homeland security is a limited objective for developing long-range self interests and global stability.

Although it makes sense that America should want to extricate itself from the muddy waters of the Middle East, Nasr argues forcefully that it is short-sighted and against American interests to do so. He finds an important distinction between ending wars and closing all types of engagement. For too long, in fact, American foreign policy has been little else except the exercise of military might. Had America invested instead in economic development and diplomacy it is quite possible the Middle East countries would be more stable today and on their way to more open, less authoritarian forms of government.

Nasr served as a senior advisor to Richard Holbrooke when he was the US Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and his book is largely a tribute to the philosophy of engagement and diplomacy which Holbrooke practiced so effectively throughout his career. When Nasr speaks, it is often as if he were Holbrooke. You can clearly see the high regard Nasr has for Holbrooke’s skills, and the frustration he feels since his absence.

Nasr is not alone in his view. Michael Ellliott’s remembrance of Holbrooke in Time magazine said, “When F. Scott Fitzgerald heard of the death of Thomas Wolfe, he sent a message of condolence to Maxwell Perkins, their editor at Scribner. ‘That great, pulsing, vital frame quiet at last,’ Fitzgerald wrote. ‘There is a great hush after him.’ To countless numbers around the world, that is how things feel with the death of Richard Holbrooke, America's diplomat extraordinary.”

Nasr argues for giving greater authority to the role of experienced diplomats. In addition to Holbrooke, Nasr cites the nuanced leadership skills of Hilary Clinton. Although critics recently weighing in on Clinton’s accomplishments as Secretary of State found her unable to claim a major peace accord, Nasr claims Clinton was outstanding, especially when considering the constraints on her by Obama’s political advisors, unwilling to risk anything. To her credit, despite that, she found ways to correct a damaged view of America abroad and replace it with positive assertions of American values. Nasr cites her speech in Africa where she cautioned Africa to look to the US, rather than China, as a “model of sustainable partnership that adds value, rather than extracts it.” This statement could be applied beyond Africa to the Middle East.

Both Holbrooke and Clinton, highly experienced politicians themselves, constantly battled with political advisors to make their cases. When diplomacy collided with political advice, political advisors usually prevailed. There is nothing new in this except it is noteworthy occurring in the Obama administration where foreign policy is now rocking to and fro in a lassize faire style lacking a careful thought out approach to the region.

Relying on the chaotic world of political campaign-style maneuvering is no substitute for the advice of foreign policy veterans and can result in misguided policies. Political benefits are not America’s long-term interests. Using this modus operandi, America’s recent positions regarding the Arab Spring have yo-yoed leaving the world, but particularly the Middle East itself, to see inconsistency. When America does actively become involved, it is largely now disengagement and drone strikes.

Nasr notes that America has never before encountered so much change and uncertainty in so many Middle East countries and all at once . The instability of the region has been magnified by the Arab Spring. The “value of the Arab Spring to Iran is that it will ensnare America in conflicts and distractions; Iran is not as weak as America thinks because America is not as strong as it thinks. As one astute Middle East observer put it to me, ‘America is standing with its back to a tsunami. It does not see what is coming at it.’” Although Israel is America’s one true ally in the region, Nasr argues America should realize the country we next have the most in common with is Iran. The Middle East is full of such ironies, but we tend not to indulge in recognizing them.

Nasr builds his case for American engagement in the Middle East closely examining our involvements with Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, the Arab Spring, Persian Gulf countries and China. While the Obama administration seems inclined to pivot to Asia and back away from the Middle East, the facts of oil, Israel and terrorism will not allow that. China, in particular, has emerged as a key power player with economic interests in the Middle East. Nasr reminds us that while America has been using its resources fighting in Afghanistan and creating pockets of stability, China was the first country to benefit by that relative security by obtaining a mining contract.

What Nasr is arguing for is essentially a return to considering the balance of power in foreign policy. This concept seldom is used today, relinquished to the “old way” pile along with those veteran foreign policy analysts. Like a chess match, moves by one country result in an array of other possible moves by many other players. The Sunni-Shia rivalry is often more important than the country borders, and America must fine- tune its moves accordingly. Unfortunately, despite the ongoing civil wars playing out throughout the Middle East, most Americans, including Congress, seem oblivious to this Sunni-Shia tension driving the instability throughout the region. We seem to prefer going with the simpler, but inaccurate, picture of Arabs and Muslims as terrorists.

In contrast, Nasr would have us put into practice that speech Clinton delivered in Africa which was turning increasingly to China for economic development and ties. So, too, might the Middle East ties to China, already strong, increase in the absence of an American non-military role.

Although Nasr’s criticisms of the Obama administration’s weak and largely reactive foreign policy are persuasive, one cannot discount the opposing argument that doing little may be better than doing something unwise. A pragmatic politician is still better than a foolish one.

As Nasr himself argues, recent foreign policy has been largely a matter of military involvement. To stop that military dominance is a good step, and perhaps the necessary first step to reengage with less military force as Nasr recommends. Obama’s instinct to proceed cautiously, even if pragmatically motivated for political advantage, is still a vast improvement over the decades-long tendency to embrace the most authoritarian regimes to protect our economic interests. After all, it is our own role in the region that helped set in motion the unraveling of long festering animosities. That is something Obama seems to recognize while he is still at sea as to what new course to set.

Nasr has asked a fundamental and critical question: what are American interests in the Middle East. Until we address this question openly and with informed debate, our foreign policy will be left to politicians. It is time for statesmen and skilled analysts to reclaim their needed voice. That will only happen, however, if Americans insist upon that.

I've only read a little of the US's foreign policy regarding the Middle East. This was definitely a pretty good introduction to recent past and the current situation. It is definitely a very one sided perspective, and I could likely get a much different view from other authors. He backs up most of his assertions with facts and there's enough information there to read between the lines and remove some of the author's bias. I think it would be important for this book to be only one of several in formulating and opinion of our current foreign policy. ( )

This is an informative book about foreign policy in the middle east. The author covers issues related to several of the countries in the middle east including: Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Vali is an expert on the issues and has some definite opinions on how America should best be a player in this area. He anticipates a growing involvement by China in the area and in international issues in general. I am not an expert in this area, so I consider this to be educational. I cannot intelligently comment on the veracity or the wisdom of his suggestions. ( )

While Vali Nasr, doesn’t put all the blame on President Barack Obama for what he sees as the decline of America’s role in today’s world, he does blame him for much of it. Born and raised in Iran, the dean of the Paul H. Nitze Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and former senior advisor to Ambassador Richard Holbrook, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Nasr was in a unique position to observe the workings of the Obama administration’s foreign policy.
The chapters focus on Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, the Arab Spring, the role of other nations, especially China, in the changing Middle East, the influence of other Arab and Moslem countries, and what America can do to regain credibility.
When he campaigned for office, Obama spoke about changing the policies of President George W. Bush and extricating the US from the Middle East wars begun during that administration. Unfortunately, President Obama chose to surround himself with “a small cabal of relatively inexperienced White House advisors” who were more concerned about “how any action in Afghanistan or the Middle East would play on the nightly news” or how the Republicans would be able to use his actions against him.
Nasr claims that “America went into Iraq to build democracy, but left building an authoritarian state as an exit strategy....Obama was not really committed to democracy in the Middle East.” That lack of a foreign policy, partially the result of Obama’s inexperience in that area and of his over reliance on his close-knit, inexperienced group of advisors formed the core of his inability to resolve the issues in America’s favor. They were used to working in a fast-pace campaign mode. Governing a country requires different skills.
Obama also insisted on examining every detail personally, which not only slowed down the process for making decisions, it also lessened the information that could be used to make those decisions. In addition, when he did not like the options he was offered, instead of asking for more options, he chose one of them anyhow.
Leaders of the opposition of both Afghanistan and Pakistan sent messages that they wanted to talk to the US to find a solution to the war. The US refused to meet with them, preferring to use the military to achieve its aims.
When writing about Iran, Nasr states that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad wanted to deal with the US. Unfortunately his tactics backfired. “He hoped his vitriol, denying the Holocaust, taunting Israel, and rallying resistance to America, would make him too important to ignore....He made himself a pariah.” He wrote to Obama to congratulate him on his election in 2008. He received no response. He supported making a deal about the nuclear issue but got no credit for that.
To get Russia’s support for sanctions against Iraq, Obama ignored the human rights abuses perpetrated by Russia.
It is necessary to win the support of the people in order for a government to be successful but the US provided money to help favored projects regardless of how they would help the population. For example, COIN (counterinsurgency) sent almost all its money into Helmand province which housed fewer than one percent of the population. In 2011, only six percent of Afghans had electricity but the US spent $1 billion to provide electricity to parts of Kandahar.
In both Pakistan and Afghanistan, Holbrook and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton believed the United States should engage the people and use that relationship to achieve if not a peaceful at least a workable solution to the problems. For example, the State Department noted that the US went into Afghanistan to get the Taliban. When the group moved to Pakistan, the US continued the fight in Afghanistan. The Obama Administration chose, instead, to use a dual approach: diplomacy plus military might with the emphasis on the latter. It also excluded the State Department from many of the meetings relating to the Middle East and ignored its observations.
People in the are fear our military power because they think we use it recklessly and they can’t defend themselves against it. They don’t want to agree to plans they know won’t work and put their nations at risk. They believe we will abandon them when push comes to shove, or even earlier, leaving them to deal with the mess we have made.
None of the issues that brought us to the Middle East have been resolved. Instead, China has taken advantage of the turmoil and has been gaining influence. It wants to extend its influence in the Middle East and maintain the oil and gas sources it desperately needs. Part of its operation is giving money to the countries for projects that the people can actually see, such as bridges, highways and rail routes, which makes China more appealing to them. China also has the ability to move some of the low-paying jobs which have resulted in low cost products throughout much of the world, including the US, to Arab countries. That would help resolve two problems: Unemployment and low incomes.
Another major problem underlies much of the turmoil in the Middle East: Sunni versus Shia. The sectarian feuds, many caused by minority-ruled governments, will not disappear without a lot of work and time. The US doesn’t seem to want to expend either.
The Arab Spring was the result of a long history of “political repression, economic stagnation, and cultural and religious expression.” Nasr writes that the US should return to diplomacy and economic engagement to help regain its preeminent place in the world as well as help bring democracy to other countries. We should “ensure regional stability and promote regional harmony.” It worked before and could do so again.
As I write this review, Egypt has overthrown its democratically elected president after less than a year in office. The country’s future is uncertain. The US is planning its exit from Afghanistan while terrorist attacks against the forces we support are ongoing. These issues or the possibility of them are discussed in the book.
This well-written, well-documented book does an excellent job putting America’s foreign policy and its results under a microscope and provides suggestions for improvement. It
supports many of the comments found in Kim Ghattas’s recent book THE SECRETARY which discussed Hillary Clinton’s years as Secretary of State.
I received my Early Reviewers copy from LibraryThing. ( )