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Loading... Roosevelt and Churchill: men of secretsby David Stafford
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will love Sign up for LibraryThing to find out whether you'll like this book. A cool book. Both these men were formidable and facinating in their own way. A great book if you want to learn more about how the whole modern spy game got started. Mostly about intelligence, as you might expect from David Stafford, who mainly writes spy histories. This book concentrates on the conflicts, compromises and co-operation between FDR and WSC in the field of intelligence, with particular reference to the relationship between Churchill's SOE and FDR's OSS. This narrow field might be disappointing to anyone hoping for a more general account of the relationship between the two leaders, but of itself this isn't a bad book at all. It eschews sensationalism, has a decent regard for evidence and the reliability or otherwise thereof, and is tolerably well written. However, it doesn't really add anything new to the story, and suffers somewhat from long digressions away from the main subject (one particularly dull passage relates at too much length the story of a 'covert operation' in Spain that seems to have achieved nothing except enriching various Francoite leaders). An interesting sidelight for students of the era, but hardly essential reading. Informed view of FDR/WC relationship and the tension sheds light on gaps in WC's WW2 history and in particular money paid indirectly to keep Spain out of the axis. Britain's and WC's subordinate role as the war progresses is subtly expressed. Worth a read. no reviews | add a review
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We learn about the fascination both leaders held for the clandestine services, and the power struggles between their respective directors: “Wild Bill” Donovan in the U.S., and Sir Stewart Menzies in Great Britain. We don’t learn much about Donovan and Menzies as men, nor as spy directors: their stories are restricted to how they expressed the wills of their heads of government.
Churchill’s admiration for Roosevelt is explored in depth, as is his increasing (and reluctant) capitulation to the great American juggernaut as the war progressed. But Churchill wouldn’t discuss India, and in general Roosevelt ignored the subject, although he felt strongly about Indian independence. The two also disagreed on Stalin; Churchill fought in vain to get Roosevelt to recognize the danger of the USSR.
On the whole, I felt the book kept scratching the surface, but never taking the plunge. For example, I was surprised to find out how much time Churchill spent at the White House, but I never did really glean what he was doing there all that time, nor how Roosevelt felt about him after they got to know one another. Bletchley Park, Ultra and Magic were constant topics of discussion, and yet nothing much was said of what they were or did or accomplished. Famous moles merited only a passing mention, as they weren’t part of the overall intelligence strategy, I assume.
On balance, I would say this book had entertaining moments, but presented more of a tease than a solid reward. (