This is the CIA station chief from Pakistan around 9/11 (who also had extensive responsibilities with Afghanistan), and later high-level CIA official's opinion of internal and external CIA politics and activities throughout his career (up until around 2014). Spoiler alert: CIA really didn't get along with DOD Rumsfeld Cheney, and everyone thought CPA was incompetent.

Probably the best part of the book was the concept of "first" and "second" US-Afghan wars, and the possibility of a third. Essentially the first was the CIA/SOF-driven small war from 2001-2005 (which was largely "won", in the sense of achieving the limited initial objectives, by the end of 2001); the second was the 2005-Present failure involving the big army, hundreds of thousands of military personnel, and essentially negative gains. The third US-Afghan war would be whatever happens after we pull out, Afghanistan becomes a threat again, and we're forced to intervene again.

It's evident from this book that Grenier is very convinced of his own superiority, but it also seems very likely his high estimate of his own competence is accurate. It also seems like CIA, DOD, and the rest of the US Government really were the wrong tools for the job in 2001 (and really, since the end of the Cold War), and that the internal politics within CIA's bureaucracy are toxic and counter to US interests. What's interesting to me is what a purpose-built entity would look like -- and would probably work a lot closer to how a business enters a new market than how CIA/DOD handle operations.

As a tangent, I'd be interested in a book about the role of gender politics within CIA; from this book, other books, and other reports I've heard, it seems like a lot of the post-cold-war hires were female, and highly concentrated in certain roles/departments, and at cross purposes to the post-9/11 challenges, and that the post-9/11 personnel were excessively paramilitary/drone focused, perhaps bad in the other direction. ( )