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The Cold War: A New History by John Lewis…
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The Cold War: A New History

by John Lewis Gaddis

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Very ideologically driven vision of the Cold War - at times fun to read but watch out. ( )
  behemothing | Oct 25, 2014 |
Wonderful overview of the Cold War from end of WWII to end of Soviet Union. All the major players and their contributions as well as all the major playgrounds. Overuse of appositive structures slowed down the reading, but did not detract too much. Probably required to maintain high level overview and avoid too much detail. ( )
  econtom | Oct 22, 2013 |
Filled in some blanks, the part about Nixon is especially relevant today ( )
  BakuDreamer | Sep 7, 2013 |
The rivalry of the “official” Cold War may have ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December, 1991, but John Lewis Gaddis still has an ax to grind. In his mind, the USSR was never anything but The Evil Empire, and the U.S. never had anything but good intentions. And the most important factor in striking down that Evil was none other than that alleged towering paragon of strategy and tactics, Ronald Reagan.

The Cold War: A New History provides an excellent example of the ideological biases of a historian creating a skewed misrepresentation of the facts about an era in order to conform with biased perceptions. This so-called “new history” is full of sweeping generalizations, unwarranted conclusions, and dubious assertions that scream out bias at every turn. I’m just going to point out a few that irritated me more than the rest.

Gaddis is an unabashed Reagan idolizer, although he himself is the only "authority" he can come up with to footnote when he bestows lavish praises upon Reagan. His thesis is that it was Ronald Reagan, more than anyone or any event, who was responsible for the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War. In support of this dubious allegation, Gaddis asserts: “Reagan was as skillful a politician as the nation had seen for many years, and one of its sharpest grand strategists ever.” In a sentence worthy of Animal Farm, Gaddis declares about Reagan, “His strength lay in his ability to see beyond complexity to simplicity.”

Almost all other accounts tell a different story. Reagan’s biographer Lou Cannon wrote that Reagan came to the White House “notoriously ill-informed about foreign affairs” and that Bill Clark, his second national security advisor, found that he could only teach Reagan about issues by showing him movies.

Robert McFarlane (quoted by Pulitzer Prize winning historian Richard Rhodes, in Arsenals of Folly) explained that the fundamentalist Reagan derived his commitment to strategic defense “primarily from his belief that Armageddon was approaching.” McFarlane went on:

"He sees himself as a romantic, heroic figure who believes in the power of a hero to overcome even Armageddon. I think it may come from Hollywood.” Frank Carlucci, one of Reagan’s five national security advisers, confirmed that Reagan was guided in his decision-making by the belief that, as Reagan said in 1971, “Everything is in place for the battle of Armageddon and the second coming of Christ.”

Without the Bible (or a script) around as a guide, however, Reagan was in trouble. When he met with Gorbachev, he read from a pocket set of color-coded cue cards he carried, full of clichés. As Rhodes reported, Gorbachev was appalled at Reagan’s index cards with their vapid maxims and his initial unwillingness to engage Gorbachev directly, recalling ‘the blank, uncomprehending eyes of the president, who mumbled banalities from a piece of paper.’”

Rhodes tells about the time Reagan dropped his cue cards, and was literally unable to continue with the meeting after that.

But let’s go back to the beginning, when the seeds for the Cold War were just getting planted. Gaddis traces the intellectual underpinnings of the Cold War, which followed World War II, to the visions of both Wilson and Lenin at the end of World War I.

To me, the most egregious misrepresentation in the book is the portrait Gaddis paints of Woodrow Wilson, one of the most reprehensible presidents in our American pantheon. Wilson, yet another president guided by his understanding of the Bible (this characteristic seems to elevate the decision-making process of a president in Gaddis’s estimation), is made out by Gaddis to be democracy’s champion. Wilson, Gaddis explains, saw a world that could be made better by capitalism, and Lenin saw one that could be improved by socialism. So far, so good. But then Gaddis continues that although both ideologies were meant to offer hope, one of them (socialism) depended upon the creation of fear, while the other "had no need to do so. Therein lay the basic ideological asymmetry of the Cold War.”

Writing this about Wilson is just pure, unadulterated garbage. Wilson is the president who, as World War I began, put into force a 200,000 member American Protective League, who reported to the Justice Department’s new internal security agency headed by J. Edgar Hoover, and whose mission was to spy on neighbors and coworkers for “loyalty.” Another force, the “Minute Men,” ultimately exceeding over 100,000 in number, gave patriotic speeches before meetings, movies, and shows. George Creel, named by Wilson to head the Minute Men, told his workers that "fear was an important element to be bred in the civilian population" (my emphasis). Creel’s organization also advised citizens to spy on one another and “If you find a disloyal person in your search, give his name to the Department of Justice in Washington and tell them where to find him.”

Wilson’s government arrested union men for “disloyalty,” and put socialist presidential candidate Eugene Debs in prison for ten years for “opposing the war.” Wisconsin Congressman Victor Berger, the first Socialist elected to Congress, was sentenced to twenty years under the Wilson-initiated Espionage Act for doing the same. [The Espionage Act of June, 1917, made it a crime to “convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of its enemies when the United States is at war, to cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States, or to willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States.” The violator of this Act could be fined $10,000 and sentenced to twenty years in prison. In May 1918, Congress at Wilson’s request increased the government’s power to control opinion with the Sedition Act, which basically was a set of amendments to the Espionage Act. It added to the list of punishable crimes anyone who used “disloyal, scurrilous, profane or abusive language” about the U.S. government, the armed forces, the flag, or the Constitution. The Sedition Act was repealed on December 13, 1920, but the Espionage Act is still in force.]

It is also true that Wilson’s devotion to hope and liberty only extended to the “superior” white race. His response to seeing the racist movie “Birth of a Nation” is indicative of his attitude. ("The Birth of A Nation," the highest grossing film of the silent film era, portrays black men (played by white actors in blackface) as unintelligent and sexually aggressive towards white women, and shows the Ku Klux Klan as a heroic force.) Reportedly Wilson said, “My only regret is that it is all so terribly true.” When the NAACP tried to have the movie banned, Wilson’s endorsement was used to promote the film for months, before political pressure caused him to dissociate himself from it. But Wilson of course is also the one who allowed his Cabinet leaders to extend segregation throughout the federal bureaucracy, telling black leaders that it would reduce friction and therefore “It is as far as possible from being a movement against the Negroes. I sincerely believe it to be in their interest.” (For more on Wilson, see The Illusion of Victory: America in World War I by Thomas Fleming).

Racism is also absent from Gaddis’s very brief coverage of the McCarthy Era during the Cold War, when Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy led a witch hunt against American citizens, and in particular those who had “leftist” sympathies. During the McCarthy era (lasting roughly from the late 1940s to the late 1950s), thousands of Americans were accused of being Communists or communist sympathizers and became the subject of aggressive investigations and questioning before government or private-industry panels, committees and agencies. In spite of inconclusive or questionable evidence, many people suffered loss of employment, destruction of their careers, and even imprisonment. Some committed suicide. Among those who lost their jobs was the brilliant J. Robert Oppenheimer, who helped develop the atomic bomb in World War II. His opposition to its continued use and to the development of the hydrogen bomb was seen as “proof” of his disloyalty.

It also happened that many prominent blacks during this time were determined to have leftist sympathies, since vocalizing objections to the treatment of blacks in America was also considered disloyal. Among those attacked were Paul Robeson, Langston Hughes, Lena Horne, and W.E.B. DuBois.

This horrible period in American history merits a whole one and one half paragraphs in this book, with Gaddis’s summarizing it by commenting: “with the onset of McCarthyism in the United States and with irrefutable evidence that espionage had taken place on both sides of the Atlantic….” In other words, it wasn’t so bad, and anyway, McCarthy was right.

The entire orientation of this book is that the U.S. was a largely innocent force of good in the world, and the USSR wanted nothing more than to sabotage the American way of life. But the so-called American way of life was (1) only open to whites; (2) only free to the extent the government decided to allow it at any one time; and (3) characterized by organizations dedicated to spying and sabotage that were every bit as nefarious as those operating in the Soviet Union.

George Kennan, whose 1946 analysis of the Soviet Union became the basis for U.S. Cold War strategy, stated that he “believed that the American focus on the Russian military threat was a misguided American projection onto Russia of a danger that would confer legitimacy on the continued existence of the immense military establishment that the formerly isolationist United States had built up during the war.” (“Wise Men Against the Grain,” William Pfaff, NYReview of Books, June 9, 2011)

Years after the fact, “tidbits” get admitted, such as:

  • The overthrow of the democratically elected but leftist Iranian Prime Minister Mossadegh in the 1950’s [this mission led by none other than Kermit Roosevelt, grandson of Theodore, and the blowback for which included the taking of American hostages in 1979];


  • Operation Northwoods, a 1962 plan drafted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, calling for terrorist attacks on Americans secretly committed by the U.S. but blamed on the Cubans to justify an attack on Cuba;


  • The CIA-backed ouster of the democratically elected leftist President Allende of Chile in 1973;


  • CIA-backed Contra invasions in Nicaragua directed by Reagan in the 1980’s; [In 1984 the CIA mined three Nicaraguan harbors. When Nicaragua took this action to the World Court, which an $18 billion judgment was rendered against the U.S. In response, the U.S. refused to recognize the Court's jurisdiction in the case.]


  • One could go on and on.

    None of these episodes are explored by Gaddis. His recital of Cold War crimes is almost exclusively limited to those committed by the USSR.

    Gaddis continues his biased reporting into the modern era. He devotes considerable verbiage to the multiple crises in the early 1960’s, attributing blame on Krushchev for bringing us to the brink of nuclear war. Yet Frederick Kempe, in his convincing analysis of John F. Kennedy’s contributions to the Cold War (Berlin 1961), concludes that "Kennedy’s indecisiveness in the early states of the [Berlin wall] crisis produced the wall itself, an exponential increase in East-West tension, and, in the half-century that followed, other fateful consequences that included the Cuban missile crisis…”

    Yes, it was Krushchev who sent the missiles to Cuba. But Krushchev also needed to restore his prestige after Kennedy approved The Bay of Pigs Invasion. The Bay of Pigs Invasion was an unsuccessful invasion of Cuba by a CIA-trained force of Cuban exiles, with support and encouragement from the US government, in an attempt to overthrow the Cuban government of Fidel Castro. The invasion was launched in April 1961, less than three months after John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency in the United States. (Nixon proposed it, Eisenhower planned it, and Kennedy approved it.)

    Gaddis, however, claims that all the blame should be laid on the door of Krushchev; it was he who did not think things through, and “allowed his ideological romanticism to overrun whatever capacity he had for strategic analysis.” [Sounds to me like an analysis of The Bay of Pigs invasion….] “He was like a petulant child,” Gaddis asserts, and claims that Khrushchev got some of what he wanted “as children sometimes do.” There was no suggestion whatsoever that the fault was Kennedy’s blunders rather than Krushchev’s tantrums.

    (Gaddis claims that the Cuban missile crisis is “universally regarded now as the closest the world came, during the second half of the 20th century, to a third world war…” This is patently untrue, however, and represents yet another attempt by Gaddis to put the onus for irrationally risky behavior on the Soviets. In 1983, a nine-day NATO military exercise designated ABLE ARCHER 83 came closer. The drill turned out to be different from previous ones, and a bit too realistic. Robert Gates is among those who observes that the KGB was convinced American forces had begun a countdown to nuclear war. The Soviets took a number of steps to enhance their military readiness short of mobilization. Afterwards, Reagan was “surprised and shocked that the Soviets had taken his years of militant rhetoric and his massive arms buildup seriously.” (Gates, Robert M., From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War, 1996, and Rhodes, Arsenals of Folly.) As British author Fred Inglis points out (The Cruel Peace: Everyday Life and the Cold War):

    "The foreign policy of the Reagan years turned out to be an unappetizing mixture of grudging hypercaution at the arms limitation negotiating tables, reckless and unendearing braggartry in front of the microphones, and minor acts of war that combined bullying and cowardice in about equal proportions.”

    As for Gorbachev, whose brilliance and vision is noted by other historians, Gaddis is condescending, charging that U.S. Secretary of State Shultz had to “educate” Gorbachev on economics. (Here he footnotes Shultz’s self-serving memoirs.) Gaddis even goes so far as to aver that when Gorbechev made a dramatic speech, he was “borrowing a trick from Reagan.” Good grief! And finally, he holds that Gorbachev, who was was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1990 for his role in ending the Cold War, “was never a leader in the manner of Vaclav Havel, John Paul II, Deng Xiaoping, Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, Lech Walesa – even Boris Yeltsin.” Boris YELTSIN? Come on! As Neil MacFarlane, professor of international relations at Oxford says of Yeltsin, “his record of governance is pretty mixed, and the government was substantially weakened during his time.” It was also Yeltsin who failed to control the growing political influence of wealthy oligarchs who still wield inordinate power in Russia. After Yeltsin’s death, the Economist reported that:

    "Mr Yeltsin's great rival, Mikhail Gorbachev, reflected the mood of most Russians when, amid the polite tributes and saccharine television montages, he alluded to the dead man's “serious mistakes”. Mr Yeltsin's had been a “tragic fate”, said Mr Gorbachev. Even before he left office, a majority of Russians, from Kaliningrad to Kamchatka, despised him, partly on account of the raging inflation, unpaid salaries and oligarchic larceny of his rule, but even more for the shame many thought he brought on Russia through his clownish drunkenness.”

    It is apparent that for Gaddis to elevate the role of Gorbachev, even over Yeltsin, would be to diminish the role of Reagan, a path the author wants to avoid. In Rhodes’s history of the Cold War, however, Gorbachev is the incontrovertible hero of the situation.

    Gaddis begins and ends his book with a discussion of the nature of war, as part of his eventual argument that the Cold War changed that nature forever. He cites Thucydides who predicted that there would always be a propensity for violence, “human nature being what it is.” Gaddis draws the ridiculous conclusion, however, that because of the success of the political game strategy Mutual Assured Destruction (or MAD), “Contrary to the lesson Thucydides drew from the greatest war of his time, human nature did change – and the shock of Hiroshima and Nagasaki began the process by which it did so.” WTF? MAD is a strategy that in fact is based on the inevitability of violence, that posits that only by each side holding a gun to each other’s head simultaneously (and assuming participation by rational actors), would that violence be deterred. Note: the violence is deterred by a rational calculation of odds. There is no change in propensity! The relentless continuation of wars and skirmishes since the Cold War make manifest the utter absurdity of Gaddis’s argument.

    Gaddis has two main conclusions about the Cold War in general. One is that the Cold War is “the point at which military strength, a defining characteristic of ‘power’ itself for the past five centuries, ceased to be that.” Gosh, that’s not what the military-industrial complex thinks. I wonder if Raytheon, Boeing, Northrup Grumman, General Dynamics, and so on have heard the news…. The second is that the Cold War “disproved Marx’s indictment of capitalism as elevating greed above all else.” I’m glad to hear that. All those CEOs making millions and the bankers taking advantage of the poor’s desire for housing in order to ensure their own enrichment are just aberrations. Thank heavens!

    Evaluation: Beware of books claiming to be history books! This one doesn’t meet the most basic criteria of objective reporting of the facts. ( )
    2 vote nbmars | Jul 19, 2011 |
    Brilliant short summary of the Cold War. I spent a good chunk of my life fighting the Cold War, and I appreciate this book. ( )
      RobertP | Aug 28, 2010 |
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    Amazon.com Product Description (ISBN 0143038273, Paperback)

    The “dean of Cold War historians” (The New York Times) now presents the definitive account of the global confrontation that dominated the last half of the twentieth century. Drawing on newly opened archives and the reminiscences of the major players, John Lewis Gaddis explains not just what happened but why—from the months in 1945 when the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. went from alliance to antagonism to the barely averted holocaust of the Cuban Missile Crisis to the maneuvers of Nixon and Mao, Reagan and Gorbachev. Brilliant, accessible, almost Shakespearean in its drama, The Cold War stands as a triumphant summation of the era that, more than any other, shaped our own.

    (retrieved from Amazon Mon, 30 Sep 2013 13:23:47 -0400)

    (see all 2 descriptions)

    Beginning with World War II and ending with the collapse of the Soviet Union, this is a new account of the strategic dynamics that drove the age, with portraits of its major personalities and much fresh insight into its most crucial events. It contains much new information drawn from newly opened Soviet, East European, and Chinese archives. Now, as America once again finds itself in a global confrontation with an implacable ideological enemy, this is a story whose lessons it is vitally necessary to understand.--From publisher description.… (more)

    » see all 5 descriptions

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