The authors provide an overview of Kurt Gödel's 1931 proof regarding axiomatic demonstration in arithmetic. Gödel constructed his proof on the basis of Principia Mathematica by Whitehead and Russell, but this treatment does not presume a familiarity with that text. It does, however, place Gödel's work in the larger context of efforts to axiomatize arithmetic, an agenda notably defined by David Hilbert. The first five chapters set the stage for Gödel's proof in the history of mathematics and philosophy, while the fifth chapter discusses a critical idea underlying the operation of the proof. The long sixth chapter discusses the actual techniques and conclusions of the proof itself. A valuable final chapter outlines the larger implications and consequences, most especially and usefully discouraging misreadings which amount to "an invitation to despair or an excuse for mystery-mongering." (101) Interestingly, a secondary conclusion that they do support, is that algorithmic computers are unlikely ever to attain the equivalent of human consciousness. Gödel himself took his proof as support for a position of philosophical Realism, although it's not conclusive in that regard.

For anyone interested in the beauty of logic or the elegance of math, the mechanisms of Gödel's proof are impressive. This book by Nagel and Newman reads quickly--for a math book. The reader must be prepared to slow down and spend five to ten minutes on a page when getting into the thick of the mathematical concepts in use. The reward of doing so is an appreciation of an intellectual event that provided a turning-point in the philosophy of knowledge.

A very readable, short introduction to Gödel's famous arguments, suits also the non-mathematician. Easy to follow and even inspiring at times. I read this because Douglas Hofstadter had recommended it in his preface to GEB. ( )

Nagel and Newman provide a nice, quick, and generally well written exposition of Godel's famous proof. This book can easily be read in an afternoon by anyone with the requisite background in logic.

They do a particularly nice job in their brief dissemination of the historical concerns that led up to the crisis in foundations in the late 19th and early 20th century. What's nice about this is that it puts Godel into context in a salient way. Godel without Hilbert is like Kant without Leibniz (and Wolff, I suppose). Given the narrow scope and short page count, Hilbert is covered well.

However, there are a couple of real problems with this book.

First, I do not believe that this book would really be that helpful for "the educated layman". Insofar as their target audience is concerned, the book is, perhaps, a failure. Why do I say this? Given its brevity, the authors are forced to introduce important bits of information without adequate exposition. For example, the notion of universal quantification makes its first appearance in the last twenty odd pages of the book and is explained in a sentence or two. This is fine for anyone that's had an intro logic course (and can recall what was covered) but is probably inadequate for the logical/mathematical novice. Furthermore, this example is just one case of something that occurs quite often throughout the book.

My second worry is that the actual mechanics of the proof are not presented lucidly. This is not altogether unexpected, but the fifteen pages or so that comprise the actual exposition of the proof seem to go by too quickly and sacrifice depth and clarity for readability and brevity. This may not be the authors' fault. I have doubts about whether or not one can successfully offer the sort of exegesis the authors are striving for. That is, I'm just not sure that anyone will ever pull off a lucid "Godel for Dummies". Similar problems plague Rebbecca Goldstein's attempt at this task in her recent Godel biography.

Final thought: I think this book would best serve the needs of a first year graduate student or advanced undergraduate in philosophy. For the student that has some background in logic (perhaps they've done a completeness proof for FOL or at least some proofs with quantifiers) but has yet to take a meta-logic course this book can provide a nicely structured overview of what the typical meta-logic course aims for. ( )

This little book offers real insight into one of the weirdest aspects of modern mathematics. ( )

This is a non-formal, though still rigorous, presentation of the argument of Gödel's famous demonstration that will be accessible to anyone familiar with the basics of mathematical proof, logic, and number theory. By the end of the book, I acutally had the outline of Gödel's tricky self-referential argument all in my head at once, and though it faded quickly, I feel confident I could resurrect it with another reading. Nagel's description of the significance of the proof, as opposed to its mechanics, is less thorough, but that's a quibble. This slim book is a truly impressive feat of exposition. ( )