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Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic

by Joanne B. Freeman

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303585,782 (3.97)2
In this extraordinary book, Joanne Freeman offers a major reassessment of political culture in the early years of the American republic. By exploring both the public actions and private papers of key figures such as Thomas Jefferson, Aaron Burr, and Alexander Hamilton, Freeman reveals an alien and profoundly unstable political world grounded on the code of honor. In the absence of a party system and with few examples to guide America's experiment in republican governance, the rituals and rhetoric of honor provided ground rules for political combat. Gossip, print warfare, and dueling were tools used to jostle for status and form alliances in an otherwise unstructured political realm. These political weapons were all deployed in the tumultuous presidential election of 1800-an event that nearly toppled the new republic. By illuminating this culture of honor, Freeman offers new understandings of some of the most perplexing events of early American history, including the notorious duel between Burr and Hamilton. A major reconsideration of early American politics, Affairs of Honor offers a profoundly human look at the anxieties and political realities of leaders struggling to define themselves and their role in the new nation.… (more)
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A rich and engaging book. Freeman argues that early American politics can only be understood by taking into account cultures of honor and the emotional experiences of the men in charge, or who wanted to be in charge. Obtaining and retaining honor required certain behaviors and barred other ones. In the absence of political parties as we know them, personal alliances were everything, which is why everyone hated Burr, who was plainly willing to switch whenever it might do him good. Men had to be willing to duel if sufficiently insulted, but they had to refrain from betraying private confidences, but did anyway on occasion. This resulted in a hierarchy of ways of communicating—including anonymous pamphlets (intended to be read by a limited number of important people; Adams never saw a key Hamilton pamphlet and had to have its contents relayed by a friend who’d seen a copy that a friend owned), newspapers (intended to be read by the general public and circulated via other newspapers to other places), private letters (intended to circulate among an even more limited number of important people, and gaining credibility because the speaker’s name was attached), broadsides (intended to be read by everyone literate in a jurisdiction, and thus only used to call someone out for cowardice/to deliver the clearest insults), and conversation (which Jefferson often limited his communications to for more wiggle room, though he took detailed notes that caused a scandal when ultimately printed after his death—what Freeman calls “a ticking time bomb” whose very delay was supposed to bolster Jefferson’s neutrality and control future understanding of the Founders).

Using the right mechanism could be devishly effective—when Hamilton’s anonymous newspaper campaign against Jefferson was widely known to be Hamilton’s, it had the authority of his name without explicit attribution and thus gained extra power without exposing Hamilton to potential dishonor—no wonder Jefferson was so mad, and he wasn’t alone in expressing what Freeman calls “blood-lust” in response to attacks in print. They especially feared lingering dishonor. I loved Adams’ statement in a letter that Jefferson “cannot be a lover of history. There are prominent traits in his character, & important actions in his life, that he would not wish should be delineated, & transmitted to posterity.” Which is why, Freeman posits, he tried to write it himself, as did many others in the founding generation. Hamilton and Burr suffered most from this process, especially Burr, who almost never wrote anything down and thus lacked a record of his thoughts and actions through the relevant period (though he did try to justify himself in later writing).

Gossip was the currency of politics, and letters are full of hints about what can only be said in person, e.g. “With regard to Burr’s election I have a secret to tell you which I cannot communicate till I see you…. This hint is most confidentially communicated.” Freeman also emphasizes how difficult it was to get news across such great distances; people were often left wondering what happened for weeks or months. Receiving a letter could be a big deal, and post offices were political entities because the postmaster could keep track of who was talking to whom—often enough, indeed, letters sent by congressmen and received back at home were read publicly. Republicans were better at disseminating gossip to the public at large, with the notable exception of the Citizen Genet affair, which strained relations with France when the Federalists leaked certain unflattering information.

At the same time, the nature of public honor was changing, and people weren’t sure where it was going, which led to a lot of agonizing and not a few misjudgments, such as those of Hamilton and Adams, the latter of whom published in newspapers what he should have kept to letters, thus harming his reputation. Misjudgments bad enough, or anger roused enough, could lead to real duels, even though they were becoming less socially acceptable. National politics was a new sport, and no one knew quite what the rules were, made worse by each state’s congressmen’s general unfamiliarity with those from other states; Northern and Southern manners collided, while loyalties shifted unpredictably. Washington’s rigidity came in part from his attempts to perform in a way that got nothing wrong—once successful compromise was his inaugural suit, “made of plain brown American broadcloth and adorned with gilt buttons and diamond shoe buckles, … but the homespun was ‘so handsomely finished’ that ‘it was universally mistaken for a foreign manufactured cloth.’”

They seem very like Americans today (the President notwithstanding)—for example, even thirty years after the election of 1800, many of the participants and even their heirs were still really upset about it and tried to control the narrative. It was a tense and painful time, full of accusations against the other side. “Something seemed to be awry in the American political system, and someone had to shoulder the blame.” The major difference that made every difference, Freeman argues, was the personalization of politics—without parties with fixed positions, all politics was personal, so Jefferson’s potential rapprochement with Adams as Adams’ VP seemed like a personal betrayal. (One former Jefferson ally fumed that his first act in the Senate was to say nice things about Adams, “which was saying to his friends—I am in; Kiss my ---- and go to H-ll.”) Federalists and Republicans had difficulty maintaining political alliances over such long distances, making sectional loyalties potentially disruptive, and the partisan conflicts of 1800 were, Freemand argues, not evidence of party strength but instead “attempts to bolster national alliances that were dangerously divided along regional lines.”

Rather than reading the Jefferson-Burr tie of 1800 as evidence of party discipline, Freeman contends that the unanimity stemmed from fear of betrayal: each Republican elector feared betrayal by the others, so each one thought that he couldn’t risk leaving either one off of his ballot in case that invited further betrayals—drop Burr and the Northerners would revolt, and the same for the Southerners and dropping Jefferson. Meanwhile, Burr intepreted what was happening as a challenge to his honor: he refused to say that he wouldn’t serve if chosen President because he thought that he was as capable as anyone else to do the job, and because he’d already given his word to support Jefferson so being asked to repeat was insulting (and some because he did want to be President). Burr was offended by hearing about Madison’s letter saying that electing him would degrade America, and thus took the steps that, contrary to what he wanted, destroyed his reputation. But because this was all done by gossip and some indirection, Jefferson could accuse Burr of betrayal and Burr could just as truthfully deny that he had done so, and vice versa. “A politics of friendship was a politics of deniability.” Thus, partisan politics offered a useful solution to the otherwise “endless battle of reputations.”

One last, kind of awful, tidbit: “one unknown joker tried to provoke James Hamilton into a duel with Aaron Burr” by faking a note from James challenging Burr to a duel “where you murdered my father.” When confronted with the note, Hamilton said it was a forgery “but added that if Burr had accepted the challenge, Hamilton would adopt it as his own.” The person who brought the note, however, disrupted the duel ritual by insisting that he wasn’t there as a second but rather simply to confirm the forgery, and there the matter ended. ( )
  rivkat | Jun 26, 2017 |
Joanne B. Freeman’s Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic uses the framework of honor culture to explore the underlying motives that drove the founding generation’s decisions during the first three presidencies of the Early Republic. Freedman draws heavily upon social and political history and relies on close readings of the Founders’ own writing in order to reframe the work in a seventeenth and eighteenth century mindset free of twenty-first century biases.
Freeman argues that, amid the chaos of the Early Republic, “the culture of honor was a source of stability in this contested landscape” (xv). Honor’s “ethic limited and defined acceptable behavior; its rites and rituals displayed superiority of character through time-honored traditions recognized the world over” (xv). Honor helped shape social relationships in a country without an aristocracy. Freeman defines honor as a public presentation, writing, “Honor was entirely other-directed, determined before the eyes of the world; it did not exist unless bestowed by others. Indeed, a man of honor was defined by the respect that he received in public” (xvi). Freeman structures her book into five case studies examining different aspects of honor. In the first, she uses a close reading of Pennsylvania Senator William Maclay’s public diary to demonstrate how politicians used public perceptions of honor to garner political clout with their constituents. The second case study examines the role of gossip in shaping concepts of honor and how it could challenge or reinforce a person’s public persona. The third case study uses this same methodology to examine what Freeman terms “paper war,” the use of public and private letters, newspaper publications, broadsides, and other written matter to define the limits of honor (105). Freeman’s fourth case study focuses on dueling, the most potent demonstration of honor. Finally, Freeman reinterprets the election of 1800 through the lens of honor in her final case study.
In her first case study, Freeman writes of the role of honor in congressional oratory, “Given the importance of reputation, an attack on a man’s honor was the ultimate trump card…When honor was at stake, all else fell by the wayside, for a man’s sense of self and possibly his life were at risk” (28). Despite the usefulness of such an attack, it had its own hazards. As Freeman writes, “An insult to a man’s honor was a dangerous weapon that could explode in one’s face” (29). Those who engaged in too much vitriol or attacked persons of sound reputations might lose face themselves for such a loss of composure. In her second case study, Freeman argues that gossip served as a tool for sizing up political enemies and forming political alliances (66). Gossip relied on honest transmitters of gossip in order to have weight. Freeman writes, “A truthful man could be trusted; a liar was weak, untrustworthy, and inferior – in sum, he was no gentleman. To give the ‘lie direct’ was equivalent to striking a man: it became an immediate justification for a challenge to a duel” (67). Politicians linked their reputation to their political successes and alliances. Freeman writes, “In this highly political realm, an attack on a government measure was an attack on a politician, and an attack on a politician immediately questioned his honor and reputation” (69). This system served to unite politicians in a time before formal political parties. Unlike gossip, paper war posed a greater threat to its wielder as they committed their thoughts to the more permanent medium of print. Freeman writes, "A signed attack bore the clout of its writer’s reputation but risked it by thrusting him into the public eye. Unsigned publications offered the safety of anonymity, but without the authority of a name they had less power. A poor choice of medium could backfire…Hence the ongoing stream of letters from men seeking advice on paper war" (113). The authors sought to present themselves as gentlemen, thus leading to their dilemmas in engaging in print war. Freeman writes, “A gentleman was always true to his word; such was the very definition of gentleman. It was the central importance of truth telling to genteel status that made ‘giving the lie’ an insult grievous enough to demand a duel” (128). More to the point, “Print combatants often adopted the language of the duel” in their publications and counter-publications (132). Duels, naturally, were the purest manifestation of honor, though even they had rules to ensure the honor of combatants. Freeman writes, “…To early national politicians, duels were demonstrations of manner, not marksmanship; they were intricate games of dare and counterdare, ritualized displays of bravery, military prowess, and – above all – willingness to sacrifice one’s life for one’s honor. A man’s response to the threat of gunplay bore far more meaning than the exchange of fire itself” (167). The duelist who accepted a challenge thus proved himself worthy of political leadership (170). Finally, Freeman argues that Aaron Burr’s unwillingness to concede defeat and the political machinations that decided the election of 1800 all resulted from the interplay of these ideas of honor.
Freeman bases her study on “thousands of letters, diaries, pamphlets, newspaper essays, and other assorted writings by roughly three hundred national political figures, their families, and friends” (292). Freeman benefited from the support and scholarship of Bertram Wyatt-Brown, author of one of the definitive volumes on honor culture, in her work. Freeman’s methodology borrows from Clifford Geertz’s methodology of cultural anthropology, especially in how she works to recapture the thoughts and emotions of her subjects and eschew twenty-first century understandings of honor culture. ( )
  DarthDeverell | Nov 22, 2016 |
Joanne Freeman, "Dueling as Politics: Reinterpreting the Burr-Hamilton Duel" WMQ 53:2 (Apr. 1996), 289-318.

Early working out of ideas to be presented in the book.

Freeman begins the article by stating the problem -- why, in short, did Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr go to the dueling grounds in Weehawken, NJ on July 11, 1804? To answer that question, she needs to put the practice of dueling into cultural context. Fortunately, the duelists wrote a great deal about the practice. In the case of Hamilton and Burr, Hamilton's 4 page letter of justification to posterity, written on the night before the duel, was particularly revealing. He was highly conflicted over the coming duel, but felt compelled to defend his honor on the dueling field. Arguing in his letter that he exhausted all options to avoid the duel, and he had decided not to fire at Burr. Understanding why this was the case, why he made that decision, provides up a window into the values of the political leadership of the Early National Period.

"What men of the world denominate honor"

Honor was a value for which Hamilton was willing to risk sacrificing his life. Dueling to protect one's honor was a nationally significant political activity, as it provided the last check in the political system of checks and balances. In a system without political parties, where faction was decried as corrupt, every issue was a personal one. To be a leader, you needed to prove yourself honorable. The conduct of the honorable leader was governed by an intricate set of rules.

"If our Interview is conducted in the usual manner."

Freeman situates the language of dueling within the broader field of the language of political combat of the era. Recounting the stories of James Monroe's quarrel with John Adams, she notes that Monroe considered challenging Adams to a duel, but decided not to because Adams was "old and the President." The correspondence in which Monroe revealed this to Madison was part of the ritual correspondence surrounding an "affair of honor." When men felt their honor and personal reputation slighted, they began the process of brinksmanship that often (though not always) lead to the dueling grounds. The objective was not to kill your opponent, but rather to show yourself worthy of leadership.

"Political opposition, which ... has proceeded from pure and upright motives"

As Alan Taylor showed in "The Art of Hook and Snivey," the hierarchical political networks of the Early National Period were the means of exercising influence and affairs of honor were no different. Not only did the duelists have seconds, who aided and abetted the process, but the whole ritual of the affair of honor was facilitated by the "friends" of the principal parties. The cause of the affair was the individual around whom the lesser lights rallied. These bands of followers formed a fighting band not unlike the "interests" which Taylor describes. The affair of honor was often the result of a loosing politician trying to regain his honor after being defeated in an election. They were, in fact, ways in which political battles were fought. Appealing to public opinion, the objective of the affair was to show that your cause was upright and that of your opponent was corrupt. More than aristocrats fighting for a position at court, the American duelist was also a republican pursuing the public good!

"I shall hazard much, and can possibly gain nothing."

Burr and Hamilton came to the dueling ground through the course of an affair of honor that could have taken many different turns. It began six weeks after Burr had lost the NY governor's race. Anxious to remain a viable leader, he seized upon a reported slight of his character reported by a third party. An exchange ensued in which Burr demanded a humiliating apology from Hamilton. After the duel, the seconds of Burr (van Ness) and Hamilton (Nathaniel Pendleton) jockeyed to control public opinion about the outcome of the affair of honor. Burr ended up leaving NY state in dishonor. Because he failed to control the fallout coming out of the duel, Burr actually lost the affair of honor.

"I hope the grounds of his proceeding have been such as ought to satisfy his own conscience."

Hamilton and Burr dueled because they could not do otherwise. Especially Hamilton felt this deeply, and his refusal to fire reflects this internal conflict. He wrote his last letter to justify to posterity why he was dueling and to vindicate his memory to posterity. He doesn't seem to have done that, but he did leave a tortured record of the political culture of the period.

Other Readings:

Isaac Kramnick, "The 'Great National Discussion': The Discourse of Politics in 1787," WMQ 3d ser., 45 (1989): 341-375.

Sections include:" I: Civic Humanism and Liberalism in the Constitution and Its Critics," "II: The Language of Virtuous Republicanism," "III: The Language of Power and the State," and "Conclusion"

Thomas P. Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution (New York, 1986).
  mdobe | Jul 24, 2011 |
Centered around the Hamilton-Burr duel, Freeman expands her analysis to cover other duels, laws, etc. An excellent analysis. ( )
  JBD1 | Jan 14, 2006 |
Freeman delivers a convincing argument that it is the language and rituals of honor that allow men from disparate backgrounds and locales to come together and create a working American political system in a time before party and instant communication. ( )
  ulfhjorr | Jan 7, 2006 |
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In this extraordinary book, Joanne Freeman offers a major reassessment of political culture in the early years of the American republic. By exploring both the public actions and private papers of key figures such as Thomas Jefferson, Aaron Burr, and Alexander Hamilton, Freeman reveals an alien and profoundly unstable political world grounded on the code of honor. In the absence of a party system and with few examples to guide America's experiment in republican governance, the rituals and rhetoric of honor provided ground rules for political combat. Gossip, print warfare, and dueling were tools used to jostle for status and form alliances in an otherwise unstructured political realm. These political weapons were all deployed in the tumultuous presidential election of 1800-an event that nearly toppled the new republic. By illuminating this culture of honor, Freeman offers new understandings of some of the most perplexing events of early American history, including the notorious duel between Burr and Hamilton. A major reconsideration of early American politics, Affairs of Honor offers a profoundly human look at the anxieties and political realities of leaders struggling to define themselves and their role in the new nation.

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Yale University Press

2 editions of this book were published by Yale University Press.

Editions: 0300088779, 0300097557

 

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