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Loading... The Lessons of Terror. A History of Warfare against Civilians: Why It Has…by Caleb Carr
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Amazon.com Product Description (ISBN 0375760741, Paperback)Military historian Caleb Carr’s groundbreaking work anticipated America’s current debates on preemptive military action against terrorist sponsor states, reorganization of the American intelligence system, and the treatment of terrorists as soldiers in supranational armies rather than as criminals. Carr’s authoritative exploration demonstrates that the practice of terrorism, employed by national armies as well as extremists since the days of ancient Rome, is ultimately self-defeating. Far from prompting submission, it stiffens enemy resolve and never leads to long-lasting success.Controversial on its initial publication in 2002, The Lessons of Terror has been repeatedly validated by subsequent events. Carr’s analysis of individual terrorist acts, and particularly of the history of the Middle East conflict, is fundamental to a deep understanding of the roots of terrorism as well as the steps and reforms that must be taken if the continuing threat of terrorist behavior is to be met effectively today and, finally, eradicated tomorrow. (retrieved from Amazon Wed, 06 Jan 2010 07:32:45 -0500) The first test round has been closed. Visit the Open Shelves Classification group for details. |
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Wikipedia in English (1)
Caleb Carr's The Lessons of Terror, when published in 2002, was a timely look at the history of terror tactics in warfare and the ultimate failure that these tactics bring to the perpetrator.
Starting with ancient Rome and moving forward, Carr cites example after example of the use of terror against an enemies civilian population, and points out the failings of each effort. At times, Carr seems to stray in his definition of terror tactics to include such things as trade embargoes; though I can see the author's point on these examples, I don't necessarily agree with them.
In the end, Carr's point is that the terror attacks of 9/11 will ultimately fail; history has since proved his point in the Irag war as the factions that have terrorized the civilian population to get at the US military effort have seen the tables turned on them and the civilians are fighting back.
But, beyond the historical lesson on the failures of terrorism, this book can be taken as a lesson as to how not to act during warfare. It could also be learned from reading this book that the US actions in places like Abu Ghraib would ultimately backfire as well, a lesson that we must learn from our own mistakes. (