The first of a two-volume biography, Kershaw has given us a magisterial study of Hitler which far surpasses Fest's effort of the 1970s, good as that was. Kershaw has taken good advantage of the work which has been done since then, displaying an impressive range of research from which he draws conclusions that are cogently argued. He looks not only at the man himself, but also at the conditions which gave rise to him, placing him in context—not depicting him as an inhuman monster, but showing the monstrousness and the inhumanity of what he achieved. Both this and its concluding part, Nemesis, are highly recommended. ( )

3420. Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris, by Ian Kershaw (read Mar 19, 2001) I read Joachim Fest's excellent biography of Hitler on August 21, 1978, and it for years has been considered the best Hitler bio, but this one is THE bio for the 21st century, and so I read the first volume (and am reading the second one now). With 174 pages of footnotes and 31 pages of bibliography it is clear the book is most excellently researched, and not popularized. The book shows
Hitler as the evil egomaniac he was, and yet it is hard to see how such a weird and odd youth could become a person inspiring the adulation he did. It is a fearsome story, heavy with warning to those who would shortcut the rule of law for the result they think would be best. Epic. ( )

This is a very fine book, a truly impressive range of research and deep knowledge presented clearly, coherently, cogently, convincingly. In his preface, Kershaw describes the objective of his study:

What follows is a work which reflects, through the medium of a biography of Hitler, such an attempt to bind together the personal with the impersonal elements in the shaping of some of the most vitally important passages in the whole of human history. What has continued in the writing of the book to interest me more than the strange character of the man who held Germany`s fate in his hands between 1933 and 1945 is the question of how Hitler was possible: not just how this initially most unlikely pretender to high state office could gain power; but how he was able to extend that power until it became absolute, until field marshals were prepared to obey without questioning the orders of a former corporal, until highly skilled `professionals`and clever minds in a ll walks of life were ready to pay uncritical obeisance to an autodidact whose only indisputable talent was one for stirring up the base emotions of the masses. If the answer to that question cannot be presumed in the first instance to lie in those attributes, such as they were, of Hitler`s personality, then it follows that the answer must be sought chiefly in German society–in the social and political motivations which went into the making of Hitler. To search out those motivations and to fuse them with Hitler`s personal contribution to the attainment and expansion of his power to the point where he could determine the fate of millions is the aim of the study.

Kershaw argues that Hitler`s dictatorship,

...far more than that of Stalin of Mao, has the quality of a paradigm for the twentieth century. In extreme and intense fashion it reflected, among other things, the total claim of the modern state, unforeseen levels of state repression and violence, previously unparalleled manipulation of the media to control and mobilize the masses, unprecedented cynicism in international relations, the acute dangers of ultra-nationalism, and the immensely destructive power of ideologies of racial superiority and ultimate consequences of racism, alongside the perverted usage of modern technology and `social engineering`. Above all, it lit a warning beacon that still burns brightly: it showed how a modern, advanced, cultured society can so rapidly sink into barbarity, culminating in ideological war, conquest of scarcely imaginable brutality and rapaciousness, and genocide such as the world had never previously witnessed. Hitler`s dictatorship amounted to the collapse of modern civilization–a form of nuclear blowout within modern society. It showed what we are capable of.

Kershaw does an excellent job of describing the political and social atmosphere in Germany which Hitler grew up in the pre-WWI period, including a heady mixture of assertive German nationalism, a sense of nationhood which gained definition from culture and language and so promoted an ethnic definition of nationhood which could easily slide over into forms of racism, and a pervasive anti-Semitism. Kershaw continually provides the balance between the effects of Hitler himself and the conditions that provided the grounds for his emergence:

The Nazi assault on the roots of civilization has been a defining feature of the twentieth century. Hitler was the epicentre of that assault. But he was its chief exponent, not its prime cause.

It would be a mistake to present selectively a catalogue of extremist opinions and attitudes as if they were representative of a whole society. But just as it is a distortion to read into German history an inexorable pattern of development culminating in Hitler, so it would be misleading to imply that Hitler was a bolt from a clear blue sky, that nothing in Germany`s development had prepared the ground for the catastrophe of Nazism; and dangerous to presume that a single individual so hypnotized the nation that he had driven its otherwise healthy progress off the rails.
It was more than anything else the ways in which nationalism had developed in late nineteenth-century Germany that provided the set of ideas that, if often in distorted–even perverted–form, offered the potential for Nazism`s post-war appeal. In particular, the years between 1909 and 1914 saw a strengthening and regrouping of the radical Right that formed a bridge spanning the war to the post-war political world. Crucial to the character of German nationalism was the pervasive sense, present already long before the war, of incomplete unity, of persistent, even widening division and conflict within the nation. What, in the changed circumstances after the war, Hitler was able most signally to exploit was the belief that pluralism was somehow unnatural or unhealthy in a society, that it was a sign of weakness, and that internal division and disharmony could be suppressed and eliminated, to be replaced by the unity of a national community.

Kershaw details Hitler`s rise within the radical Right, first coming to prominence as a rabble-rousing speaker. It was very much this ability that formed the basis of his appeal and his increasingly central role in holding the disparate interests and parties of the Right together, certainly rather than any well-thought-out set of programs or policies. His indispensability in this regard became apparent when he served time for the failed putsch of 1923 and the interests on the Right became even more fractious. Hitler became the glue that held all of these together, but he did so by sheer force of will and personality coupled with an unshakable belief in his own rightness, a belief that would grow into a meglomania and narcissistic egoism that culminated in the Fuhrer cult and thus embodied perfectly Hitler`s definition of the role of the Party and politics, i.e. that the Party and its leader were inseparable and blind belief in the latter is all that was required from followers.

Kershaw is also very good on the sheer opportunism that marked Hitler`s rise to power, detailing the many points at which some small shift in circumstance would have left Hitler relegated to a very minor footnote in a history of right-wing politics in Germany. For example:

The fall of the Social Democrat Chancellor Hermann Mulleer and his replacement by Heinrich Bruning of the Zentrum was the first unnecessary step on the suicidal road of the Weimar Republic. Without the self-destructiveness of the democratic state, without the wish to undermine democracy of those who were meant to uphold it, Hitler, whatever his talents as an agitator, could not have come close to power.

Far from his career being the triumph of will that the propaganda machine depicted, Hitler most often benefitted from circumstances not of his own making and in which he won out through sheer obstinacy and refusal to compromise in any degree. This comes out again and again in the internecine fights among the parties on the Right, and most importantly when Hitler was handed the position of Chancellor. The latter was an example of a further element that benefitted Hitler`s rise to power: the continual underestimation of him by his opponents, and their willingness to accept illegal activities aimed at common opponents (Jews, Communists) without realizing that these same methods would in turn, be used against them. Although not all were blind. When Hindenburg agreed to give Hitler the Chancellorship in 1933, Ludendorf wrote to him:

You have delivered up our hold German Fatherland to one of the greatest demagogues of all time. I solemnly prophesy that this accursed man will cast our Reich into the abyss and bring our nation to inconceivable misery. Future generations will damn you in your grave for what you have done.

Very prescient, but even Ludendorf could have had any no idea as to how deep that abyss would be.

It is astonishing how quicky the government system collapsed under the Nazis, almost as if it had never existed.

The rapidity of the transformation that swept over Germany between Hitler`s takeover of power on 30 January 1933 and its crucial consolidation and extension at the beginning of August 1934, after Reich President Hindenburg`s death, and following close on the major crisis of the Rohm affair, was astounding for contemporaries, and is scarcely less astonishing in retrospect. It was brought about by a combination of pseudo-legal measures, terror, manipulation–and willing collaboration. Within a month, civil liberties–protected under the Weimar Constitution–had been extinguished. Within two months, with most active political opponents imprisoned or fleeing the country, he Reichstag surrendered its powers, giving Hitler control of the legislature. Within four months the once powerful trade unions were dissolved. In less than six months, all opposition parties have been suppressed or gone into voluntary liquidation, leaving the NSDAP as the only remaining party. In January, 1934, the sovereignty of the Lander–already in reality smashed the previous March–was formally abolished. Then, in the summer, the growing threat from within Hitler`s own movement was ruthlessly eliminated in the `Night of the Long Knives`on 30 June 1934.

From the summer of 1934, Hitler`s power was unchallengeable institutionally, and over the next few years, it became absolute with, in particular, the surrender of the officer corps. Three tendencies were prominent in this time: the erosion of collective government, emergence of clearer ideological goals, and Fuhrer absolutism. Another effect was the abuse of power and corruption of government, aided by Hitler`s style of management which was to let underlings fight among themselves for power and position, building initiatives that would `work towards the Fuhrer`and, if lucky, receive his ultimate blessing and support.

Hitler`s approach to the state, as to all power-relations, was purely exploitive and opportunistic. It was purely a means to an end, and if there the bureaucracy could not deliver, then competing organizations could be put in place to do so. This personalization of power opened the door to vast corruption and overlapping and competing jurisdictions.

Even had Hitler been far more conscientious and less idiosyncratic and haphazard in his style of leadership, he would have found the highly personalized directions of the complex and varied issues of a modern state beyond him. As it was, the doors were opened wide to mismanagement and corruption on a massive scale. Hitler coupled financial incompetence and disinterest with an entirely exploitive and cavalier usage of public funds.

Hitler was driven by three interlinked passions: anti-Semitism, anti-Marxism/Bolshevism, and the drive for Lebensraum. Once he had ultimate power, he was free to pursue these with no regard to any other elements or features of society except as they supported these goals.

A sense of his own greatness had been instilled in Hitler by his admirers since the early 1920s. He had readily embraced the aura attached to him. It had offered insatiable nourishment for his already incipient all-consuming egomania. Since then, the internal and above all the foreign policy successes, since 1033, accredited by growing millions to the Fuhrer's genious, had immensely magnified the tendency. Hitler swallowed the boundless adulation. He became the foremost believer in his own Fuhrer cult. Hubris–that overwhelming arrogance which courts disaster–was inevitable. The point where nemesis takes over had been reached by 1936.

One can only hope that Kershaw plans to follow up this excellent study with further volumes taking us through to the end of the Nazi nightmare.

My review in The Voice of the Turtle published here:

http://www.voiceoftheturtle.org/show_...

Reviewed by Milton Goldin for H-Net here:

http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev....