"We can clearly see that there is no bi-univocal correspondence between linear signifying links or archi-writing, depending on the author, and this multireferential, multi-dimensional machinic catalysis. The symmetry of scale, the transversality, the pathic non-discursive character of their expansion: all these dimensions remove us from the logic of the excluded middle and reinforce us in our dismissal of the ontological binarism we criticised previously"This quote, from psychoanalyst Félix Guattari, is typical of the obfuscation that runs amok in contemporary humanities; an obfuscation called into question some years ago by the famous Sokal Affair and re-invigorated by Sokal and Bricmont's [book: Fashionable Nonsense]. There is a reason that science and the humanities are administered by different departments in (almost) every university. Common-sense would dictate that physicists are not in the habit of teaching courses on Shakespeare, and English professors are not in the habit of teaching quantum mechanics. However, as Sokal shows us, the latter is no longer true in all cases. As a scientist, Sokal does not overstep his own areas of expertise, while showing that po-mo academics routinely overstep theirs. Keeping strictly to the scientific claims (and subsequent abuses) of several famous po-mo academics, Sokal shows both that post-modernism has created a parody of intellectual rigor, and that the post-modern methodology is in danger of undermining the once proud study of arts and letters.The results of Sokal's critique are often hilarious. That the theories of Irigiray, Guattari, Deleuze, et. al. are supposedly malleable enough to be applied to any topic whatsoever is almost a running gag. To wit, Sokal's discussion of Irigiray's bizarre combination of gender studies, feminist ethics, and special relativity is a comedic highpoint (E=mc^2 is a sexist equation?!). The underlying message is, of course, that po-mo theorists are intellectually dishonest insofar as they purport that a scientific theory is just another 'text' to be deconstructed. That 'special relativity' and 'cultural relativism' share the same etymological root does not mean they share the same epistemological foundation. The equivocation is blatant enough to be funny; though Sokal shows that we should temper our laughter.If Sokal is correct, the shibboleths 'hermeneutics', 'Lacanian' and 'desituationism' are sufficient for advanced degrees from premier universities, and this has lead to a crisis. This crisis is not so much a 'dumbing-down' of the humanities, but, rather, that the humanities are in danger of losing credibility. By making scientific claims from outside of the scientific method, post-modernists are coming across as the ivory-tower equivalents of Ann Coulter: incredibly bright but misguided to the point of parody. The credibility gap is perpetuated when po-mo academics couch their usually non-existent 'theories' in language so dense and difficult to read that those who cannot understand are looked down upon as intellectual inferiors and those who do understand are lying. In sum, post-modern theories are the epitome of the academic foolishness described by Pope: "Such laboured nothings in so strange a style, / Amaze th' unlearn'd, and make the learned smile." Unfortunately, if Sokal is correct about the humanities, a majority of English majors may not even know who Pope is. ( )

Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science… by Alan Sokal
Co-Author Alan Sokal, a physics professor, is famous for a hoax he perpetrated in 1996. He wrote a deliberately meaningless article, consisting of pseudo-scientific quotes, from prominent "postmodernists," connected by strings of gibberish. With the appealing title of "Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity," the article was published in prestigious postmodern journal. Afterward, Sokal published a disavowal, identifying his piece as a parody. (It is re-printed as an Epilogue to this book.)

This book takes up where Sokal's hoax left off. Postmodernism, Sokal and Bricmont state, has "atomized mankind into cultures and groups having their own conceptual universes." Fashionable Nonsense reveals, and repels, the postmodernist war on the exemplar of objectivity in our culture: science.

In some cases, the authors' scientific knowledge allows them to uncover the postmodernists' falsehoods and distortions. Most of the quotes selected, however, are so self-evidently bizarre that one needs no specialized knowledge to judge them.

Einstein's theory of relativity, for example, is - according to one critic - actually a theory of power, representing "a struggle for the control of privileges, for the disciplining of docile bodies." Physics is said to be "sexist," because it explains the behavior of solids better than that of liquids. ("Whereas men have sex organs that protrude and become rigid, women have openings that leak menstrual blood and vaginal fluids.")

The most philosophically interesting part of the book, and the most philosophically mixed, is a 55-page "intermezzo," criticizing philosophical relativism - the notion that there are no objective truths, only "relative" truths. Although Sokal and Bricmont stand on shaky ground (claiming, for example, that the existence of an external world can be demonstrated only on the pragmatic grounds that science seems to "work"), they subtly analyze the verbal trickery employed by relativists such as Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend.

More than just a lengthy "horror file" on postmodernism, *Fashionable Nonsense* is a powerful weapon in the battle to save science from intellectual assailants. ( )

This is a necessary book that exposes the gibberish of many prominent postmodern philosophers. Its case is clear, and I am glad Sokal and Bricmont went through the trouble of wading through their literature to build such a solid argument. Their arguments on epistemologists (Kuhn and Feyerabend) are far weaker, though. ( )

Alan Sokal (PhD in Physics) achieved his goal by poking fun at so-called intellectuals misusing science when he published a paper “Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity” with on purpose many pseudo-scientific statements in their journal. They were first delighted with all their deconstruction and the like.

After getting his article with all the gibberish and nonsense published, he angered those pseudo-intellectuals by exposing all the mistakes he on purpose wrote in the article.

Giving a flair or perfume of science does not make a text anything reliable.

In fact, he showed that what they were writing is sheer nonsense or even worse fraud.

Priceless by trashing all postmodern nonsense and pseudo-science. ( )

Before I start, let me nail my colours to the mast: I'm pro-science, I'm pro-evolution, I really like the idea of rational enquiry and I'm a sceptic bordering on the cynical. I'm *not* some lentil-munching, kaftan-wearing, feng-shui-hugging hippie with airbrushed unicorns and a yin-yang sign on the side of my Kombi. Honestly.

Now we've got that cleared up, let me say it straight: This book takes on some big arguments, but, other than humorously swatting some flies, loses hands down. All it succeeds in doing is illustrating that there are fakers, losers, charlatans and wankers to be found in the Social Sciences departments of any given University. Anyone who's been to university and didn't know that deserves a clip around the ear and to be sent to the back of the class. Now either Sokal didn't know that ( - ~clip~ -), or he's spent half his book shooting fish in a barrel. That might seem like good sport, but before long it becomes obvious it's a cheap thrill.

Having said that, I sincerely doubt that the titillation of seeing dumb French Feminists taken apart is what made this book such a splash: I think it's because of Sokal's purported intent: to undermine the notion of cognitive relativism, especially as it associated with modern philosophy of science, in particular the work of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. This is the battle: Sokal aligns with those who say scientists are the exclusive purveyors of a shining light called truth; the Barbarians at the gate are these simpering postmodernists who want to tear the temple down.

While the poseurs cited in this book are certainly (for the most part) phoneys or idiots, I think Thomas Kuhn was neither, and while Paul Feyerabend overplayed the court jester hand, he had some important things to say too.

So, to the first point: Proving that one writer (or a hundred, or a thousand) who purports to adhere to relativism is a charlatan doesn't establish anything about *the idea* of relativism. All you have established is that you have a found yourself a charlatan. Give yourself a star.

But while you're pinning it on, remember that postmodernists do not have a monopoly on illogical, bamboozling, balderdash:

Example: Sir Roger Penrose (Emeritus Rouse Ball professor of mathematics at Oxford University, no less) and his dreadful, lumpen-headed, and deliberately bamboozling anti-AI tract "The Emperor's New Mind". The very point of the (no doubt correct but nonetheless entirely irrelevant) science deluged on the reader in that book is to obscure the fact that the real emperor was Roger Penrose and his arguments on AI really blow the kumara.

Example: Noam Chomsky and Steven Pinker's Linguistic Nativism, which has held sway for a good thirty years in many linguistics departments, and is anything but post-modern: nativism holds that humans have an innate understanding of grammar hard wired into their biology. From my paltry readings in linguistics and the philosophy of language, my impression is that Pinker's and Chomsky's arguments are seriously flawed. (See: Sampson: "The Language Instinct Debate" for a thorough linguistic critique of nativism; see Rorty: "Contingency Irony, and Solidarity" for a philosophical perspective on the contingency of language). Make note of this example, as it becomes relevant later on.

Secondly, Sokal and Bricmont (quite deliberately) refuse to engage on certain topics, in particular on cultural or aesthetic relativism, which they say (without providing a reason) "raise very different issues". Take that star away, for this statement betrays a fundamental misunderstanding about relativism. Actually, ethical, aesthetic and cognitive relativisms raise different manifestations of *exactly* the same issue: Cognitive relativism, in that it relates to "epistemic" truth (as opposed to "moral" truth or "aesthetic" truth - both of which seem intuitively more questionable ideas) is simply a cut closer to the quick: indeed, the aesthetic and moral brands of relativism rely for their plausibility on cognitive relativism anyway (i.e. if the truths we understand about the physical universe are contingent on our language, then it follows that ideals of right and wrong and beauty must be similarly contingent on our language).

Thirdly, Sokal provides the following account of cognitive relativism:

"While scientists ... try to obtain an objective view ... of the world, relativist thinkers tell them that they are wasting their time and that such an enterprise is, in principle, an illusion"

Now that, to put it mildly, is a *very* punchy version of relativism, and not one that any credible relativist philosopher I know of (and certainly not Thomas Kuhn, who spent a whole book explaining how and why the process scientific discovery works) subscribes to.

That is, in the trade, known as a straw-man argument: You set it up to knock it over. Here goes:

P1: Relativists say science is a waste of time
P2: Science helps us reliably predict and react coherently to phenomena occurring in the world
P3: Things which help to predict and react to such phenomena have genuine utility
C1: Therefore, science has genuine utility
C2: Ergo, science is not a waste of time

Case closed. Is relativism dead? No: the problem is, most relativists I know would completely agree with all of the above argument except for premise 1. The cat is most definitely still out of the bag. (In a nutshell, all reasonably stated relativism says is that you can't know that your theory actually maps onto the actual configuration of the outside world; it may, it may not: logically there will always be some other possible explanation for the same set of data, however implausible or difficult to imagine, and in part that difficulty in imagination may be a function of the historical contingency of our belief in, and description of the world in terms of, the current "paradigm". Relativism simply says the best you can do is to know that, for now, your theory works, not that it is *true*. Though Sokal and Bricmont may disagree, I don't think this is controversial amongst philosophers nor, really, scientists.)

Lastly, in criticising an admittedly utterly ludicrous passage bestowed on the world by that splendidly silly feminist philosopher Julia Kristeva, Sokal makes the following footnote:

"...Kristeva seems to be appealing ... to the 'Sapir-Whorf thesis' in linguistics that is ...that our language radically conditions our view of the world. This thesis nowadays is sharply criticised by some linguists: see, for example Pinker ..."

Hold the phone. The implication is that the Sapir-Whorf thesis (as to the contingency of language) has been discredited, but by none other than Steven Pinker in his "The Language Instinct" which, as per the above, is at the very least a controversial piece of writing. This is an extremely important point, since it's utterly central to the credibility of the anti-relativist cause, and if one takes Geoffrey Sampson's book (cited above) at face value the nativist claims themselves are built on very suspect reasoning and scientific research. It seems to me (and to writers like Richard Rorty) that language must radically condition our view of the world, because that's the only basis on which we can even describe it.

At the end of the day, properly stated cognitive relativism is no a threat to modern scientific discourse, except that it relegates the scientist from "truth knower" or "person through whom you may have exclusive access to the truth" (sounds a bit like a grand high pooh-bah or - dare I say it - high priest, doesn't it?) to "person whose theory works the best for now" and who may be in competition for that status with other people in the community whether or not they're scientists.

If science *does* work better than feng shui or healing crystals (and I, for one, think it does) then this shouldn't be a particularly troubling way of looking at the world for a scientist who is at ease with his views and his value to the community. So it makes the knee-jerk reactions against relativism, from the likes of Sokal and elsewhere Richard Dawkins, all the more mystifying. ( )

Science > Philosophy

What a fun book!

If you have had any upper level philosophy classes in the past 20 or more years you have been introduced to postmodern ideas. When I was taking these classes I was fascinated by them (of course it helps to have a highly intelligent and charismatic professor). But at the end of the day I was always left slightly confused as to the chain of reasoning and felt embarrassed trying to nitpick my professors arguments. So this book was enjoyable in the sense that it confirmed my original confusion and showed that while several of the postmodern ideas are valid to a point they are often overextended to such a degree that they become nonsense.

This book can be a quick read if you just go through the main text and skim many of the excerpts, or a much slower read if you go through all the footnotes and try to understand the excerpts. But the whole point of the book is that most of the “postmodern” excerpts included are highly convoluted mush. I skimmed through most although some were really funny and worth reading closely.

The two authors of this book are physicists and are careful to critique the authors they cover from the perspective of mathematical and scientific ideas and reasoning. Interspersed with the chapters covering several famous thinkers (Lacan, Latour, Baudrillard, Deleuze, etc) there are more general chapters on:

- “Epistemic Relativism in the Philosophy of Science”,
- “Chaos Theory and Postmodern Science”, and
- “Godel’s Theorem and Set Theory: Some Examples of Abuse”

Towards the end of the book the authors include the original parody that was submitted and accepted by the magazine “Social Text”. This paper is called
“Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity” and can be found online here: http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/so... ( )

I'm not one to tangle with pomos, poststructuralists, and semioticians. Listen politely, aim for the gentleman's C, and move on. In their minds, something, somewhere is being fed that rings the dinnerbell for them. Good for them. (And Foucault and Eco really are top notch thinkers)

However, I am a sucker for reading about cons, and Sokal smacked down a good one. What is priceless about this book for me was the reportage on the actual con, vs the laundry list attack on the Academes that frankly reads more like the incomplete notes for a potentially interesting critique of retarded pomo blather. The response from the aggrieved magazine editors (granted it's filtered through Sokal)is so wounded and whiney and LAME that you wonder just how much real dog eat dog interaction these folks put their poor cloistered lily necks out for. They must go through a lot of tissue at those MLA conventions!

So if your expecting a thorough thrashing of postmodern theory, this aint it. But, if you are looking for a tale of a pin for pomposity, this should do. ( )

Very, very funny. The extracts from the French "intellectuals" are hilarious. ( )

An important message, but not enjoyable reading: In 1996, New York University physicist Alan Sokal wrote a paper, "Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity", discussing how theories of quantum gravity prove that physical 'reality' is merely a social construction and exploring the resulting progressive political implications and the need for a new "liberatory postmodern science" and mathematics. On the day it was published by the journal Social Text, Sokal revealed that it was nonsense: nothing more than "a melange of truths, half-truths, quarter-truths, falsehoods, non sequiturs, and syntactically correct sentences that have no meaning whatsoever", along with a large number of (regrettably accurate) fawning quotations of the editors of Social Text and other postmodern luminaries (268-269). How shocking.

"Fashionable Nonsense", coauthored by Sokal and Belgian physicist Jean Bricmont (originally published in French as "Impostures Intellectuelles" in 1997) is another product of the same research that prompted Sokal to perpetrate his hoax. Troubled in the mid-90s by reports of 'postmodern' intellectuals abusing scientific concepts in their work, Sokal did some research and found plenty of examples. A few were incorporated into his hoax, but there was not room for many of them there. To complement "Transgressing the Boundaries", Sokal and Bricmont compiled many of the most flagrant cases of scientific abuse into this volume, accompanied by clear explanations of what is wrong with the examples considered and how they are abusive.

The postmodern luminaries Sokal and Bricmont consider are Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray, Bruno Latour, Jean Baudrillard, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari and Paul Virilio. All are represented through lengthy extracts from their offending works. Many reviewers of this volume have claimed to find the nonsense spouted by these individuals inadvertently hilarious. I personally found it more depressing (and often painful) to read their twisted prose with at least a partially open mind. I couldn't bring myself to enjoy the book, though I recognize the service it does in battling obscurantism and abuse of scientific terminology. In addition there are three 'intermezzos': one on epistemic relativism in the philosophy of science that didn't overly impress me, as well as two more entertaining chapters on abuse and confusion related to chaos theory and Godel's theorem. Finally, "Fashionable Nonsense" includes Sokal's "Transgressing the Boundaries" and some related material in appendices.

As a second edition, Sokal and Bricmont have a valuable opportunity to clear up ambiguities and misunderstandings as well as address criticism of the original French "Impostures Intellectuelles". For instance, they are able to emphasize (repeatedly) that their purpose isn't to challenge postmodern philosophy as such, only "to denounce intellectual posturing and dishonesty" (16) as related to scientific concepts. In addition, they note that 'postmodernism' is not a strictly accurate term and is used in part "for convenience" (14) and refute accusations of being right-wing reactionary American intellectual imperialists (Sokal's leftist credentials include a pilgrimage to Nicaragua in the '80s to teach mathematics under the Sandinistas).

While the mid-90s furor over the 'science wars' seems to have died down, "Fashionable Nonsense" still performs a valuable service in exposing and debunking abuse of science, expanding the critique introduced by Sokal's hoax. Though I didn't find the book enjoyable reading, it effectively delivers an important message and constructive critique. ( )