This is the last book Halberstam wrote, he having finished it five days before he was killed in a car accident on 23 Apr 2007. It tells ths story of the Korean War in considerable detail up to the summer of 1951, and then sketches the remaining events, with an Epilogue which I thought detracted from my appreciation of the book--it caused me to lower my rating of the book to four and a half stars. Otherwise I would give the book five stars, even though there are considerable detailed accounts of battles--something which can be wearisome to me. But the view of MacArthur and of General Ned Aalmond is devastating and I think accurate. The account of the firing of Mac Arthur and of his return to the U.S., which I followed extremely carefully white it was going on, is well-told and met with my full approval, since I was and am convinced Truman was right to fire MacArthur--as I think most knowledgable people now agree. I think this is the best Halberstam book I have read--I have read four others. ( )

Short on War History Long on Political Analysis: I ordered and read this book as a suggested title by Amazon. This is not a meticulously researched historical description of battle like Rick Atkinson's first two volumes of his WWII trilogy of American forces in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and France. It is not an engrossing first person history of battle like "Band of Brothers" by Ambrose or "We were soldiers once . . . and young" by Moore. And it is certainly not historical fiction with the entertainment value of the collected works of the Shaara's. Halberstam did not have the luxury of the passage of time to observe the geopolitics like Groome did in "A storm in Flanders", describing the disaster of WWI that set the stage for WWII, and his post hoc reflections on Vietnam as it relates to Korea are pure opinion and poorly backed up by facts.
I, like other reviewers, would have liked to see more discussion of the battles, something about the advent of the Air Force, high speed dogfighting (isn't the history of the Lafeyette Escadrille wonderful in Jeff Shaara's "To the Last Man"?), and other battles commented here by those who were there.
Finally, I can not reconcile David Halberstam's opinions about "Who Lost China", with the facts meticulously documented by Evans in "Blacklisted by History". Roosevelt, Truman, Marshall, Acheson and the Democrats won WWII, stablized Germany and Japan, and totally set the stage for 50 years of cold war by not realizing the true threat of Communism, Stalinism, Maoism, and the dark world of the Gulag. Not unlike the naive Wilson setting the stage for WWII with the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations. It is such a shame that Halberstam is no longer with us, a debate between Stanton Evans and he would be fascinating.

In my experience, most books can be divided into three broad categories: those that seek to educate, those that seek to entertain and those that seek to do both. When you can find books that fall into the third category, and succeed, you have most profitably invested your time. In this category I place the works of Stephen Ambrose and David McCollough. Also, works of historical fiction by such authors as James Michener and James Clavell would qualify. However, the further in depth the education becomes, the more difficult it is to maintain the entertainment factor. Ambrose and McCollough are masters in this regard.

David Halberstam is an outstanding historian and a meticulous one. It is the depth of his analysis that makes this work extremely educational, but at the same time, dry at times and plodding at others. This is definitely a worthwhile read for anyone seeking an education on matters involving the Korean War in general and the military and political landscape of East Asia during the period following the Second World War in particular.

Of particular interest, and outstanding focus are the relationship between President Truman and General Douglas MacArthur; the Chinese civil war and the dichotomy between the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist army of Mao Zedong; the domestic political struggle surrounding the fall of China and the leadup to the Korean conflict; and the relationship between Korean dictator Kim Il Sung and his Communist overlords in both Russia and China.

This is an outstanding piece of work from the standpoint of analysis and historical relevance, however it falls slightly short from the viewpoint of purely enjoyable reading, due in large part to the depth of the analysis and the detail used by the author. Nevertheless, I highly recommend it. ( )

This book was less than complimentary to both President Truman, as a prisoner to MacArthur's reputation and to General MacArthur as an absentee delusional commander who sent US soldiers to their death in the most meaningless of reasons; self gratification and the need to be right above all else. It was a sad testimony to the quality of leaders throughout the book. It made me angry. Halberstam was not very subtle and although he tried hard to make the story matter of fact it could not hide his disdain for the leadership housed in the Dai Ichi in Tokyo and in the White House as well as the Joint Chiefs of staff inability to deal appropriately with MacArthur. The book was very eye opening about a war I knew very little about. ( )

A superb account. Well researched and based primarily upon interviews of soldiers and primary sources. ( )

Very well written. Having spent a fair amount of time in modern Korea it was hard to picture this took place in my lifetime. Very revealing information on the back channel politics and maneuvering going on in Washington. When compared to todays situation in Iraq, puts things into perspective. ( )

Just incredibly well done. ( )

David Halberstam's last book is a substantial volume on the Korean War. However, don't be misled. This is not a history of the entire war. Rather it is an examination of the year 1950-51, decisions made by General MacArthur in his running of the war, and the conflicts between MacArthur and the Truman administration.

Halberstam spins a sprawling story, sharing the United States' lack of readiness for the war, the stiffening of American resistance at the Pusan perimeter, the Inchon surprise, the heady push across the 38th parallel and the devastating results of Chinese intervention.

Halberstam made thorough use of many secondary resources. However the real brilliance of the narrative lays in the testimony of Korean War veterans who paint a vivid picture of this less-remembered conflict on the mid-twentieth century. ( )

If you enjoy history well told you must read the last book by David Halberstam. Reading The Coldest Winter reminds me why I still remember reading The Best and the Brightest and The Powers That Be many years ago. As a writer Halberstam is superb and his latest, an excursion into the early years of the cold war, is more evidence of his skill. The story unfolds with careful attention to the details of the battles as well as incisive character sketches of the main players on each side. The international political tensions of the early fifties are highlighted and become as real as those in the Mideast today. That North Korea is still a significant international political and diplomatic problem even today makes this book relevant. Halberstam himself regarded this as his best book. But more importantly, from the perspective of a literature lover, it is a very good read. ( )

The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War
by David Halberstam

David Halberstam points out in the introduction to this book that, despite numerous works on the Korean War, this period of American history is still treated with far less importance than it deserves. His interviews with American veterans of this war makes it clear that they still feel that their story has been neglected; and often it is the veterans themselves that are responsible for this.

Previous books, particularly the more scholarly ones, have given us excellent military histories of the war. But, unlike Vietnam, relatively few have offered a detailed presentation of the political events leading up to the war; and almost none have illustrated the mistakes made and the lessons learned (and not learned) by America's experience in Korea.

Halberstam did NOT attempt to write another military history; except for a description of pivotal events, and a few narratives from his interviewees in order to illuminate the experience of the war, he spent relatively little time in Korea at all. Rather, he concentrated his research efforts and interviews on the myriad errors and triumphs of the major players involved in precipitating the war, as well as those at all levels of the military hierarchy who were responsible for conducting it. He also examines whether the Americans, Koreans, Chinese, and Russians learned anything from the experience.

In order to help his readers understand the historical background of the conflict and, just as importantly, the motivation of the peole involved, his narrative of the war is frequently punctuated with biographies: The careers and character of Harry Truman, Dean Acheson, Douglas MacArthur, Mao Zedong, Josef Stalin, Kim Il Sung, Syngman Rhee, George Marshall and Matthew Ridgway are examined in considerable depth.

Of particular interest in this book is Halberstam's description of the effect post-WW2 politics (both in America and in the Communist world) had on the precipitation of the conflict:

1. The attempts by the Republican party (including the erratic actions and influence of Gen. MacArthur and the China Lobby) to regain the White House, the politicization of foreign policy that became particularly virulent as the war progressed.

2. The legacy of FDR's long tenure and Truman and Acheson's struggle to establish a coherent post-WW2 policy in Asia and elsewhere, particularly regarding American relations with China and Russia.

3. The failure of the more pragmatic members of the foreign service community (such as George Kennan) to educate the American public, as well as leaders such as Acheson and Truman, on the very real
divisions that existed in the 'Communist bloc'.

4. How the conduct of the war was crippled by the drastic demobilization of the American military after WW2, the very rapid decline in public support for the war after it began to go badly, and the silence of the veterans of Korean combat as a result of the dubious conculsion of the war.

Lastly, Halberstam offers a very valuable epilogue, analyzing the legacy of the Korea War. He asserts that, due to a 'purge' of the US diplomatic corps as a result of a combination of McCarthyism and the efforts of the China Lobby to pin the blame for the 'loss of China' on Roosevelt and Truman, the US was very poorly prepared for its later entanglements in Asia. The partisanship and politicization that accompanies foreign policy discussions still plagues us to this day. ( )

Up until now, the Korean War has been the black hole of modern American history. Halberstam gives us a masterful narrative of the political decisions and miscalculations on both sides. He charts the disastrous path that led to the massive entry of Chinese forces near the Yalu River, and that caught Douglas MacArthur and his soldiers by surprise. ( )