Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World (original 2001; edition 2002)

I rarely give out five stars--that's deliberate--but this is so illuminating on a complex topic without being dry, I think it deserves full marks. The book treats of "six months that changed the world"--the Paris Peace Conference that produced the Treaty of Versailles. I was taught in high school that the vindictive terms of that treaty were ruinous to Germany and at the root of Hitler's rise and the outbreak of World War II. It was a view popularized by John Maynard Keynes (who was involved in the peace process--as was Winston Churchill. There were some interesting and unexpected players in this story.) MacMillan makes the case it was by no means so simple. That among other things, that especially since the terms were never really enforced, you can't really blame the treaty for what would happen over the next decades. I think what really astonished me about the peace conference though was just how many fingers were in how many pies. Yes, some developments such as establishment of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were fait accomplis by the time the conference started, but it was largely this conference, and especially the "Big Three" of France, Britain, and the United States who drew the borders.

And not just of Europe, but in Africa and the Middle East as well, and we're still dealing with the messy after effects. To take one example, Iraq was created from three different provinces of the recently defunct Ottoman Empire and drawn to suit colonial ambitions of the British and French--not along historical lines or reasons of ethnic cohesion. Roots not just of World War II, but Greek/Turkish, Jewish/Arab, Bosnia/Serb, Chinese/Japanese conflicts can be traced back here. It's all very complicated, and it's a very, very long book (around 600 pages) but part of what makes it digestible is that MacMillan breaks it up regionally, following say the personalities of the newly emerging Yugoslavia and following up on its ultimate fate and how it was affected by those six months in 1919.

I think it also escapes being dry due to how well drawn are the various personalities involved. MacMillan deals with many of the leaders from the newly emerging states, but her primary focus is on the leaders of the Big Three: Woodrow Wilson of the United States, Clemenceau of France and Lloyd George of Britain. Wilson seemed from the portrait painted here a dangerous mix of naive and stubborn. His precious League of Nations became an idee fixe that overrode all other issues. If there was a problem with the deals emerging, it seems Wilson would wave it away with the idea the League of Nations would fix it. At the same time, his stubborn inflexibility, his dogmatism and partisanship doomed the acceptance of the League and the Treaty back in the United States. And those very ideals, particularly "self-determination" as enunciated in his 14 Points, raised unrealistic expectations and caused bitter disappointment. Clemenceau comes across as vengeful and vindictive towards the Germans. At the same time, given what MacMillan detailed of France's losses in the war, and its geography that didn't put a channel, let alone an ocean, between it and Germany, Clemenceau's determination to keep Germany weak is understandable. I got less of a fix on Lloyd George. Some called him "vacillating" and "unprincipled" according to MacMillan. He seemed the opposite of Wilson--much more pragmatic. But without the kind of guiding principles or clear goals of Wilson or Clemenceau, he did seem more indecisive. He seemed all over the map--oftentimes quite literally.

I think there's really no more fascinating time than the outbreak of World War I and it's immediate aftermath. I can't think of a period of more stark, abrupt change. The end of the war marks the real end of the 19th century, whatever the dates. Visual and performing arts, literature, music made radical breaks--you can even see it in modes of dress. MacMillan illuminates an important part of what shaped that era. ( )

When it comes to big non-fiction books, I sometimes reach a saturation point before the book is actually finished, even though the book itself is perfectly fascinating. I've reached that point about 3/5 of the way through Paris 1919, which admittedly is a pretty good portion of the book. MacMillan has obviously done her research well, and I did learn a lot about the peace conference (and about China's and Japan's contributions to the war, which are probably overlooked in North American teachings on the subject). I've also been pointed in a new reading direction: the history of France, which I really only know about piecemeal from histories of Britain and its interactions with France.

I would definitely recommend this book to anyone with an interest in the inter-war years and a longer attention span than mine! ( )

Very comprehensive account of the Paris Peace Conference. Atfer the first part which sets up the history, characters and nations going into the conference it deals with each geographical area rather than a chronology of events. Given the complex negotiations and the constant switching between items discussed, this approach was perhaps enviatable to preseve some coherence and keep the reader onside with events. It does though sometimes make it hard to get a flavour of the talks as they progressed and the fact Wilson went back to america during the negotiations loses the importance I feel it would have had. However, dealing with each area provides a great reference to come back to and Macmillan does a good job of following through the consequences of what was decided right through to the modern day, e.g. the mess that is now Iraq, makes better sense knowing how it was thrown together. ( )

Paris 1919 was an engaging character study of the Big Three: Georges Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and President Wilson. As an American, my history classes were inadequate on the subject of World War I. This book sent me to hunt for information in Wikipedia to bridge the gaps in my knowledge many times.
MacMillan skillfully portrayed the expectations that were heaped upon the Peace Conference, and she also showed that the hopes and ideals were beyond the reach of men. Men with large staffs of intelligent advisors often ended up giving in to the forcefulness or charm of men who were grabbing territory and resources.
I gained a better understanding of the troubles that have plagued the Slovaks, the Kurds, and even the Chinese. This book covered a neglected part of history -- The Peace.
Ultimately, the shattered ideals of most of the key players in the book ended the story. I found President Wilson's story quite poinant. The one thing I did learn from my history education was that President Wilson failed to gain approval of the League of Nations that he so dearly believed in.
This book was the beginning of my study of Modern History. It gave me a good understanding of the geography, personalities and the events that were affected by the Peacemakers after WWI. I would recommend it. ( )

David Lloyd George was the author's great-grandfather. Similar to Barbara Tuchman, she is very familiar with the foibles of the ruling class. Her character vignettes are a joy to read. She truly manages to evoke the flair of the period and the city. Her book provides both a good account of the peace negotiations and a summary of the resolutions for the discussed territories. The end of the First World War saw the collapse of the Eastern European empires of Germany, Austria, Russia and the Ottoman Empire. MacMillan highlights the American and French failure in creating viable and ethnically sound units. In my opinion, she is too soft on the often pernicious British influence (especially in the Middle East).

The peace negotiations were doomed from the start, as the German acceptance of a preliminary peace had not resulted in an occupation of the defeated's territory. Thus, the odd situation that the Allies could not really exert pressure upon the Germans. On the other hand, the Allies wanted to transfer the cost of this senseless war upon the shoulders of those least able to bear them. The unwillingness of the US establishment to accept international responsibilities and to refinance and net the war debts of its Allies was the underlying cause of the treaty's failure. The excessive French demands were only secondary in nature. As Keynes had shown, Germany could have paid a fairly calculated war debt if given economic aid at the same time. Given that for half a year, the world's politicians worked alongside one another in one city, the fruits of its labor were barren. The prize for the worst behaved negotiators clearly goes to the Italians whose ineptitude during the war turned into a gargantuan appetite during the peace negotiations. No wonder that it was the first to fall into fascism.

Highly recommended. ( )