You've seen The Dark Knight and you're marvelling over the outcome of the scenario with the two ferries wired with explosives and each ferry given a control that will blow the other ferry out of the water. You watched as the tension grew with each passing second. Would someone push the button to blow the other guy out of the water or was there a way out of this?

It's a scenario referred to as the prisoner's dilemma.

This book explores that game scenario, how it came to be, how it became a winning strategy in computer gaming, and most importantly how this game is played out every day in myriad ways you never dreamed possible - especially in your own life, if you are willing to take a long, hard, honest look.

The book contains the most cogent argument for co-operation over ruthless competition as a strategy for survival and success. The might-is-right arguments of those who wield and abuse power for short-term gain are countered by proof that co-operation wins in the end and mercy triumphs over might.

"Do unto others as you would have them do unto you" is more than a platitude; it's a winning strategy - the ONLY winning strategy.

This book ought to be compulsory reading in every school, family, business, place of worship, and legislature. ( )

This is the most convincing and comprehensive explanation this reviewer has read about the germination and proliferation of co-operative models of behaviour, and the most relevant one to social science (which was a surprise given the amount of text that is given over to the computer simulations of the iterative Prisoner's Dilemma game). Many books explain how positive sum co-operation results in mutually better outcomes, and many more opine how good it would be if individuals and groups would only do a bit more of it and trancend one-time gain for slower but cumulatively superior multi-period gain. This is the only text so far that shows mathematically how a co-operative strategy can displace a previously dominant non-cooperative one, and ultimately out-compete it. Accordingly, it provides one of the tightest links between social evolution and maths.

That happy outcome only holds under certain conditions, but fortunately these are conditions that are not drastically unlikely. And if they are in place, then the main finding of the arguments is that a central authority is not necessary for co-operation to get started and endure.

The book illuminates just how wide a selection of social situations can be decomposed into Prisoner's Dilemma games. Those who think that game theorist's fixation with that model represents too much dewlling on rudimentary, drawing-board, non-relevant basics (this included your reviewer) have something to learn here. Perhaps it could have gone further with this. It is essential, and worthwhile, to spend the amount of time that the author does on the computer tournament in order to develop the idea of co-operative displacement rigorously, and in theoretical terms. Yet your reviewer found herself wishing there was more real-world, everyday application of it provided later, as a reward. Thankfully, she can get a good amount of that elsewhere.

Francesca ( )

This is everything a popularized account of science should be. It is clear, deep, practical as well as theoretical, and very relevant. I knew of the Prisoner's Dilemma, and I knew of Axelrod's computer tournament, so I thought I wouldn't get much out of this book. I was wrong: the discussion goes far beyond the game itself and into a grounded exposition of the growth of cooperation in a selfish environment. Fantastic. ( )

Explores how cooperation can emerge in a world ruled by selfishness with no central authority or rule. Axelrod demonstrates that enlightened self interest can lead to effective cooperation in any situation where the participants believe that they will need to interact with each other in the future. These lessons can, and should be applied to personal, corporate, national, and international interactions. After reading this book I noticed that I was much less likely to take an all or nothing approach when dealing with others, and was more more likely to look for win-win options. ( )

Robert Axelrod is a political scientist who became intrigued with an old problem known as The Prisoner’s Dilemma. (In one example two prisoners are each told that they will get a reward if they tell on the other. If neither confesses, there’s no change; if both tell, then both get another month in jail, if one tells and the other doesn’t then the sentences are lengthened and shortened by three months each.)

The prisoner’s dilemma becomes especially interesting when it is repeated so there is a pattern of interaction between the two prisoners. Have a look at the pattern of rewards and work out what you might do?

Axelrod had the idea of inviting a range of people from different disciplines to submit their suggestions for ‘winning strategies’. He then set them off to play against each other to see which ones came off best in a long series of repetitions.

Surprisingly, the ‘best’ strategy was a very simple one known as ‘tit for tat’, which cooperated until the other side defected when it immediately defected once then continued to cooperate.

I won’t spoil the story of why it was so successful or of the translation of this simple idea into the real-world political arena. That is Robert Axelrod’s story and he tells it well.

Have a look at this and you may choose to add some of the ideas to your negotiations too. ( )