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Loading... War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorismby Douglas J. Feith
None. Having just gotten this book, I haven't had time to read it but can already see that, unlike the typical "insider" memoir, it backs up its arguments with contemporary documents. (The author has posted all of the unclassified and declassified ones on-line to help readers evaluate his analyses.) The reviews in the Wall Street Journal and National Review make it clear that Mr. Feith has written an account that everyone who wants to think seriously about the war in Iraq and, more broadly, the War on Terror will have to read and digest. Update: Reading the book confirmed my favorable impression. For some comments, and a contrast with a lesser "insider's account", see http://stromata.typepad.com/stromata_blog/2008/05/feith-vs-mcclel.html
This book, an analytical description of a dysfunctional National Security Council and disloyal senior officials, will be studied for years by journalists, historians, and aspiring political appointees. Sharp insights are scattered through its more than 600 pages — which are structured as a careful legal brief, forcing the reader to sift for the many nuggets. Former undersecretary of defense Douglas Feith comes across as a serious policy wonk, both highly educated and dedicated to the proposition that the internal logic of a theory or policy position should persuade the reader and guide government. Not for him the breezy style of books where sources who remember conversations from years past slyly offer juicy gossip. Instead, half of the book is a convincing refutation of unfair allegations about the author. The other half presents a balanced analysis of policy debates about Iraq inside the administration between mid-2001 and mid-2004, including copious footnotes and copies of documents. Feith’s book brings the reader into the deliberative process to observe, as he notes early on, that “policy making often involves choosing to accept one set of likely problems over another.” On issue after issue — the quality and interpretation of prewar intelligence on weapons of mass destruction, the desired constitution of post-war Iraqi governance, Iraq-al-Qaeda/terrorist relations, and many others — Feith has laid out the most well-documented explanation of how decisions were made. Feith’s book is no less than a reference publication for the deconstruction of the myths and assertions promoted by those who either oppose or have become disenchanted with the Iraq invasion and, more broadly, the Bush counterattack on Islamic terror. [T]he best account to date of how the administration debated, decided, organized and executed its military responses to the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. . . . Mr. Feith's book does not lack for criticism of how the administration handled itself or even, at times, of how he handled himself. But . . . most of the received wisdom about the dynamics of the first Bush term -- pitting "warmongering neocons" and democracy fantasists such as Mr. Feith against more sober-minded realists such as then-Secretary of State Colin Powell and his deputy, Richard Armitage -- is bunk, and demonstrably so.
References to this work on external resources.
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The old saw is, "He who wins the war, writes the history." Well, maybe not. Because President Bush has won this war, but he's still letting others write the history. (