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War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism by Douglas J. Feith
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War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism

by Douglas J. Feith

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I'm certainly not an apologist for the Bush Administration. Nor am I one of the rabid Bush-haters. I remember very clearly what the debate was on going to war against Iraq. Feith does too and retells it in detail. And in the process he reveals the hypocrisy of those who now oppose the war, but at the time of decision didn't, and demonstrates how the Bush Administration let its critics frame the debate.

The old saw is, "He who wins the war, writes the history." Well, maybe not. Because President Bush has won this war, but he's still letting others write the history. ( )
  jmcilree | Aug 25, 2008 |
Having just gotten this book, I haven't had time to read it but can already see that, unlike the typical "insider" memoir, it backs up its arguments with contemporary documents. (The author has posted all of the unclassified and declassified ones on-line to help readers evaluate his analyses.) The reviews in the Wall Street Journal and National Review make it clear that Mr. Feith has written an account that everyone who wants to think seriously about the war in Iraq and, more broadly, the War on Terror will have to read and digest.

Update: Reading the book confirmed my favorable impression. For some comments, and a contrast with a lesser "insider's account", see http://stromata.typepad.com/stromata_... ( )
1 vote TomVeal | Apr 25, 2008 |
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This book, an analytical description of a dysfunctional National Security Council and disloyal senior officials, will be studied for years by journalists, historians, and aspiring political appointees. Sharp insights are scattered through its more than 600 pages — which are structured as a careful legal brief, forcing the reader to sift for the many nuggets.

Former undersecretary of defense Douglas Feith comes across as a serious policy wonk, both highly educated and dedicated to the proposition that the internal logic of a theory or policy position should persuade the reader and guide government. Not for him the breezy style of books where sources who remember conversations from years past slyly offer juicy gossip. Instead, half of the book is a convincing refutation of unfair allegations about the author. The other half presents a balanced analysis of policy debates about Iraq inside the administration between mid-2001 and mid-2004, including copious footnotes and copies of documents.
added by TomVeal | editNational Review, Bing West (Jun 16, 2008)
 
Feith’s book brings the reader into the deliberative process to observe, as he notes early on, that “policy making often involves choosing to accept one set of likely problems over another.” On issue after issue — the quality and interpretation of prewar intelligence on weapons of mass destruction, the desired constitution of post-war Iraqi governance, Iraq-al-Qaeda/terrorist relations, and many others — Feith has laid out the most well-documented explanation of how decisions were made.

Feith’s book is no less than a reference publication for the deconstruction of the myths and assertions promoted by those who either oppose or have become disenchanted with the Iraq invasion and, more broadly, the Bush counterattack on Islamic terror.
 
[T]he best account to date of how the administration debated, decided, organized and executed its military responses to the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. . . .

Mr. Feith's book does not lack for criticism of how the administration handled itself or even, at times, of how he handled himself. But . . . most of the received wisdom about the dynamics of the first Bush term -- pitting "warmongering neocons" and democracy fantasists such as Mr. Feith against more sober-minded realists such as then-Secretary of State Colin Powell and his deputy, Richard Armitage -- is bunk, and demonstrably so.
 
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Human rights in Saddam Hussein's Iraq

Iraq sanctions

War and Decision

Book description

Amazon.com Product Description (ISBN 0060899735, Hardcover)

In the years since the attacks of September 11, 2001, journalists, commentators, and others have published accounts of the Bush Administration's war on terrorism. But no senior Pentagon official has offered an inside view of those years, or has challenged the prevailing narrative of that war—until now.

Douglas J. Feith, the head of the Pentagon's Policy organization, was a key member of Donald Rumsfeld's inner circle as the Administration weighed how to protect the nation from another 9/11. In War and Decision, he puts readers in the room with President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, General Tommy Franks, and other key players as the Administration devised its strategy and war plans. Drawing on thousands of previously undisclosed documents, notes, and other written sources, Feith details how the Administration launched a global effort to attack and disrupt terrorist networks; how it decided to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime; how it came to impose an occupation on Iraq even though it had avoided one in Afghanistan; how some officials postponed or impeded important early steps that could have averted major problems in Iraq's post-Saddam period; and how the Administration's errors in war-related communications undermined the nation's credibility and put U.S. war efforts at risk.

Even close followers of reporting on the Iraq war will be surprised at the new information Feith provides—presented here with balance and rigorous attention to detail. Among other revelations, War and Decision demonstrates that the most far-reaching warning of danger in Iraq was produced not by State or by the CIA, but by the Pentagon. It reveals the actual story behind the allegations that the Pentagon wanted to "anoint" Ahmad Chalabi as ruler of Iraq, and what really happened when the Pentagon challenged the CIA's work on the Iraq–al Qaida relationship. It offers the first accurate account of Iraq postwar planning—a topic widely misreported to date. And it presents surprising new portraits of Rumsfeld, Rice, Powell, Richard Armitage, L. Paul Bremer, and others—revealing how differences among them shaped U.S. policy.

With its blend of vivid narrative, frank analysis, and elegant writing, War and Decision is like no other book on the Iraq war. It will interest those who have been troubled by conflicting accounts of the planning of the war, frustrated by the lack of firsthand insight into the decision-making process, or skeptical of conventional wisdom about Operation Iraqi Freedom and the global war on terrorism—efforts the author continues to support.

(retrieved from Amazon Fri, 24 Apr 2009 07:58:04 -0400)

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