Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief (2008)

McPherson is one an expert on the causes and actions of the Civil War. The author's focus on Lincoln gives invaluable insight into Lincoln, both for his strength of character as well as his many mistakes. Being Commander was an ordeal when considering his generals. ( )

"Abraham Lincoln was the only president in American history whose entire administration was bounded by war," writes noted Civil War historian James M. McPherson at the outset of "Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief." Given that the southern insurrection took shape before Lincoln's inauguration and ended a few weeks after his assassination with a surrender of the last rebel army, this observation is correct. More important, though, is McPherson's implication: too little attention has been paid to Lincoln's military policy and decision-making within the breadth of Lincoln scholarship.

It would be incorrect to state that no attention has been paid; indeed, several books have been written on the very issue, in addition to other articles and the like. However, it is clear that such analysis has had limited impact on, and inclusion in, most biographies of the 16th president. Aside from issues related to generals Winfield Scott, George McClellan, and Ulysses Grant – and such analyses usually revolve more around interpersonal relationships than military policy – Lincoln's involvement in military policy is largely overlooked.

McPherson addresses this omission in a thought-provoking and engaging way in this well-researched and well-written book. With his characteristic ability to explain substantial issues clearly, the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of the great single-volume history of the Civil War, "Battle Cry of Freedom," explores Lincoln's growth in military matters from a neophyte to a superb commander in chief whose approach to this presidential responsibility became a model that other chief executives followed. In fact, McPherson argues that the concept and application of "war powers" was developed by Lincoln, virtually from scratch.

In his analysis, McPherson identifies five key components to presidential leadership of the military; of these, tactics, which Lincoln famously studied through on-the-job reading, is least important, in his assessment, while policy is most important. (Other key functions are national strategy, military strategy, and military operations.) From the beginning, McPherson is clear that being an able commander in chief is foremost, and perhaps necessarily, a political thing. An analysis of Lincoln's dealings with general in chief Winfield Scott at the outset of the war, in which Scott repeatedly advocates political policy under the guise of military strategy, sets the tone for McPherson's study, implying that Lincoln was already an above-average commander-in-chief even at the outset of the war, because of his political skills and his refusal to cow-tow to the military establishment.

Throughout, McPherson describes Lincoln as a very active, and increasingly capable, commander-in-chief. Perhaps the most striking aspect of his analysis, though, is a subtle refutation of conventional wisdom of Lincoln as a military leader. Most historians attribute Lincoln's involvement in military matters to a paucity of able and competent top-level leadership until the emergence of Grant in 1864. Although McPherson recognizes that Lincoln grew to appreciate and admire Grant's approach, he carefully shows that Lincoln very much supervised, and occasionally overruled, Grant after he became general in chief.

It is difficult to name any significant problems or oversights in McPherson's book, though I suppose some might quibble with bits and pieces of the analysis. Instead, the book seems a marvel of excellence, blending learned research, a discerning eye, and felicitous prose into a study certain to inform readers of all backgrounds. The book's accessibility, its consistent focus on its intended subject, and the well-deserved reputation of its author should cause the book to be influential in Lincoln studies for the next generation or two, a status it richly deserves.

This review is also posted at http://lincolniana.blogspot.com/2011/07/book-review-tried-by-war.html ( )

In “Tried By War” preeminent Civil War historian James McPherson brings his considerable talents to the subject of Abraham Lincoln’s actions as Commander-in-Chief during the Civil War. Utilizing a narrative that largely follows the rotating collection of Lincoln’s generals and how each came into and fell out of favor with the President. Throughout the war, Lincoln’s primary focus was the destruction of the rebel army, which he viewed as the key to defeating the Confederacy while his generals were too preoccupied with minimizing losses and capturing Richmond to sustain an effective assault on the Rebel forces.

McPherson makes clear that Lincoln developed his military strategy based on his political strategy. Above all, Lincoln’s greatest desire was to maintain the Union. In order to gain support early on, he accomplished this by taking a defensive strategy, goading the rebels into attacking Fort Sumter and first setting foot in neutral Kentucky. These two actions solidified support for the war in the North and ensured that the border states would not actively support the Confederacy. With that support in place, Lincoln began his search for a general who would carry out his plan for an all-out attack on the rebel army.

Brigadier General Irvin McDowell was placed in command of the Army of Northeastern Virginia but was quickly relieved following an embarrassing loss at Bull Run. The army’s failure was due to many factors, but none more important than McDowell being rushed into combat by Washington politics with a complicated strategy and an extremely green army.

Following the relief of Gen. McDowell, General George McClellan was the first man to lead Lincoln’s new Army of the Potomac. Billed as a “young Napolean, McClellan’s early command success actually hindered him during the Civil War. As McPherson eloquently but succinctly puts it, “never having experienced failure, he feared the unknown. To move against the enemy was to risk failure. So McClellan manufactured phantom enemies to justify his demands for more troops, to explain his inaction against the actual enemy, and to blame others for that inaction.” The general was “perpetually almost but not quite ready to move. No matter how many men or weapons he head, the enemy always had more. Even when faced with irrefutable evidence that he was overestimating his opponent’s strength, McClellan refused to move against the rebels. Lincoln was disgusted with his general’s “case of the slows” and even tried to replace him in August of 1862 only to be spurned by his choice of replacement, Ambrose Burnside. After three more months of having McClellan ignore his pleas for action, Lincoln finally relinquished the general of his command and convinced General Burnside to take command of the Army of the Potomac.

Burnside’s tenure as commander did not last long. His disastrous campaign against Fredericksburg after a mere two months as general and the subsequent aborted “Mud March” lost him the confidence of his subordinate generals. After first (unsuccessfully) attempting to relieve his subordinates of duty, Burnside offered Lincoln the choice of dismissing him or them. Lincoln accepted Burnside’s resignation and placed General Joseph Hooker in command.

Lincoln advised Hooker that, following the failures at Antietam and Fredericksburg, he expected the general to concentrate on Lee’s Army and to commit all of his forces in battle. Unfortunately, in his first real action at Chancellorsville, Hooker failed to carry out any of the President’s orders. He had been on the attack the previous week but, following a move by Stonewall Jackson, backed off and allowed the Confederates to gain the offensive, which they used to score a decisive victory in Chancellorsville; a battle in which two of the seven Union corps did not participate. The last straw came when Hooker requested Lincoln’s permission to attack the lightly defended Richmond as opposed to following Lee’s army. After more bickering with the President’s Secretary of War, Hooker submitted his resignation, which Lincoln accepted.

On his fourth day in command, General George Meade directed a successful defensive against Lee at Gettysburg, driving the Confederates out of Pennsylvania. Unfortunately for the general, he followed that victory with a missive proclaiming his desire to “drive from our soil every vestige of the presence of the invader.” To Lincoln, who was operating under the premise that “the whole country is our soil,” this statement reeked of McClellan. That statement, combined with Meade’s hesitation to follow, which allowed Lee’s army to escape, nearly caused the President to send the general a letter which would have provoked Meade’s resignation. Lincoln waited, though, mostly the Union army’s success in the west kept his mood cheerful.

Meade would remain in command of the Army of the Potomac for the remainder of the war, but his power was diminished in March of 1864 when Ulysses S. Grant was appointed Lieutenant General in command of all Union armies. Grant traveled with Meade for the rest of the war and most strategic decisions himself. With Grant, Lincoln finally found the general willing to make hard war he had been looking for. The general was far more willing to accept losses, knowing that the Union had men to replace those who died, while the Confederacy did not. Under Grant’s leadership, the Union was finally able to defeat and capture Lee’s army, effectively signaling the end of the Civil War.

For four years, Lincoln ordered his generals to take the offensive, to attack Lee’s army, and to stop overestimating the enemy’s numbers. For four years Lincoln’s generals failed him. Finally, under the leadership of Ulysses S. Grant, the Union army fought to win; and to defeat Lee’s army. ( )

The most amazing point of interest regarding this book about Abraham Lincoln is that it is the first book that basically analyzes Lincoln's position as the Commander-in-Chief. His entire administration was impacted by war starting with letters from Fort Sumter requesting aid on the day of his inauguration and ending with his assassination 6 days after General Lee surrendered at Appomattox. We have books about Lincoln's writings, his humor, his views on religion and slavery, and his ideas of how to reunite the nation, but nothing that had centered on his military role as Commander-in-Chief.

Lincoln spent more time during his Presidency with matters of war - communications with his Generals in the field, visiting the troops and battlefields, international relations, and military strategy then any other aspect of his policies. Never having been a soldier (he actually only served in the military for a short period and saw no action), Lincoln spent hours studying military strategy. He had to deal with incompetent Generals who were either filled with their own thoughts of supremacy or with Generals who were afraid to move their troops. Not until Ulysses Grant was placed in the position of the General in charge did Lincoln have a leader that would eventually end the Confederacy's drive toward separation from the Union.

I found this book fascinating in that the reader can see all the abilities that Lincoln had to put in place to prevent the Southern forces from completely demolishing the morale of the North and at the same using the knowledge that he had gathered from his military studies to instruct the officers in the Union Army to do what was need to win the war.

After reading this book, I am really glad as an American, that at this time, Lincoln was the President of our nation. He was the man that was needed at the time and he truly completed the task that was given to him. ( )

This book is touted as a look at Abraham Lincoln as the commander-in-chief during the Civil War. James McPherson, the author, has a reputation as one of America's finest writers on the Civil War based to a large extent on his authorship of Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, one of the volumes in the Oxford History of the United States. In the foreword McPherson states that this aspect of Lincoln's presidency has never been adequately covered, neglecting a very good book, Lincoln and His Generals by T. Harry Williams. Having read this I will have to go back and review Williams book which as I remember was much better than this book.
Much of the focus of the book is on the relationships between Lincoln and the commanders of the Army of the Potomac. George McClellan was the commander until late 1862 and McPherson added little information or insight to my knowledge of what passed between the two men. McClellan was a great trainer of men but was always hesitant to take them into battle. The quote of Lincoln regarding McClellan that McPherson uses "He has a case of the slows" is repeated in many other sources. The generals who succeeded McClellan had were not much better. Of course they had to face Robert E. Lee.
Lincoln had similar frustrations with generals in other theaters. They all wanted everything just perfect before making an attack.
McPherson did add one specific item to the understanding Lincoln developed about the best strategy for the Union armies. Lincoln figured out that the Union had used their superior numbers and attack the Confederates at many points so the Confederates could not use their interior lines to transfer their forces to defeat individual attacks. It was only when Grant took supreme command of the Union armies that this strategy was adopted and the Confederates finally defeated.
McPherson added very little to my knowledge of Lincoln as an individual. Lincoln is simply portrayed as a man who is continually frustrated and depressed by the failures of the army. This is how Lincoln appears in any number of books about the Civil War. In short, Mr. McPherson does not live up to his reputation as an excellent Civil War scholar in this book. I cannot give any recommendation of this book. The author only repeats what can be learned in any number of books about the subject. I have the feeling that Mr. McPherson is coasting on his reputation and had to get a book out for the anniversary year of Lincoln's birth. One star. ( )