Bob Woodward’s The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008 isn’t exactly a description of something secret about the Bush presidency. The judgment, as with all four Woodward books about the Bush presidency, is in the tone. At first, Woodward seemed to be impressed with the can-do mentality Bush radiated. However, the tone rapidly changed in following books. The last installment is in some ways as bizarre as the war in Iraq itself - in the end of course the main theme of all books. How to be enthusiastic about the ’surge’ without discussing the validity in historic perspective? By now it’s even clear to the staunchest of Bush aficionados that the Iraq war was an unjust war without a cause, which from a military viewpoint started with way too few troops. The so-called surge was no brilliant strategic move but a mere correction of a flaw known from the very beginning in a war that shouldn’t have been.

The story of the book is simple. Bush lets generals decide, careful to avoid the bad example of Lyndon B. Johnson’s micromanagement of the Vietnam war. He assures his generals “tell me what you need, and I take care you’ll get it.” But in the end Bush becomes dissatisfied with the progress and slowly tips over to the surge solution. The tale is a horrid one about postponing decisions in a bloody and unjust war due to electoral considerations.

The supposed nefarious role of the VP in the Bush administration is nowhere to be found in this book. Bush seems to be in control with his “gut feeling only” decisions. Careful analysis and subtle operations are nowhere to be seen. Logical - because were such qualities available in the Bush administration the Iraq war never would have taken place. The absence of Cheney might be caused by something else. It’s clear the VP isn’t very elated about telling the outside world what happens in the White House. It’s clear his agenda was not so much starting a war, but securing unlimited presidential powers. His forte was undoing constitutional guards that followed the criminal actions of the Nixon government.

It’s weird however. Living through the Watergate area and collecting about everything I could find about it Nixon remained a tragic figure, mainly struggling with himself. A clever man turning to the Dark Side because of his fears and inferiority complexes, especially regarding the Kennedy’s. But George W. Bush never looks tragic in all his disastrous decisions. After eight years of number 43, it’s clear this man simply is what in the schoolyard we call a bully. And he’s surrounded by his kin as well. Some more subtle, other less. Nixon doubted all of his life. Bush never have seemed to. That might be the problem of this administration: they never doubted. They knew all the answers. But it was all preconceived wisdom. They didn’t care about subtleties, analysis and careful considerations. That’s what makes them all so unsympathetic: basically they all were a bunch of bullying know-it-alls. Woodward’s books might contain some admiration for Dubya, but it doesn’t seem to hide that cold fact. ( )

Bob Woodward has provided another candid, incisive, and informative window into the personalities, key players, and power brokers who have helped shape and implement the Bush administration's policy in Iraq. He provides detailed accounts of candid, sometimes back room discussions among the key figures who have shaped American military policy in Iraq in the waning years of the Bush administration. This includes figures such as Bush's key advisor Stephen Hadley, Peter Pace, Stephen Petraeus as well as the obvious Bush officials Condi Rice and Dick Cheney.

Woodward's portrait is well-balanced and highlights both shortcomings, such as internal debates about Iraq policy (or lack thereof) among his senior aides; to the apparent success of measures like "the surge" and "Anbar Awakening." He then turns to providing some developing impressions about Bush's possible legacy, as well as what the next president (at the time of publication it was down to McCain and Obama), and what he will inherit.

Woodward, who has authored countless acclaimed books on presidential politics, including three previous books in the "Bush at War" series, was granted unprecedented access. He also provides clear, cogent analysis of the key players and factions in Iraq- from the dubious initial role of Chalabi, to the missteps of Bremer's transitional government, to the election of Maliki as the president of Iraq. He also interestingly observes how, among the three main factions in Iraq (Sunni, Shia and Kurds), the Shia, in addition to being the most numerous, also control the lion share of the vast, rich, oil fields of southern Iraq.

Overall an excellent book by an acclaimed, award-winning author and reporter, who as many may remember, broke the Watergate story way back when along with Bernstein.

My one critique of this book is that, while the access and detailed reporting are outstanding, I was hoping for more analysis and narrative commentary from Woodward. Then again- that is not really his "shtick." If you like Woodward's other books and his columns you will love this book, but be mindful that he leaves the reader to connect a lot of the dots and draw their own conclusions from his detailed accounts of this arguably dubious era in presidential history. ( )

Woodward always writes well and this book is informative to us white house junkies. I lost interest about 2/3 through as did my husband as it felt like the same things were being said over and over. ( )

Bob Woodward's insta-histories has become sort of a habit of mine; since Bush at War (2002), which seems a lifetime ago, I've read each of the volumes as they have appeared, at their own regular and predictable pace: Plan of Attack (2004), State of Denial, (2006) and now The War Within (2008, just out from Simon & Schuster). Woodward's journalistic prose remains much as it always has been (these books are basically really long newspaper articles), but the lack of bells and whistles serves only to underscore the important subjects at hand.

Like State of Denial, which I called "eminently depressing" in my review, The War Within does not put the current presidential administration in a particularly good light. And considering the havoc they've overseen, it could hardly be otherwise. In this book, which covers events from late 2005 through the early part of this year, Woodward examines the debate (my own adjectives for which would include incoherent, haphazard, unmanaged, ...) over Iraq strategy which consumed the American political and military leadership during that time - except for when it was completely ignored and events allowed to drift with the bloody tides of increasing violence and continued political turmoil in Iraq.

What comes through most clearly from this book is the extent of the dysfunctionality which paralyzed the Bush administration through much of 2006, as its various players worked to answer what Woodward calls "the big question: if it's not working, what do you do?" As we know now, the final answer to that was implement a surge of troops into Baghdad and push hard(er) there for security ... but this was far from a foregone conclusion, and as Woodward reveals here was not even the solution being sought by the commanders on the ground.

As depressing as its predecessor, but no less important, The War Within tells a cautionary tale of how not to manage a war. The two men who are vying to inherit this war would do well to read it, and labor mightily not to repeat the mistakes recounted herein.

http://philobiblos.blogspot.com/2008/... ( )