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Loading... Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zoneby Rajiv Chandrasekaran
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will love Sign up for LibraryThing to find out whether you'll like this book. Excellent book - another one for my IR of the Middle East class. All I can say is "wow." I never agreed with the Iraq War, but never really had any facts to back up my opinion other than personal feeling. However, after this book, it is plainly obvious that we never should have started this war. The Bush administration created a huge $3 trillion mess for the American people to pay for. It's ludicrous. All the people who were properly qualified to turn Iraq around were overlooked or dismissed so "loyalists" could be in control. Is this the beginning of the 20th century? when the huge political machines controlled America, where nothing but your party affiliation mattered. After this and "The Looming Tower" I am thoroughly disgusted with the Bush administration and disgusted with humanity in general. All nations and peoples resort to violence when they don't get their way, and rather than put the good of all first, they cater to their personal interests and egos. Sorry for the tirade. I do feel I should read another book from a different viewpoint, though, because one should always see both sides before completely making one's own mind. I'll get around to it sometime I suppose. Brilliant: "Imperial Life in the Emerald City" will undoubtedly go down in history as a classic of political journalism, war reporting, and political satire. It is extremely informative, fast-paced, darkly (and depressingly) humourous at some points, and well-written. I couldn't put this book down. The author does an admirable job at telling his story in a manner that is not bitter, though he and essentially anyone esle present in Iraq currently or during the period of time in which the book was set certainly has a right to be. Though some could probably make a case that the author is "biased," I don't believe that really had an impact on the book itself, for nearly everything he says is backed up by people with on-the-ground experience in Iraq or Washington, and these individuals come from a variety of political backgrounds (most were conservative). Perhaps the most compelling aspect of this book is that it leads one to believe that, had certain things been done differently in 2003-2004, the occupation could have indeed been a short one and the insurgency would have been far shorter and less effective. But re-writing history isn't what Chandrasekaran is concerned with. His goal is simply to inform. If you want to know why things turned out the way they have in Iraq, it is essential that you read this book. This is a grimly funny, monumentally depressing chronicle of the incompetent and ill-fated attempts of the Coalition Provisional Authority to remake Iraq. It's probably a particularly useful book for anyone who still finds anything to admire in the Bush Administration. A damning indictment of the US military occupation, this book is both entertaining and informative. Although Chandrasekaran is highly critical of the US officials charged with running the country, he writes calmly and clearly, without resorting to the simplistic cliches one might expect. no reviews | add a review
Amazon.com Product Description (ISBN 0307278832, Paperback)The Green Zone, Baghdad, 2003: in this walled-off compound of swimming pools and luxurious amenities, Paul Bremer and his Coalition Provisional Authority set out to fashion a new, democratic Iraq. Staffed by idealistic aides chosen primarily for their views on issues such as abortion and capital punishment, the CPA spent the crucial first year of occupation pursuing goals that had little to do with the immediate needs of a postwar nation: flat taxes instead of electricity and deregulated health care instead of emergency medical supplies.In this acclaimed firsthand account, the former Baghdad bureau chief of The Washington Post gives us an intimate portrait of life inside this Oz-like bubble, which continued unaffected by the growing mayhem outside. This is a quietly devastating tale of imperial folly, and the definitive history of those early days when things went irrevocably wrong in Iraq. (retrieved from Amazon Fri, 24 Apr 2009 07:58:11 -0400) The first test round has been closed. Visit the Open Shelves Classification group for details. |
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The quotation from T. E. Lawrence placed at the front of this book sums up the writer’s views on the Iraq reconstruction project perfectly, which is why I’m going to reproduce it in full here:
‘Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.’
This, according to Chandrasekaran’s work, is the error the Americans leading the reconstruction effort made. Faced with a country that lacked sufficient sources of clean water, a people desperate to access basic healthcare facilities and medications, the Americans tackled what they felt were the medical necessities: they began an anti-smoking campaign. Faced with the outmoded Iraq stock exchange, the minister in charge began drawing up complicated plans to computerise everything and bring the exchange up to ‘international standards of transparency and efficiency’ – in less than four months. All the Iraqs wanted was a building, some cell phones and a blackboard. Blinded by the idea that democracy and capitalism are things you can create by splashing some cash around, the Coalition Provisional Authority continued to flounder as the Iraq people began to lose patience with their supposed rescuers.
Based on interviews and documentation completed during and since his months spent in Iraq, Chandrasekaran traces the activities of the CPA in sixteen well written chapters, which are interspersed with scenes from ‘the Green zone’, the secure area those governing Iraq lived and worked in throughout the occupation. The book is neatly split into two halves: ‘building the bubble’, which tends to feature the optimistic attitudes of the various ministers, and ‘shattered dreams’, which typically focuses on the CPA’s increasing recognition of the volatility of Iraq.
My thoughts
The book is well laid out for reading and information assimilation purposes. There are two maps placed at the beginning, one of the Green Zone and one of Baghdad. These did come in useful later in the book, for example, when I wanted to quickly check where an attack on the zone was coming from. I find maps in non-fiction books worrying as it normally suggests they will be necessary to understanding the story and I just don’t want to have to work that hard mentally (ooh, where is this character going now?). In non-fiction, however, they can be vital, and while that is not quite the case here, they were helpful to get a sense of place and size.
The scenes chosen from the Green Zone ‘show’ a lot of the things that Chandrasekaran tells the reader at other points, so they work well to reinforce the key messages the writer wishes to express. For instance, the first scene demonstrates the lack of direction and organisation behind the rebuilding as soldiers wait peaceably to be told what to do with some zoo animals by the incoming administration staff. The brief episode (barely two pages long) creates an uneasy atmosphere due to the preceding two chapters, in which the writer has already outlined the lack of established plans. We never hear about the zoo animals again, which is possibly simply because there is too much else worth showing and telling, but also neatly suggests the lack of attention shown to Iraq lifestyles.
Chandrasekaran usefully introduces each major player in this history with a brief biography containing all the necessary details – and sometimes, perhaps, slightly more than necessary. The people he describes are generally terribly well meaning, but they all become consumed by impossible projects. They are led by their sense of what would suit America, rather than any real understanding of life in Iraq. Alternatively, if they have developed thoughtful, well reasoned, implementable suggestions, they are immediately sent home to America and a thoroughly harebrained scheme is pursued instead.
The truly chilling aspect of this book is the sense of what might have been, could have been, achieved, if only the sole criteria for leading the reconstruction efforts wasn’t the political convictions of those recruited. Chandrasekaran demonstrates convincingly through his use of interviews and discussions that political connections were more important than qualifications or even experience. At times, I became quite frustrated as the journalist clearly outlined what the problems were, and then how the Americans tackled a completely different set of issues.
Of course, it is difficult to understand a country if you never really experience it. Chandrasekaran shows how the decision to move into a republican palace and create a ‘bubble’ of American life on Iraq soil leads to a sense of dissociation from the place. Gradually, as tensions build, it becomes impossible to leave this sanctuary, which heightens the sense that they have become oppressors to the very people they are there to help. In this sense, it is a sad book, although Chandrasekaran never adopts an overtly pitying approach. In fact, one of his strengths as a writer is that he conveys his ideas clearly without needing to manipulate the reader in any obvious way.
Of course, ultimately this is a work of journalism and different writers may have slightly different viewpoints, and everyone has their own agenda to follow, but the details that Chandrasekaran chooses usually speak for themselves. The titles of his chapters are quite forceful in emphasising his opinions, heading up the chunks of text with phrases like ‘a fool’s errand’ and ‘crazy, if not suicidal’, but I did not otherwise feel overtly manipulated.
The index is comprehensive and all notes are clearly referenced, so this could be a useful introductory work for someone exploring this period in recent modern history.
Conclusion
I enjoyed reading this well researched and thoughtful book, even though I found the decision making it recorded nearly unbelievable at times. I do not claim to know anything about running a country, but I’m fairly sure that buying desks and books for classrooms is usually of more use to students than organising departmental affiliations with American universities. Equally, I am no economist, but I would anticipate that having the stock market running again would be more of a priority for those waiting to take back their jobs than an immediate and prolonged revamping of all systems. Of course, I could be wrong. It seems that many good-hearted people were.
Highly recommended. (