Do you think you know every bone-headed decision that was made by the Bush administration on the civilian side of occupied Iraq? Well, guess what, I assure you that Chandrasekaran has found plenty more. Plus, the ones that you already knew were probably because of his reporting in the Washington Post in the first place. I'm not a fan of reading about military campaigns, so I have to admit that I'll never read many of the other books put on lists of great books that have come out of Persian Gulf II, like those of Thomas Ricks. That means that to me, this is the one and only book that everyone should read about the Iraq War. Just to be clear, though I'm incredibly politically biased, Chandrasekaran isn't. This is not a polemic. There are plenty of positive stories included, but seriously, how positive how you be in the middle of one of the greatest failures in the history of American imperialism? ( )

Disappointingly often, I find that I disagree completely with the exultant praises strewn liberally across the covers of books. ‘Superb!’ and ‘Amazing!’ often turns out to mean dull and ponderous, especially where non-fiction is concerned. Surprisingly, then, I feel compelled to state that I agree with every last one of the quotations printed on the cover of Chandrasekaran’s exploration of the management of Iraq post-invasion. It is indeed ‘black comedy’ (John le Carre) and ‘a tragic tale of naivety, hubris, waste and wilful ignorance’ (Richard Wyre, Guardian). The almost unbelievable tales of how an American led, continually shifting coalition attempted to create a Western democracy inside a war-torn Middle Eastern country create a consistently engaging – and frustrating – read.

The quotation from T. E. Lawrence placed at the front of this book sums up the writer’s views on the Iraq reconstruction project perfectly, which is why I’m going to reproduce it in full here:

‘Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.’

This, according to Chandrasekaran’s work, is the error the Americans leading the reconstruction effort made. Faced with a country that lacked sufficient sources of clean water, a people desperate to access basic healthcare facilities and medications, the Americans tackled what they felt were the medical necessities: they began an anti-smoking campaign. Faced with the outmoded Iraq stock exchange, the minister in charge began drawing up complicated plans to computerise everything and bring the exchange up to ‘international standards of transparency and efficiency’ – in less than four months. All the Iraqs wanted was a building, some cell phones and a blackboard. Blinded by the idea that democracy and capitalism are things you can create by splashing some cash around, the Coalition Provisional Authority continued to flounder as the Iraq people began to lose patience with their supposed rescuers.

Based on interviews and documentation completed during and since his months spent in Iraq, Chandrasekaran traces the activities of the CPA in sixteen well written chapters, which are interspersed with scenes from ‘the Green zone’, the secure area those governing Iraq lived and worked in throughout the occupation. The book is neatly split into two halves: ‘building the bubble’, which tends to feature the optimistic attitudes of the various ministers, and ‘shattered dreams’, which typically focuses on the CPA’s increasing recognition of the volatility of Iraq.

My thoughts

The book is well laid out for reading and information assimilation purposes. There are two maps placed at the beginning, one of the Green Zone and one of Baghdad. These did come in useful later in the book, for example, when I wanted to quickly check where an attack on the zone was coming from. I find maps in non-fiction books worrying as it normally suggests they will be necessary to understanding the story and I just don’t want to have to work that hard mentally (ooh, where is this character going now?). In non-fiction, however, they can be vital, and while that is not quite the case here, they were helpful to get a sense of place and size.

The scenes chosen from the Green Zone ‘show’ a lot of the things that Chandrasekaran tells the reader at other points, so they work well to reinforce the key messages the writer wishes to express. For instance, the first scene demonstrates the lack of direction and organisation behind the rebuilding as soldiers wait peaceably to be told what to do with some zoo animals by the incoming administration staff. The brief episode (barely two pages long) creates an uneasy atmosphere due to the preceding two chapters, in which the writer has already outlined the lack of established plans. We never hear about the zoo animals again, which is possibly simply because there is too much else worth showing and telling, but also neatly suggests the lack of attention shown to Iraq lifestyles.

Chandrasekaran usefully introduces each major player in this history with a brief biography containing all the necessary details – and sometimes, perhaps, slightly more than necessary. The people he describes are generally terribly well meaning, but they all become consumed by impossible projects. They are led by their sense of what would suit America, rather than any real understanding of life in Iraq. Alternatively, if they have developed thoughtful, well reasoned, implementable suggestions, they are immediately sent home to America and a thoroughly harebrained scheme is pursued instead.

The truly chilling aspect of this book is the sense of what might have been, could have been, achieved, if only the sole criteria for leading the reconstruction efforts wasn’t the political convictions of those recruited. Chandrasekaran demonstrates convincingly through his use of interviews and discussions that political connections were more important than qualifications or even experience. At times, I became quite frustrated as the journalist clearly outlined what the problems were, and then how the Americans tackled a completely different set of issues.

Of course, it is difficult to understand a country if you never really experience it. Chandrasekaran shows how the decision to move into a republican palace and create a ‘bubble’ of American life on Iraq soil leads to a sense of dissociation from the place. Gradually, as tensions build, it becomes impossible to leave this sanctuary, which heightens the sense that they have become oppressors to the very people they are there to help. In this sense, it is a sad book, although Chandrasekaran never adopts an overtly pitying approach. In fact, one of his strengths as a writer is that he conveys his ideas clearly without needing to manipulate the reader in any obvious way.

Of course, ultimately this is a work of journalism and different writers may have slightly different viewpoints, and everyone has their own agenda to follow, but the details that Chandrasekaran chooses usually speak for themselves. The titles of his chapters are quite forceful in emphasising his opinions, heading up the chunks of text with phrases like ‘a fool’s errand’ and ‘crazy, if not suicidal’, but I did not otherwise feel overtly manipulated.

The index is comprehensive and all notes are clearly referenced, so this could be a useful introductory work for someone exploring this period in recent modern history.

Conclusion

I enjoyed reading this well researched and thoughtful book, even though I found the decision making it recorded nearly unbelievable at times. I do not claim to know anything about running a country, but I’m fairly sure that buying desks and books for classrooms is usually of more use to students than organising departmental affiliations with American universities. Equally, I am no economist, but I would anticipate that having the stock market running again would be more of a priority for those waiting to take back their jobs than an immediate and prolonged revamping of all systems. Of course, I could be wrong. It seems that many good-hearted people were.

Highly recommended. ( )

Excellent book - another one for my IR of the Middle East class. All I can say is "wow." I never agreed with the Iraq War, but never really had any facts to back up my opinion other than personal feeling. However, after this book, it is plainly obvious that we never should have started this war. The Bush administration created a huge $3 trillion mess for the American people to pay for. It's ludicrous. All the people who were properly qualified to turn Iraq around were overlooked or dismissed so "loyalists" could be in control. Is this the beginning of the 20th century? when the huge political machines controlled America, where nothing but your party affiliation mattered. After this and "The Looming Tower" I am thoroughly disgusted with the Bush administration and disgusted with humanity in general. All nations and peoples resort to violence when they don't get their way, and rather than put the good of all first, they cater to their personal interests and egos. Sorry for the tirade. I do feel I should read another book from a different viewpoint, though, because one should always see both sides before completely making one's own mind. I'll get around to it sometime I suppose. ( )

Brilliant: "Imperial Life in the Emerald City" will undoubtedly go down in history as a classic of political journalism, war reporting, and political satire. It is extremely informative, fast-paced, darkly (and depressingly) humourous at some points, and well-written. I couldn't put this book down. The author does an admirable job at telling his story in a manner that is not bitter, though he and essentially anyone esle present in Iraq currently or during the period of time in which the book was set certainly has a right to be. Though some could probably make a case that the author is "biased," I don't believe that really had an impact on the book itself, for nearly everything he says is backed up by people with on-the-ground experience in Iraq or Washington, and these individuals come from a variety of political backgrounds (most were conservative). Perhaps the most compelling aspect of this book is that it leads one to believe that, had certain things been done differently in 2003-2004, the occupation could have indeed been a short one and the insurgency would have been far shorter and less effective. But re-writing history isn't what Chandrasekaran is concerned with. His goal is simply to inform. If you want to know why things turned out the way they have in Iraq, it is essential that you read this book.

This is a grimly funny, monumentally depressing chronicle of the incompetent and ill-fated attempts of the Coalition Provisional Authority to remake Iraq. It's probably a particularly useful book for anyone who still finds anything to admire in the Bush Administration. ( )

A damning indictment of the US military occupation, this book is both entertaining and informative. Although Chandrasekaran is highly critical of the US officials charged with running the country, he writes calmly and clearly, without resorting to the simplistic cliches one might expect. ( )

Read this and get some first-hand understanding about the difficulties we've had in accomplishing statecraft from within. Rajiv Chandrasekaran is a Washington Post reporter who covered the CPA's attempt to restore order in Iraq. His balanced account shows some clear blunders. We dissolved the military, creating 40,000 unemployed former soldiers. We banned Baath party members, including most of the former government and technical specialists, from important jobs. We may have created more division through the quota-based approach we attempted to use in establishing representative democracy. I believe the restored hospital I heard about in e-mail forwards was the one that was restored within the Green Zone. Chandrasekaran adds interest to the politics through his description of the personalities and daily life in Sadaam's former protected area. Many of the stories are ironic - such as the former St. John's professor who arrived without having read anything about Iraq. Most of the stories about our decisions and business dealings describe actions that range between sad and reprehensible. ( )

Rajiv Chandrasekaran’s IMPERIAL LIFE IN THE EMERALD CITY: INSIDE IRAQ’S GREEN ZONE is an important piece of investigative journalism; indeed, it should be required reading for every politico on Capitol Hill. IMPERIAL LIFE IN THE EMERALD CITY is an account of what went wrong in Iraq – politically and practically speaking - in the aftermath of the American military invasion. It's a story of broken promises and missed opportunities, nepotism and cronyism, bureaucracy and incompetence. The Green Zone, much like the Bush administration’s vision of a post-war Iraq, is a fantasyland, a veritable Oz, subject not to the realities of the times but only to the whims of its creators. Day-to-day life in Iraq’s Green Zone, then, is emblematic of our failure in Iraq.

But let's start at the beginning. After the invasion of Iraq, American forces set up shop in the Green Zone, a 4-square-mile gated area of villas and palaces in central Baghdad which had previously been occupied by select government officials, ministries, and Saddam Hussein and his family. From here the so-called "coalition of the willing" (read: America) tried to rebuild and restructure Iraq via a transitional government called the Coalitional Provisional Authority (CPA), which was formed on April 21, 2003 and disbanded on June 28, 2004. By chronicling the CPA’s exploits in the Green Zone, Chandrasekaran explains how our utter lack of post-war planning stretched a war that was supposed to last “weeks rather than months” into an occupation that recently passed the five-year mark.

The CPA was doomed from the start. Instead of sending out best and brightest minds to help the Iraqis build a democracy in their newly-liberated country, the Bush administration vetted recruits for loyalty and partisanship. Rather than cooperating with the Iraqi people, CPA eggheads tried to foist changes upon them – and radical changes, at that (e.g., a shift from a socialist to capitalist economy…in a period of months, not years). Programs were underfunded, or not funded at all. Sectarian differences were stressed and reinforced by clueless newbies, leading to a highly fractured and contentious interim government. Meanwhile, de-Ba’athification purged the Iraqi government of all experienced politicians.

Bush loyalists, charged with recreating Iraq in America’s image, had little or no knowledge of Iraqi culture and society – an oversight that was not corrected once CPA employees arrived in Iraq, as they were rarely allowed to leave the Green Zone and experience Iraq first-hand. Instead, they remained sequestered in the Green Zone, which had been remade into a “little America”, a “bubble”, an “American subdivision”. Though many of the cafeteria workers in the Green Zone were Muslims, CPA employees expected them to serve pork dishes with a smile. (Even this secular atheist is aghast at the religious and cultural insensitivity!) Whereas the economy of Iraq could have benefited by providing for the CPA’s needs in the Green Zone, much of the work was outsourced to American companies, and most of the supplies were imported. All the while, essential services (for the Iraqis, that is) suffered; water, electricity, food, jobs – to date, Saddam has proven more able to provide the necessities for the Iraqi people than have the occupying American forces. This is perhaps why we have lost their hearts and minds – and why America is still engaged in warfare with militia groups five years after the invasion.

Watching the Senate Armed Services hearings on Iraq on the teevee today, it’s striking how quickly the Democrats and Republicans alike are to blame our current problems on the Iraqis themselves. It’s almost like listening to a spousal abuser blame his wife for her beatings. We invaded Iraq – and then we failed to help them rebuild a country, a government, that was already in rough shape to begin with; one that we further decimated by waging war upon it. Afterwards, we tried to ram our version of a democratic, free society down their throats, instead of working hand-in-hand with the Iraqi citizens to build a viable and stable country. The problems that we face today are our own, as is illustrated in IMPERIAL LIFE IN THE EMERALD CITY.

Whether you believe that the war in Iraq was a justified preemptive strike or an impeachable offense, there is no denying that America has a responsibility to the people of Iraq. By showing us the many ways in which we have failed to fulfill these obligations, Rajiv Chandrasekaran also gives us an important roadmap for change and success.

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See also: Broken Promises & Missed Opportunities on Amazon.com. ( )

Imperial Life in the Emerald City spends three hundred tightly compressed pages detailing the many ways in which the United States -- no, let's be honest, the Bush Administration -- screwed up the occupation of Iraq.

Rajiv Chandrasekaran writes from first-hand experience, for he saw much of what happened in the Green Zone with his own two eyes. He watched as troops of buraucrats, chosen not because they were qualified but because they were loyal Bushies, came into Iraq and set about trying to establish a Jeffersonian democracy...or at least a free market, the kind that American companies could exploit. They wrote manifestos. They debated how the new stock market should work. They spent a lot of time on interdepartmental turf wars. While they did all this, the country all around them -- the one they knew nothing about -- went up in flames. And then they wondered why the Iraqis were so damned ungrateful.

If you think six years of the Bush Administration has damaged the United States, you should read about what they've done in Iraq. It's worth noting that when the Iraqis were forced to live under the kind of regime the Bushies have tried so hard to establish here, they reached for their AK-47s.

Chandraseksaran writes very well about all this, and much more calmly than I ever could. He's been compared to Orwell, and rightly so. I wish he'd never had the chance to write this excellent book.

Smooth, easy writing on an unpleasant subject. I haven't paid attention to the nitty-gritty of what's been going on in Iraq, so I learned a bunch. Some quibbles:

1) I couldn't keep track of all the names. I tried the index once, but it was just plain wrong. The copy I was reading was a paperback, so I'm wondering if the index was compiled for the hardcover and then not adjusted for the paperback edition.

2) It jumped around from subject to subject. I was hoping for a cohesive summing up in the end, but there wasn't one.

3) The book, as far as I can remember, never showed anything at all succeeding for the Green Zone Americans. Maybe that's how it really was, but I find that hard to believe. I'm anything but a Bush supporter, but I figure somebody in the Green Zone did something, however small, that had some Iraqi saying, “That was good!”

Imperial Life in the Emerald City tells a story of the Coalition Provisional Authority - who were apparently mostly a group of young, ideological neocons, hoping their work in Iraq would expediate their rise in the Republican Party. Few of them had the even close to the experience necessary for the job - the litmus test for hiring appears to have been commitment to a specific ideology rather than competence. On top of this - they were sent to fail. No one in power seemed to understood the magnitude of the task at hand. Communicating potential for failure was not an option - nor was getting the resoures you needed to accomplish your tasks. Nor was leaving a small compound, the heart of which was a dictator's palace. From any situation like this, a series of surreal stories will emerge - this book tells them. But it does little else. The author appears to have spoken to a few disgruntled CPA employees and discuss their experience in absence of much other context. Any "success" is minimized, any failure magnified. Of the multitude of books I have read on American failures in the "War on Terror" - this is by far the worst. If you just can't resist collecting highlights of neocon arrogance, read this book. If you are looking to understand the situation in Iraq - Fiasco is a much better choice. ( )

Eye-opening account of deliberate incompetence. ( )

The evidence of cronyism, misguided loyalty, and sheer idiocy reduced me to righteous fury. Required reading for anyone who wants to know what really goes on inside the administration and over in Iraq. ( )

A review is available in The Middle East Journal Vol. 60, No. 4, Autumn 2006. pp. 797-798.
http://www.mideasti.org/programs/prog...

A depressing, if also powerful, account of the self-delusion of the CPA in its attempts to develop a new society in Iraq. Led by hubris and arrogance rather than knowledge or compassion, a group of people were recruited based more on their Republican party credentials rather than any knowledge or experience of Middle Eastern affairs, Arabic, reconstruction or often even the issues they were meant to be working on. They then attempted to rebuild a nation in the image they preferred, ignoring the realities on the ground or the day-to-day needs of Iraqi, preferring to micro-manage and attempt to implement a privatized capitalist system on what had been a socialist society for years.
This book will make you angry, with its missed opportunities and ignorance. But it still needs to be read, especially anyone that still believes the situation in Iraq is okay. ( )

http://too-old-to-know-better.blogspo... ( )

Everyone in the Nation should read this book, along with The Assassin's Gate and The Looming Tower. ( )

From The New Yorker
This revealing account of the postwar administration of Iraq, by a former Baghdad bureau chief for the Washington Post, focusses on life in the Green Zone, the American enclave in central Baghdad. There the Halliburton-run (and Muslim-staffed) cafeteria served pork at every meal—a cultural misstep typical of the Coalition Provisional Authority, which had sidelined old Arab hands in favor of Bush loyalists. Not only did many of them have no previous exposure to the Middle East; more than half had never before applied for a passport. While Baghdad burned, American officials revamped the Iraqi tax code and mounted an anti-smoking campaign. Chandrasekaran's portrait of blinkered idealism is evenhanded, chronicling the disillusionment of conservatives who were sent to a war zone without the resources to achieve lasting change. ( )

Rajiv was a WashPo reporter in Iraq from pre-invasion to late 2004. The core of his narrative is the period under Bremer when the CPA (the US civilians tasked with re-building Iraq) were stationed in the Green Zone (ie. Emerald City because in Oz, the city was Green, except that everyone wore green-colored glasses). It is a devastating account of American corruption, incompetence, denial of reality and humanitarian crimes. We get to see the reality behind the headlines during a period when we were told everything was going well and getting better when in facts things were getting worse - not in spite of the Americans, but because of the Americans. Most people today blame the CPA, Bremer in particular, which is all this book focuses on. Another book Fiasco looks at the military as well and offers some larger lessons.

After reading this I am left wondering how things could have gone better. No doubt Iraq is a tough place and no plan could have gone perfectly. The biggest mistake was the assumption that free Iraq would welcome Democracy with open arms. Creating a Democracy and capitalist economy is one of the hardest things that can be done, look at the history of the west and how long it took and how bloody it has been. Dictatorships and the like are easy to set up, that is why there are so many of them. In a collapsed stated like Iraq, creating a Democracy and capitalism in a few years through American intervention was never going to work because the Iraqi's never really wanted it. It can't be forced. Many critics were saying this from the start, and the neo-cons had no plan to implement their vision - it was an afterthought after WMD's were not found. ( )

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is depicted as full of good intentions, but severely lacking in the knowledge and expertise required to do the job in Iraq. If they had been on the Titanic they would have been sequestered in first class and at the first sign of alarm would have rushed to begin arranging the deck chairs. Then, satisfied they had done all they could, they would have followed the directions of the crew to take to the life boats. Reflecting today on their accomplishments, they would be at a loss as to how the ship could have sunk with all the deck chairs so perfectly positioned. (read more) ( )

Excellent journalistic account of the brief, pathetic history of the Coalition Provisional Authority. The occupation was not planned or thought out well at all. Ideological correctness was valued over competence as inexperienced Bush loyalists replaced those with some experience on the ground. Twenty-something congressional staffers were put in charge of rebuilding a country the size of Iraq.

Chandrasekaran also has some memorable sketches of some familiar figures. Paul Bremer is not a sympathetic figure. He comes across as hard working but also as something of a control freak. Henry Kissinger, his former boss, called him this! (Place that in the category of "it takes one to know one.") His grandiose plans for Iraq fell apart as the basic needs of the Iraqi people (safety, electricity, jobs, etc.) were not met.

Chandrasekaran covered the Green Zone for The Washington Post and has an insiders knowledge of the occupation. He also writes clearly and breaks down complex issues in an accessible style. He fills a need for books on the CPA; there are few out there. ( )

Having not followed most of Chandrasekaran's reporting for the "Washington Post," I really can't say how much of this is a cut-and-paste job of the man's previous work. However, one does get a broad survey of the period when the Civilian Provisional Authority purported to run the country, and it's a quick and snappy read to boot. The sad thing is that from procounsel Jerry Bremer on down most of the people involved probably meant well, but they could never quite connect with the reality that they had a real county on their hands, and ultimately did little to ameliorate the pressing problems of Iraqi society. It's almost enough to make one believe that simply foisting Ahmed Chalabi on Iraqis as the country's new maximum leader would have been a better solution. ( )