An essential book for any WWII buff. Edited by Liddell-Hart.

This was my military history book for Pennsic. Each year for the last several years, I have taken the piece and quiet afforded by the first week of Pennsic to read a ‘book I have been meaning to read’. This year there was two, this one and Germs, Guns and Steel . As a result, I didn’t actually finish it (I kept switching back and forth). Unlike GGS, I will finish this one ‘eventually’. However, as with GGS, I think I have read enough to give a decent review for you.

First the overview: Don’t confuse this book with the terminally boring ‘Achtung Panzer!’. AP was a book length white paper that Guderian wrote for the German military press before WWII to gain support for the concept of mass use of armor in warfare. If you read this book, you will learn the concepts in that book and the reasoning of why it was necessary. This book is basically a biography of Guderian’s professional career. There are a couple of chapters about his early training and life and then we get into the meat of things, World War II and the role Guderian and his concepts played in the successful early campaigns.

Now, there are a zillion books that try to explain what went wrong with the German Military Machine and this, to some extent, is one of them. That is one of the reasons I read books like this: take something apart, see why it worked and why it broke. There are nearly as many reasons for these things as books, but approaching this as a true (if amateur) historian, I prefer to first hand accounts and as many as I can get my hands on. Then, I can synthesize the answer rather than have any one author’s predjustices feed to me.

If you are one of those people that think that the German Military Machine was a cohesive entity and the only real downfall was Hilter’s constant intervention, this book will set you straight. In addition to accounts of the battles and uses of panzers in warfare, you get a glimpse into the workings of the German General Staff and chain of command during the war.

My one complaint, if you can call it that, is that he did it all. Guderian portrays himself as fearless and efficient. On one occasion he broke a Soviet roadblock by personally firing the machine gun in his command car and driving through the confused soldiers. I don’t know about all that. Sure it is possible, but I am a little dubious when it comes to his personal behavior in and out of combat.

One of the coolest thing in the book is the inclusion of a significant number of Guderian’s Operational Orders in the appendices. These show you how lower level commanders were able to interpret orders and accomplish seemingly impossible tasks. Very good read.

As I said, I haven’t finished the book. I am before Moscow in the late Fall. We know where things are going: the offensive is going to stall and Guderian is going to be benched by Hilter, only to be brought back in once things are irretrievably hosed. Then benched again.

Being an old school Prussian officer who didn’t participate or condone any atrocities, Guderian escaped the Nuremberg fate of many of the other leaders and lived to retire to a quiet life. ( )

A fascinating book that is marred by the self-justification of its author and his inability to accept any guilt for the events of the war. ( )