In this examination of the cut and thrust of Allied planning in regards to operations against the Japanese Empire, the core of the book is the conflict between Churchill and his service chiefs. This is between Churchill's near obsessive fixation on recapturing Singapore and expunging that humiliation from the record, and how the Chiefs of Staff (Alan Brooke, Andrew Cunningham & Charles Portal) viewed participation in the final assault against Japan as being imperative if good faith and good post-war relations were to be maintained with Washington. Sarantakes tends to play up that Churchill was long past his best performance at this stage of the war, and the stresses of dealing with the man came close to breaking civil-military relations in Wartime Britain. That it did not is probably a tribute to the basic soundness of the Allied policy apparatus.

Next most important is Sarantakes' consideration of relations between London, Ottawa, Canberra & Wellington. While Commonwealth military relations would never be closer, the reality is that the junior governments all had their own agendas; matters not being helped that (particularly in Australia & Canada) none of the leaders of these nations had the same reservoir of prestige that Churchill had to play with when he became British prime minister. In particular, John Curtin of Australia often seemed to have a closer relationship with Douglas MacArthur then he did with Churchill.

The third most relevant issue that Sarantakes deals with is the nature of the British operational contribution, which boiled down to the deployment of the British Pacific Fleet in the teeth of opposition from Ernest King. If never that well-explained by anyone King's intransigence by this point in the war was well understood and efforts were made by all parties to make sure the Royal Navy got in the fight.

These then are essentially the points covered. I do wonder whether Sarantakes really had the material for a book, instead of two or three good journal articles; much of his wordage is devoted to background that I'm already familiar with. On the other hand, I can see this as being a good book for someone taking an advanced undergrad class; I'm probably not the person this monograph was meant for. ( )