my first military strategy primer, most excellent for all armchair generals. ( )

Hart talks about the standard concept of using indirect strategy to succeed, and draws from some very interesting examples through history. An outstanding book for military history in general. ( )

Liddell Hart's book on the art of warfare from the Persian Wars till the sixties. With a thorough introduction in French to the "direct-indirect strategy"-model of analysis. ( )

Currently reading, but taking a hiatus.

This is a great book on military history and strategy. First of all, it’s easily the most readable book on topic that I have yet encountered. It’s short, clear and concise. The book is divided into 2 sections by Liddell Hart. The first is a survey of the military history of the western world with brief commentary on the efficacy of the strategy used. I would actually further divide the history section into everything before WWI and then WWI and WWII. Necessarily, given the vastness of the topic, Liddell Hart selected battles and campaigns that fit his theories particularly well. However, WWI and WWII are given a much fuller treatment and we get a glimpse of situations where strategic and theater commanders make decisions utilizing his theories (both consciously and unconsciously). The second section is where Liddell Hart expands on and expounds on his theories of strategy. This is probably his best work. Unlike many theoretical writers (Clausewitz and Jomini leap to mind), his writing is clear and concise and to the point. Prophetically, the section ends with a chapter on Guerilla warfare (remember Liddell Hart died before Vietnam) that should be read carefully in light of recent military history. Speaking of Clausewitz, incautious readers might interpret some of Liddell Hart’s comments as criticism of Clausewitz and they are not. There are several problems with reading On War and trying to apply the principals set there. First of all, that book was assembled posthumously and scholars of Clausewitz believe that he was about to give the entire manuscript a revision prior to getting it published when he died. Secondly, the dense and Jungian style of Clausewitz’s writing is hard to understand and easy to misinterpret. A careful reading of the text will allow you to see how so many of Clausewitz’s theories and comments are taken horribly out of context. I wouldn’t recommend the book as a text on military history, but I can’t think of any book on the theory of warfare that is as engaging and readable. It’s certainly one I would highly recommend for the study of strategy. Maps are an area near and dear to my heart and every military book gets examined in this context. Strategy does maps better than most; there are several good maps in the book. But, there should be more of them. Also, this reprint edition did a particularly poor job of printing them clearly. Overall map score: B-. ( )