Excellent book, indispenible for any Westerner seeking to understand Iraq. Ali Allawi is an Iraqui who spent much of his life in exile from the Ba'ath regime, and was well-connected to the opposition who were influential once Saddam was overthrown, being a nephew of Ahmed Chalabi and a cousin of Ayed Allawi. He held various positions in post-Saddam Iraq.

All of which prepares one for a biased telling of the story of Iraq, from the viewpoint of a partisan of a particular view. What one gets is a stunningly broad and deep look at all the strands that go into creating the Iraq of today. Allawi discusses the politics, religion, and economy of Iraq, showing the major players and their complex viewpoints, the interaction of all the persons, events, and influences in a remarkably dispassionate and balanced way. Yet he writes with an insider's knowledge and access to people in positions of influence.

Moreover Allawi is competent in discussing the influences that drove the American invasion, and provides an excellent analysis of a theorist the Americans SHOULD have paid attention to , Robert Merton, and his theories of the law of unintended consequences. By the end of the book one is well aware of how difficult and multi-faceted a job is nation building, not something that should be attempted lightly or in ignorance.

Allawi includes brief but important analyses of the views of the other regional powers, including Iran and Saudi Arabia. Their views are complex and multi-layered.

One item was particularly interesting to me. I just read the book _Century of War, Century of Media_ which was particularly horrifying in describing the use of phosphous by US troops in Fallujah. Allawi's book confirms that account on p. 339, "The MNF [multinational force] was accused of using banned chemical weapons such as white phosphorus and incendiary bombs, a charge denied by the State Department but subsequently indirectly confirmed by the Department of Defense."

The book does not end on a hopeful note. The situation in Iraq is dire, with few good solutions. But after reading this book one has a much better idea of how the situation became what it is, which is a necessary condition to finding solution ( )

Allawi is at his best in explicating the deep structures of Iraqi society and in examining the relations between the various players in the game of Shia politics in Iraq. He also expresses a deep abiding dismay that the US government and its "cheerleaders" could have waded into this great adventure with such a poor understanding of what was being attempted. Why there was such a poor understanding is, of course, one of the major questions that has to be answered in explaining what has come to pass in the last few years.

While this work is certainly much better than "instant history," one would be welcome to be distrusting of a man who was possibly part of the problem; Allawi having served in a number of post-invasion governments and is the brother of the former prime minister. What gives Allawi some credibility is that he seems to be as unsparing of Iraqi actors as he is of the Bush Administration, and that his epilog is not larded with cheap policy suggestions. Having provided an extended examination of how Iraqi society has come unwound, Allawi's expectation seems to be that the general revolt can't be too far in the future and there is precious little center left to hold matters together. The possible exception would be a federal solution, but that would be asking a lot of Sunni Arabs who still can't accept this turn of events, of Shia Arabs who believe their time in the sun has arrived, and of Kurds who hunger for independence; Allawi's grim assessment would seem to be that there is virtually no one credible left to even pose the question.

Not a book to read if you're looking for cheap hope. ( )