Originally published in 1989, this a volume from the Combat Studies Institute "Leavenworth Papers" series. In the fall of 1944, some 56,000 German troops of the XIX Mountain Corps were occupying a strongpoint line just 70 kilometers northwest of Murmansk, about 200 miles north of the Arctic Circle. To clear these enemy forces from Soviet territory, STA VKA ordered General K. A. Meretskov's Karelian Front to plan and conduct an offensive, which was to be supported by Admiral A. G. Golovko's Northern Fleet. This Leavenworth Paper explains the planning and conduct of this offensive, known in Soviet military historiography as the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation. The Soviet force of approximately 96,000 men was organized into a main attack force of two rifle corps, a corps- size economy-of-force formation, and two envelopment forces, one consisting of two naval infantry brigades and the other of two light rifle corps of two brigades each. The Soviets employed over 2,100 tubes of artillery and mortars, used 110 tanks and self-propelled guns, and enjoyed overwhelming air superiority. Engineer special-purpose troops infiltrated up to fifty kilometers behind German forward positions to conduct reconnaissance before the battle. On 7 October 1944, the Soviets began the offensive with a 97,000-round artillery preparation, followed by an infantry attack.

Written during the last days of the Cold War, this book describes the successful effort of the Soviet 14th Army, with 97,000 men, to expel to 56,000-man German XIX Mountain Corps from its three-year grip on Soviet and Finnish territory in the far north. Because it was the largest military operation ever fought north of the Arctic Circle, "it's study [was] more than a historical exercise," since that area could have been fought over again.

The exercise was a three-phased, 24-day operation that succeeded in driving the XIX Mountain Corps off Soviet territory and out of Finland, but failed to eliminate the enemy because of trafficability issues; Soviet tanks could only advance down the very few roads, on a front no wider than a single tank. Nevertheless, the Soviets could have achieved more if they had committed their naval infantry on the right flank earlier. ( )

This is an excellent book.

This is one of the "Leavenworth Papers", a series published by the Combat Studies Institute, which is part of the U.S. Army. It is about an operation between the Soviet Union and Germany during World War II. As the title indicates, it takes place in the Arctic, during October 1944. It is well illustrated with 14 maps, 5 charts and 8 tables. As the author indicates, it has a Soviet perspective because he is fluent in Russian and needs a translator for German materials.

Some minor issues:
-- The notes are grouped at the end of the book. This was OK for the ones which are only for identifying the source of the material. But, for those which are informative, they should have been with the text.
-- To use the notes, the chapter number is needed. I constantly had to go to the table of contents to find what chapter I was in and then go to the back for the footnotes for that chapter.
-- Page 52, there is mention of the Norwegian-Soviet border. There wasn't one. At that time Finland had land to the coast that separated Norway from Russia.
-- Page 102, the illustration of the Russian Camouflage Suit, what is on the bottom of the shoes?
-- Page 116, I was confused by the reference to 'the importance of the use of naval forces'.
-- Page 117, Soviet Command and Control, I disagree with the author's statement that the system was extremely complex. Complex - Yes, Extremely - No. Any large force has complex issues, but the Soviet's issues were no more so then the U.S. issues.
-- Page 128, there is mention of a World War II Russian Colonel losing his position as Minister of Defense because of the mid-1987 'Mathias Rust incident'. Some level of details should have been provided for the 'incident'. That is why the author used footnotes. (Mathias Rust illegally landed a small plane (a Cessna 172) in Red Square. So much for Soviet air defenses.)

Anecdotes:
-- Reindeer (page 26 and note 76 for Chapter 1)
-- Dogs (they detect wounded soldiers left behind, page 27)
-- Smoking (only under a poncho, page 33)

Read from December 12 to 14, 2010. ( )