This book serves as a good example of useless political philosophy. The author spends 200 pages belaboring an obvious justification for democracy: "a proper commitment to the truth of our own beliefs requires us to keep before us the manifest reasonableness of those with whom we deeply disagree" (p.150). It is no doubt a wise thing to say, but not one which needs this much explication. The author eagerly defends his self-evident thesis in mock debates with imaginary opponents, citing and discussing far too much earlier literature along the way.

A theory of "folk epistemology" is the main argumentative tool. In contrast to the third-person knowledge of standard epistemology, the author supposedly wants his readers to consider folk-epistemological theories from a first-person perspective. After reading the book I'm still not sure what that really amounts to, since his abstract statements about "proposition p" very much resemble standard objective epistemology rather than first-person analysis.

The simple idea that democracy is justified because it allows all viewpoints to be heard obviously speaks in favor of democracy. But this seems more like a practical justification than a philosophical one. I don't think the author's complicated and roundabout discussion of mutual recognition really is an interesting step toward justification. His grip on the question of legitimacy is slippery at best and his preoccupation with earlier literature seems to inhibit, rather than assist, the development of his own arguments.