John R. Walker's book British Nuclear weapons and the Test-Ban 1954-73 is a blow-by-blow description of the major decisions of British nuclear policy from the last couple of years of the Churchill Government through to the latter half of the Heath Government. This was a time of Cold War suspicion and the ever-present threat of nuclear annihilation. Walker's work painstakingly puts together the internal and international discussions the various British Governments responses to that threat in the form of the development of its own deterrent and efforts to promote a comprehensive ban on the further testing of nuclear weapons.

Almost all of the content of British Nuclear Weapons and the Test Ban is drawn from the archives of the British Government. The declassified files provide a trove of insight into the high-level thinking the British politicians and senior civil servants undertook to promote twin agendas of developing the deterrent and pursuing a test-ban. The commendable effort by Walker to produce the level of detail achieved in his work opens up the complexity of the competing policy and institutional priorities as well as the people who led the decision-making. Walker does not provide much in the way of his own analysis, instead this is a relatively sober depiction of the steps the British took in the period. As the work sticks almost rigidly to 1954-73 there is little information relating to Trident and only a couple of references to analyses of earlier decisions produced in the 1980s.

The external pressures of the time period are on display throughout the text. In particular, extensive references are carried discussing the relationship with the US on nuclear matters. The alliance between the UK and the US on defense matters has a long history and the nuclear element was a part of that during the Cold War. The other side of the War - Soviet Russia also feature quite prominently. The discussions on achieving a ban on testing are reported as running into a Soviet barrier pretty much throughout the time period. Soviet intransigence is the main cause described as preventing the achievement of a test-ban. The UK and US both have difficulty at times with the concept of a test-ban especially once the prospect of Soviet progress on anti-ballistic missiles appears to be a growing threat to the credibility of at least the UK deterrent.

It is little odd not to see more discussion of France. That country was an active part of the nuclear family during the time period under discussion but they appear not to have played a major role in the discussions within the British government. The only references to France are discussions in relation to European perceptions of British dependence on the US.

The chronological and logical flow of Walker's work makes it highly convenient. With chapters often spreading across 3-5 years, the context of the decision-making process is evident. Punctuated with occasional key years where changes in the international dimensions existed, the narrative is a consistent whole that can be re-accessed in the constituent parts to analyse specific segments. The role of key actors such as Prime Ministers, the Chief Scientist, leading civil servants including those involved in the development of atomic weapons, and the like are shown in respect of the decisions they made. There is little judgment of the actors involved, instead an appraisal straight from their own written words.

Those words cover issues like decisions on what to do with Christmas Island, the issues at stake in the various testing programs, the accountancy role of the Treasury, and the efforts of various diplomats. Walker's description of the British government records paints the British government in quite a favourable light. It is the Soviets who refuse to adopt a test-ban treaty and who resume testing despite a moratorium. The US are often reluctant to head for a test-ban treaty. It is the Brits who seem to most energetically have pursued a test-ban treaty in the various discussions held mostly in Geneva.

Access to such fine detail of the ins and outs of governmental policy making is rare on an issue as sensitive as nuclear weapons. John R. Walker has shone a light onto that detail and his illumination presents the facts as they existed between 1954 and 1973. This is not a pro or anti nuclear tome. With the exception of the Conclusion, the author does not interject himself into the narrative as he instead lets the words of those who were there at the time speak. Walker's contribution to the history of the subject matter and more broadly to the history of the Cold War is a positive step in understanding what really happened in the development of Britain's efforts to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent and to preclude the further testing of nuclear weapons worldwide. ( )