Excellent analysis about how the WW2 alllys, America and Great Britain, became truly allied in intent and purpose. Penetrative, insightful, well researched and a quite interesting read as Eisenhower deals with generals dueling generals, domineering politicians and new reports strongly biased towards the home team. He documents how Bradley, not Montgomery ordered Patton to stop and not close the Falaise Gap. The generals rarely got it right; Clark's parade into Rome, Freyberg's bombing Casino, Montgomery's Antwerp and Arnhem debacles caused many needless Allied casualties. But at the unit level occasionally up to brigade scope, the Yanks, Tommies, Poles and Dominion troops frequently got it right.. ( )

And yet another book that tries to explain the relationships between Dwight Eisenhower and his methods of command. This one is the ost ambitious in that it attempts to explain the relationships between the Colonists and Great Britain, and how those relationships led to the relationships through World War I and into World War II. Niall Barr reaches far and wide to attempt to consider all the factors including rations and smartness of uniforms. And yet there still seems to be something lacking, something that might explain better why the leaders acted as they did. For instance, it is one thing to record Montgomery being wedded to his "single thrust into Northern Germany" but what is lacking is how could Montgomery reach the conclusion that he need not consider anything else. At the end, one is forced to share in Churchill's assessment: "The only thing worse than fighting a war with allies is fighting a war without them." ( )