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Loading... One and Many in Aristotle's Metaphysics: The Central Books (2009)| 23 | 1 | 986,176 | None | None | The problem of the one and the many is central to ancient Greek philosophy, but surprisingly little attention has been paid to Aristotle's treatment of it in the Metaphysics. This omission is all the more surprising because the Metaphysics is one of our principal sources for thinking that the problem is central and for the views of other ancient philosophers on it. The Central Books of the Metaphysics are widely recognized as the most difficult portion of a most difficult work. Halper uses the problem of the one and the many as a lens through which to examine the Central Books. What he sees is an extraordinary degree of doctrinal cogency and argumentative coherence in a work that almost everyone else supposes to be some sort of patchwork. Rather than trying to elucidate Aristotle's doctrines--most of which have little explicitly to do with the problem, Halper holds that the problem of the one and the many, in various formulations, is the key problematic from which Aristotle begins and with which he constructs his arguments. Thus, exploring the problem of the one and the many turns out to be a way to reconstruct Aristotle's arguments in the Metaphysics. Armed with the arguments, Halper is able to see Aristotle's characteristic doctrines as conclusions. These latter are, for the most part, supported by showing that they resolve otherwise insoluble problems. Moreover, having Aristotle's arguments enables Halper to delimit those doctrines and to resolve the apparent contradiction in Aristotle's account of primary ousia, the classic problem of the Central Books. Although there is no way to make the Metaphysics easy, this very thorough treatment of the text succeeds in making it surprisingly intelligible. Halper's One and Many in Aristotle's Metaphysics: The Central Books was originally published in 1989 by Ohio State University Press. The reprint of this work includes a new Introduction by the author. Further, The Central Books is part of a Trilogy whose two other as of yet unpublished works Alpha--Delta and Iota--Nu will be released by Parmenides Publishing in 2008 and in 2014 respectively.… (more) |
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▾References References to this work on external resources.  Wikipedia in English
None ▾Book descriptions The problem of the one and the many is central to ancient Greek philosophy, but surprisingly little attention has been paid to Aristotle's treatment of it in the Metaphysics. This omission is all the more surprising because the Metaphysics is one of our principal sources for thinking that the problem is central and for the views of other ancient philosophers on it. The Central Books of the Metaphysics are widely recognized as the most difficult portion of a most difficult work. Halper uses the problem of the one and the many as a lens through which to examine the Central Books. What he sees is an extraordinary degree of doctrinal cogency and argumentative coherence in a work that almost everyone else supposes to be some sort of patchwork. Rather than trying to elucidate Aristotle's doctrines--most of which have little explicitly to do with the problem, Halper holds that the problem of the one and the many, in various formulations, is the key problematic from which Aristotle begins and with which he constructs his arguments. Thus, exploring the problem of the one and the many turns out to be a way to reconstruct Aristotle's arguments in the Metaphysics. Armed with the arguments, Halper is able to see Aristotle's characteristic doctrines as conclusions. These latter are, for the most part, supported by showing that they resolve otherwise insoluble problems. Moreover, having Aristotle's arguments enables Halper to delimit those doctrines and to resolve the apparent contradiction in Aristotle's account of primary ousia, the classic problem of the Central Books. Although there is no way to make the Metaphysics easy, this very thorough treatment of the text succeeds in making it surprisingly intelligible. Halper's One and Many in Aristotle's Metaphysics: The Central Books was originally published in 1989 by Ohio State University Press. The reprint of this work includes a new Introduction by the author. Further, The Central Books is part of a Trilogy whose two other as of yet unpublished works Alpha--Delta and Iota--Nu will be released by Parmenides Publishing in 2008 and in 2014 respectively. ▾Library descriptions No library descriptions found. ▾LibraryThing members' description
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Edward Halper’s three volume One and Many in Aristotle’s 'Metaphysics' contends that Aristotle argues for his central metaphysical doctrines by showing that they alone resolve various versions of what is known as “the problem of the one and the many.” The present volume, Alpha–Delta, argues that these books constitute the first stage of Aristotle’s inquiry, his case for the existence of metaphysics. Halper shows that the possibility of metaphysics turns on its having a subject matter with a sufficient degree of unity to be known by one science. Although books Alpha–Delta address the problem that occupied Aristotle’s predecessors, they also prepare the way for—and are consistent with—the second stage, the inquiry into principles in the central books. Along the way Halper argues for unique interpretations of “being qua being,” the source of the aporiai, the method of “saving the phenomena,” “said in many ways,” the principle of non-contradiction, and the significance of book Delta.  | |
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A Review of Halper's One and Many in Aristotle's Metaphysics: The Central Books written by Arthur Madigan, SJ, of Boston College
Halper, Edward C. One and Many in Aristotle's Metaphysics: the Central Books. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1989. Xl + 309 pp. $48.50 -
This is the second volume (though the first to appear) of a three-volume study of one and many in Aristotle's Metaphysics. It covers Metaphysics 6, 7, 8, and 9. Chapter 4 summarizes the results of the textual analysis. Halper argues against three interpretations of form. (1) Against the view that form is individual, he presents texts showing the universality and knowability of form. Form is universal because it is one in formula. (2) Against the view that form is a kind of universal (a species-form or lowest-level universal), he presents texts which insist on the numerical unity of form. Form is individual because it is numerically one. (3) The view that form is neither universal nor individual does not square with the requirement that form be the cause of unity in a thing.
Halper's view is that form is both universal and individual. It is not that form is a universal or that form is an individual, but rather form possesses characteristics of universality (the unity in formula by which form serves as principle of becoming and f knowledge), and characteristics of individuality (the numerical unity by which form serves as principle of a thing's unity and being). So characterized, form resolves aporiai: whether the principles of things are their kinds or their constituents; whether there is some principle apart from individuals; whether principles are one in number or one in species. Form breaks these aporiai by possessing seemingly contrary types of unity. Platonic Form was supposed to combine these types of unity, but failed to do so. Aristotle does not reject the notion of something's being both universal and particular; he intends his own forms to be exactly that. He does not change the Platonic requirements for principles; he meets them (p. 246).
This combination of types of unity is grounded in form's actuality. Actuality causes numerical unity in a composite by causing continuity between or among the materials constituents. Actuality also makes form to be one in formula. Form is an actuality, and so it is without parts; it is numerically one and its formula is indivisible (p. 248). Actuality is the function in virtue of which a thing is what it is, a function which is also a capacity and which is its own end (pp. 249-50).
The problem of individuation is really two problems. If we ask for the principle that makes one composite different from other composites, the answer is matter, but if we ask for the principle of the composite's identity, the answer is form (p. 251). Of its own nature form individuates itself by a physical process. Form imitates pure actuality by manifesting itself in a plurality of instances. Reproduction, development, and plurality of composites are aspects of form's self-manifestation in matter. (How this works is a problem of physics, not strictly of metaphysics.) “From the perspective of form, individuals are merely vehicles for form's continued existence” (p. 252).
Halper's prose is clear, his argumentation forceful. His analytical Table of Contents, Glossary, Bibliography, and Index are helpful. Some readers may find that Halper makes the central books tidier than they actually are, and his Aristotle may strike some readers as too Platonic. But his proposals are grounded on meticulous textual analyses, and his interpretation of Aristotelian form merits the attention of every serious student.
- Arthur Madigan, Boston College