The Falkland Islands War of 1982 was remarkable in many respects. At the outset of the Thatcher-Reagan era, the conflict strengthened the resolve of the Brits to bolster rather than reduce the size and strength of the Royal Navy. Only a few months prior to the Argentinian incursion, John Nott, Thatcher's new Defense Secretary, had announced his plans to retire the carriers Hermes and Invincible, 9 destroyers and frigates, and reduce the naval forces by 8,000 or more men. Thatcher was faced with the monumental task of retaking and defending a sparsely-populated group of islands on the other side of the world, far from any supporting bases or relief forces. The decision to do so said much about the government and the nation. Not only addressing the immediate conflict, the war also established British (and to some extent American) intentions to act boldly on the global stage to oppose violations of the rule of law. American assistance included use of Ascension Island (also used was South Georgia Island, which played so prominent a role in Shackleton's 1916 Antarctic expedition) logistic and intelligence support, and provision of new sidewinder missiles.

Admiral Woodward offers a complete and candid account of the battles, characters, and personal thoughts involved in the campaign. He is neither dogmatic or apologetic about the war and his role in it. He addressed head-on the controversial events that marked the war, including the sinking of the General Belgrano. The Argentinian ship had a lively story, beginning when it was the U.S. flagged Phoenix that survived Pearl Harbor to see service in the thick of the Pacific campaign. Having fought gallantly in support of the allies, it was sold to Argentina in 1951. It was sunk by the HMS Conqueror in the opening days of the Falkland Islands War.

The book is surprisingly lively for so detailed a work. It fills a very important role in accounting for this event that has so often been passed over by historians as footnote.

Excerpts:
p. 21 - "I reminded myself of the principles of war, in particular the one called 'Maintaining the Initiative'. This decrees, very broadly, that if you can inflict happenings upon your opponent which cause him to take a series of decisions he has not planned for, with insufficient time to think them through properly, the probability is that he will get a good half of them wrong. If you only force decisions on him for which he is already prepared, the chances are that he will get most of them right; push him, worry him, harry him, and hurry him."

p. 265 - " You may have thought you joined the Navy in order to attend courses and to make yourself a comfortable career. But, whether you knew it or not, you actually joined for this day, the day or reckoning. And if that should be today - then go do it."

p. 324 - "I suspect we all have to learn to live with the fact that television magnifies drastically what is already awful and somehow diminishes in importance that which it does not see." ( )

This book gives an incredible insight into the mind of a naval task force leader at war. His decision making process, while on the surface seems cold and heartless, actually makes sense when he discusses the reasons behind the choices he made. Plus, it is just a great read, it has the dry British humor, and not heavy in military lingo that the layperson wouldn't understand. Highly recommended! ( )