Judith M. Hughes

This book does an excellent job of showing the defects in French military preparation in the 1920's. The book's defects however come at two levels. First, it asks a lot of the reader who is presumed to know French period politics and the overall strategic situation without having either really explained by the author. Second [and far more important in my opinion] is that it begs the question of why the French were so little concerned with the actual strategic and military risks of their show more position. The author repeatedly sketches out the core demographic and geographic problems. She then shows the French repeatedly ignoring both sets of objectives in pursuit of budgetary and military doctrinal internal battles. She never bothers to explain the mental disconnect yet it is key to analyzing French behavior. Did they really not take the threats seriously? Were the threats so horrible that avoidance was the only useful coping mechanism? Was it something else? The road from victory in 1918 to defeat in 1940 runs straight through the 1920's. It is really very difficult to judge French decisions without some answer to this question. show less