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Loading... 7 | None | 2,387,018 | None | None | It is widely agreed that there is such a thing as sensory phenomenology and imagistic phenomenology. The central concern of the cognitive phenomenology debate is whether there is a distinctive "cognitive phenomenology" - that is, a kind of phenomenology that has cognitive or conceptualcharacter in some sense that needs to be precisely determined. This volume presents new work by leading philosophers in the field, and addresses the question of whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology. It also includes a number of essays which consider whether cognitive phenomenologyis part of conscious perception and conscious emotion.Three broad themes run through the volume. First, some authors focus on the question of how the notion of cognitive phenomenology ought to be understood. How should the notion of cognitive phenomenology be defined? Are there different kinds of cognitive phenomenology? A second theme concerns theexistence of cognitive phenomenology. Some contributors defend the existence of a distinctive cognitive phenomenology, whereas others deny it. The arguments for and against the existence of cognitive phenomenology raise questions concerning the nature of first-person knowledge of thought, therelationship between consciousness and intentionality, and the scope of the explanatory gap. A third theme concerns the implications of the cognitive phenomenology debate. What are the implications of the debate for accounts of our introspective access to conscious thought and for accounts of thevery nature of conscious thought? Cognitive Phenomenology brings the debate to the forefront of philosophy, and provides a state-of-the-art account of the issues at stake.… (more) |
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Sign up for LibraryThing to find out whether you'll like this book. ▾Conversations (About links) No current Talk conversations about this book. » Add other authors Author name | Role | Type of author | Work? | Status | Bayne, Tim | Editor | primary author | all editions | confirmed | Montague, Michelle | Editor | main author | all editions | confirmed | Carruthers, Peter | Contributor | secondary author | all editions | confirmed | Horgan, Terry | Contributor | secondary author | all editions | confirmed | Kriegel, Uriah | Contributor | secondary author | all editions | confirmed | Levine, Joseph | Contributor | secondary author | all editions | confirmed | Pitt, David | Contributor | secondary author | all editions | confirmed | Prinz, Jesse J. | Contributor | secondary author | all editions | confirmed | Robinson, William S. | Contributor | secondary author | all editions | confirmed | Shields, Christopher | Contributor | secondary author | all editions | confirmed | Siewert, Charles | Contributor | secondary author | all editions | confirmed | Smith, David Woodruff | Contributor | secondary author | all editions | confirmed | Spener, Maja | Contributor | secondary author | all editions | confirmed | Strawson, Galen | Contributor | secondary author | all editions | confirmed | Tye, Michael | Contributor | secondary author | all editions | confirmed | Veillet, Bénédicte | Contributor | secondary author | all editions | confirmed | Wright, Briggs | Contributor | secondary author | all editions | confirmed |
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▾References References to this work on external resources. Wikipedia in EnglishNone ▾Book descriptions It is widely agreed that there is such a thing as sensory phenomenology and imagistic phenomenology. The central concern of the cognitive phenomenology debate is whether there is a distinctive "cognitive phenomenology" - that is, a kind of phenomenology that has cognitive or conceptualcharacter in some sense that needs to be precisely determined. This volume presents new work by leading philosophers in the field, and addresses the question of whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology. It also includes a number of essays which consider whether cognitive phenomenologyis part of conscious perception and conscious emotion.Three broad themes run through the volume. First, some authors focus on the question of how the notion of cognitive phenomenology ought to be understood. How should the notion of cognitive phenomenology be defined? Are there different kinds of cognitive phenomenology? A second theme concerns theexistence of cognitive phenomenology. Some contributors defend the existence of a distinctive cognitive phenomenology, whereas others deny it. The arguments for and against the existence of cognitive phenomenology raise questions concerning the nature of first-person knowledge of thought, therelationship between consciousness and intentionality, and the scope of the explanatory gap. A third theme concerns the implications of the cognitive phenomenology debate. What are the implications of the debate for accounts of our introspective access to conscious thought and for accounts of thevery nature of conscious thought? Cognitive Phenomenology brings the debate to the forefront of philosophy, and provides a state-of-the-art account of the issues at stake. ▾Library descriptions No library descriptions found. ▾LibraryThing members' description
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