Raising Churchill's Army: The British Army and the War against Germany 1919-1945

If you're looking for an incisive examination of the woes of the British army in the Second World War, and how those flaws were overcome, this is the book for you. While there are any number of relevant points one can talk about, to a large degree the author boils it down to the tensions between an authoritarian organizational culture trying to operate with a machine-age doctrine that really demanded a high level of decentralization. Add to this lapses in training and professional education, more missions then could be adequately covered, and the costs of crash mobilization, and one has a picture of why British operational competance was so hard bought. What this was not about is hangovers from the 19th century, World War I trench show more warfare, an overfondness for horses, or regimentalism on the brain.

If one has a complaint, it would have been nice to see a comparison of how the process by which Britain's army in Asia gained competance compared with what happened in the Mediterranean and Western Europe. But one can only put so much in one monograph. show less

This book focuses on the performance of the British Army in the campaign in North West Europe in 1944 and 1945, and to a degree on that of the B.E.F. in France in 1940. It also covers the pre-war political and military build-up (or lack of it) before the outbreak of the Second World War.

The author has undertaken significant and in depth research. Some of the information he has unearthed is very informative. For example, I found the details on the dangers of being a platoon commander and the average time in command before being killed or wounded sobering.

My concern is that this book (as its title indicates) only concentrates on the campaigns in France and North West Europe. It only touches upon Italy, Sicily and Tunisia, and hardly show more mentions the Western Desert or South East Asia. I am also sceptical about some of the conclusions reached. For example, I question the references to Major General ROSS (GOC 53 Infantry Division) and not so favourable about MONTGOMERY's style of leadership.

In summary, I do recommend this book to any military historian. It is well researched and is very thought provoking. show less