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Loading... The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge| 50 | None | 515,223 | 
(5) | None | In a letter of 1932, Karl Popper described Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie - The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge - as '...a child of crises, above all of ...the crisis of physics.' Finally available in English, it is a major contribution to the philosophy of science, epistemology and twentieth century philosophy generally. The two fundamental problems of knowledge that lie at the centre of the book are the problem of induction, that although we are able to observe only a limited number of particular events, science nevertheless advances unrestricted universal statements; and the problem of demarcation, which asks for a separating line between empirical science and non-science. Popper seeks to solve these two basic problems with his celebrated theory of falsifiability, arguing that the inferences made in science are not inductive but deductive; science does not start with observations and proceed to generalise them but with problems, which it attacks with bold conjectures. The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge is essential reading for anyone interested in Karl Popper, in the history and philosophy of science, and in the methods and theories of science itself.… (more) |
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| Epigraph |
The answer to these questions has not, indeed, been such as a dogmatic and visionary insistence upon knowledge might lead us to expect – that can be catered for only through magical devices, in which I am no adept . . . it is the duty of philosophy to counteract their deceptive influence, no matter what prized and cherished dreams may have to be disowned. In this inquiry I have made completeness my chief aim . . .
— Kant (1781)  | |
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| Dedication |
I DEDICATE THIS BOOK TO MY WIFE
She has made great sacrifices for the book, and also for The Logic of Scientific Discovery and for my later books; greater sacrifices than I should have accepted, greater than better books would have deserved.
November 1978 | |
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Words of groups of words in square brackets are additions that were not in the original manuscript copies (K1, K2, K3 and K4). A few of these additions were made by the editor; the remainder were made by the author when he revised the edited manuscript (MS) in 1975.
[from Troels Eggers Hansen's "Editor's Foreword" (2009/2012: [ix])] The Publisher would like to thank Andreas Pickel for preparing the translation; Troels Eggers Hansen for his editorial work on the translation in its early and final stages; and John Kinory for his work in reading, revising and preparing the final version of this translation. The Publisher would also like to thank Gordon Wells for his assistance with the translation.
[from the "Publisher's Acknowledgements" (2009/2012: [x])] The present book, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie, can be seen as a collection of drafts and preliminary work from the years 1930 to 1933 for my first published book, Logik der Forschung, the first edition of which appeared in the autumn of 1934. The title is an allusion to Schopenhauer's Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik (The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics). Earlier preliminary work, as well as some of the work from the years 1930 to 1933, has been lost.
[from "Preface to the First German Edition, 1978" of Karl Popper's The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge (1979/2012: [xi])] 1. A brief historical comment on scientific knowledge as Socratic ignorance. In Plato's Apology of Socrates — perhaps the most beautiful philosophical work I know — Socrates reports how surprised he was that the Delphic Oracle answered “No” to the question of whether anyone was wiser than Socrates. What does the god mean? Socrates asked himself, knowing full well that he was not wise. And he arrived at the following conclusion: “I am indeed a little wiser than others because I know that I do not know. But the others do not even know that much; for they believe that they know something.”
[from "Introduction, 1978" of Karl Popper's The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge (1979/2012: [xiii])] [1.] Comments on the content. This book constitutes a theory of knowlegde. It is a “theory of experience”, that is of scientific experience. It shows that all scientific “experiences” presuppose hypotheses, and that scientific experience may be characterised as a method of formulating and testing theories.
[from "Exposition [1933]" of Karl Popper's The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge (1979/2012: [xxxiii])] 1. The problem of induction and the problem of demarcation. This analysis focuses on two questions: the problem of induction and the problem of demarcation.
[from "Formulation of the Problem", chapter I of Karl Popper's The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge (1979/2012: [3])] | |
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(Here we encounter an important point, for probabilistic considerations apply not only to chance-like series of events, that is, to series whose elements are all unpredictable, but to those series of events also that contain individually predictable elements and nothing else, and yet there is no association between the elements that regulates their sequence. It is important to note that this is the more general case. Chance-like sequences are an important special case only. Probability calculus, as a theory of sequences with a chance-like structure, is much more general than probability theory as a theory of games of chance.)
[From "The Problem of the Randomness of Probability Statements", chapter [X] of Karl Popper's The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge (1979/2012: 461)] (Click to show. Warning: May contain spoilers.)2. The corroboration concept and the simplicity concept; the “principle of the most parsimonious use of hypotheses”, derived from the concept of higher and lower degrees of falsifiability (or precision, or statement content).
[From "Summary Excerpt (1932)", the appendix to Karl Popper's The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge (1979/2012: 484)] (Click to show. Warning: May contain spoilers.)“In particular, the detailed critical investigations in the book, those intended to demonstrate that the problems regarded by the author as ‘the fundamental problems of the theory of knowledge’ do lie at the root of the most important questions and debates in epistemology, are reproduced in the form of an appendix of tables only. Of these critical investigations, special mention should be made of the discussions about Hume, Kant, Fries and the ‘probability philosophers’ (Reichenbach, Kaila and others). The positive results, too, could be included in the ‘Excerpt’ to a limited extent only. Not included were, above all, the theory of the law-likeness degree of a hypothesis and that of the relationship between law and randomness, and the investigation into laws of ‘causal form’ and the form of ‘possibility statements’, into the ‘problem of simplicity’ and into the ‘principle of economy’.”
[From Troels Eggers Hansen's "Editor's Postscript" (2009/2012: 497)] (Click to show. Warning: May contain spoilers.) | |
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▾References References to this work on external resources.  Wikipedia in English
None ▾Book descriptions In a letter of 1932, Karl Popper described Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie - The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge - as '...a child of crises, above all of ...the crisis of physics.' Finally available in English, it is a major contribution to the philosophy of science, epistemology and twentieth century philosophy generally. The two fundamental problems of knowledge that lie at the centre of the book are the problem of induction, that although we are able to observe only a limited number of particular events, science nevertheless advances unrestricted universal statements; and the problem of demarcation, which asks for a separating line between empirical science and non-science. Popper seeks to solve these two basic problems with his celebrated theory of falsifiability, arguing that the inferences made in science are not inductive but deductive; science does not start with observations and proceed to generalise them but with problems, which it attacks with bold conjectures. The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge is essential reading for anyone interested in Karl Popper, in the history and philosophy of science, and in the methods and theories of science itself. ▾Library descriptions No library descriptions found. ▾LibraryThing members' description |
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