Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan 2002-2007
by Antonio Giustozzi
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Since the Allied invasion of Afghanistan in 2002, the Bush administration has celebrated the imminent demise of the Taliban, with claims of a moral and psychological defeat playing a prominent role in the presidential elections of 2004. Some commentators suggested that reconstruction and development had won over the Afghan population, despite widespread criticism of the meager distribution of aid and failed attempts at nation building, not to mention the infamous corruption of Kabul's show more power-hoarding elites. In March 2006, both Afghan and American officials continued to assert that the Taliban are no longer able to fight large battles. Unfortunately that theory would soon collapse beneath the weight of a series of particularly ferocious clashes, causing the mood in the American media to turn from one of optimism to one of defeatism and impending catastrophe.Suddenly faced with a very sophisticated and creative form of guerilla warfare, the West found itself at a loss to fight an insurgency that bore little resemblance to its former enemy. In the first book ever to be published on the neo-Taliban, Antonio Giustozzi provocatively argues that the appearance of the neo-Taliban should in no way have been a surprise. Beginning in 2003, a growing body of evidence began to surface that cast doubt on the official interpretation of the conflict. With the West cutting corners to maintain peace within the country, which included tolerating Afghanistan's burgeoning opium trade, the Taliban was able to regroup and grow in strength, weapons, and recruits. Giustozzi's book poses a bold challenge to contemporary accounts of the invasion and its aftermath and is an important investigation into the rise and dangerous future of the neo-Taliban. show lessTags
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Announcements of an impending victory over the Taliban have been repeated ad nauseam since the Allied invasion of Afghanistan in 2002, particularly after the Presidential elections of 2004, which were said to have marked the ‘moral and psychological defeat of the Taliban’. In moments of triumphalism, some commentators claimed that ‘reconstruction and development’ had won over the population, despite much criticism of the meagre distribution of aid, the lack of ‘nation-building’ and corruption among Kabul’s élite. In March 2006, both Afghan and American officials were still claiming, just before a series of particularly ferocious clashes, that ‘the Taliban are no longer able to fight large battles’. Later that year, show more the mood in the mass media had turned to one of defeatism, even of impending catastrophe. In reality, as early as 2003-5 there was a growing body of evidence that cast doubt on the official interpretation of the conflict. Rather than there having been a ‘2006 surprise’, Giustozzi argues that the Neo- Taliban insurgency had put down strong roots in Afghanistan as early as 2003, a phenomenon he investigates in this timely and thought-provoking book. show less
Onderzoeker Antonio Giustozzi, verbonden aan de London School of Economics, probeert dat in zijn boek Koran, kalashnikov and laptop te verklaren. Volgens hem hebben de Taliban zich ontwikkeld van een ultraorthodoxe groepering, die elke moderne vinding afwees, tot een uiterst conservatieve, jihadistische beweging met een meer internationale uitstraling. Lees verder....
Mar 28, 2009Dutch
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- Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan 2002-2007
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