On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace
by Donald Kagan
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Professor Kagan reveals the common threads that connect the ancient confrontations between Athens and Sparta and between Rome and Carthage with the two calamitous world wars of our own century.Tags
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An absorbing book, providing a deep insight into what really causes, or leads to, armed interactions among countries and peoples. The chapters on the two world wars are especially absorbing. I, for one, got fresh insights into the role of individual leaders and statesmen like Bismarck, who balanced the European west and the east tirelessly and kept them from going to war. After his retirement, however, the bellicose factions gained ascendancy and took Europe into a devastating war. By drawing on the early examples of Sparta-Athens divisions in ancient Greece and the Rome-Carthage wars a little later, the author repeatedly makes the point that it is not only greed for plunder or land that leads to war between nations, but also, perhaps show more more usually, feelings of not being respected or given a just deal. Wars often become inevitable because of national pride and remembered or resurrected instances of humiliation or betrayal. His chapter on the Cuban missile crisis does not appear to me to be on par with the other examples, as he seems to be oscillating toward and away from a hawkish stance, and seems to be accusing John Kennedy of projecting a weak and pusillanimous character to the rough and bumptious Kruschev. On the whole, however, this author's analysis and insights into war and peace should surely improve our understanding of the current crises as well. show less
Kagan is trying to justify Bush era preemptive strike policy and aggressive foreign wars by using and comparing historical examples of failed peaces. This would more accurately say "...and the preservation of the status-quo", because the authors idea of "peace" is first strike wars against those who threaten it.
The one thing that really bothers me the most is that the examples he uses (the Punic wars, WW1, WW2)are all certainly illustrative of the consequences of leaving a tenacious enemy half defeated, but have little bearing on what it means to become involved in warfare in this modern age. Look at Afghanistan and Iraq to see that it is not a matter of crushing an enemy completely to secure victory, this simply can not be done in a show more insurgent style war. Anyone who reads the U.S. Army's Counterinsurgency Field manual, or reads any of the modern theorists on insurgent warfare (which is really all that is happening anymore) can see for themselves that destruction of the enemy by force is an unrealistic approach to this kind of warfare and that military success will never look the same again as it did even sixty years ago. It's not enough to completely destroy the enemy and remove his ability to make war because the enemy is not an army, and he makes war in the shadows with nothing but scraps.
Kagan and his children are notorious insiders. His son Frederick Kagan is credited with conceiving of the famous "surge" in Iraq, his son Robert Kagan is a notorious neo-conservative who was directly involved in the bush era insanity (see his books). The U.S. went into Iraq with a "let's just smash 'em up and go home" attitude, and IT DIDN'T WORK. How soon after Bush declared victory did it become clear that there was no victory to be had then, or ever? immediately. these guys want nothing more than a conventional war like their fathers had, with the pitched field battles like their fathers fought, but they can not have them. We will all pay the price for this desire of these few militant men in high places who want so badly the glory of days long past. show less
The one thing that really bothers me the most is that the examples he uses (the Punic wars, WW1, WW2)are all certainly illustrative of the consequences of leaving a tenacious enemy half defeated, but have little bearing on what it means to become involved in warfare in this modern age. Look at Afghanistan and Iraq to see that it is not a matter of crushing an enemy completely to secure victory, this simply can not be done in a show more insurgent style war. Anyone who reads the U.S. Army's Counterinsurgency Field manual, or reads any of the modern theorists on insurgent warfare (which is really all that is happening anymore) can see for themselves that destruction of the enemy by force is an unrealistic approach to this kind of warfare and that military success will never look the same again as it did even sixty years ago. It's not enough to completely destroy the enemy and remove his ability to make war because the enemy is not an army, and he makes war in the shadows with nothing but scraps.
Kagan and his children are notorious insiders. His son Frederick Kagan is credited with conceiving of the famous "surge" in Iraq, his son Robert Kagan is a notorious neo-conservative who was directly involved in the bush era insanity (see his books). The U.S. went into Iraq with a "let's just smash 'em up and go home" attitude, and IT DIDN'T WORK. How soon after Bush declared victory did it become clear that there was no victory to be had then, or ever? immediately. these guys want nothing more than a conventional war like their fathers had, with the pitched field battles like their fathers fought, but they can not have them. We will all pay the price for this desire of these few militant men in high places who want so badly the glory of days long past. show less
I started this book because I read another book by Kagan and liked it. I am amazed by the context between the Greek wars and WWI and WWII. It is very interesting and reminds me of A.J. P. Taylors Origins of the Second World War.
Read pages 285-307 during WWI portion of S&W at CNCS in Sept 2023.
From the syllabus: He also describes the end of the war and the problems of establishing a stable peace.
Key quotes: “The eventual superiority of sixty-five million Germans with greater natural resources over thirty-nine million Frenchmen with a lower birthrate was not checked by the Versailles Treaty.” P295
“The tragedy of the Treaty of Versailles was that it was neither conciliatory enough to remove the desire for change, even at the cost of war, nor harsh enough to make another war impossible.” P297
From the syllabus: He also describes the end of the war and the problems of establishing a stable peace.
Key quotes: “The eventual superiority of sixty-five million Germans with greater natural resources over thirty-nine million Frenchmen with a lower birthrate was not checked by the Versailles Treaty.” P295
“The tragedy of the Treaty of Versailles was that it was neither conciliatory enough to remove the desire for change, even at the cost of war, nor harsh enough to make another war impossible.” P297
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- Canonical title
- On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace
- Original publication date
- 1995
- Dedication
- For Bob and Fred, who have taught me so much and will teach many others
- First words
- (Preface): The roots of this book may be found in a seminar I taught jointly with Professor Walter A. Ralls of Hobart College in the summer of 1967 to a group of very bright high school seniors at Telluride House in Cornell ... (show all)University.
(Introduction): The collapse of the Soviet Union put an end to the dangerous rivalry between the great powers that threatened the peace and safety of the world for almost half a century.
For almost three decades at the end of the fifth century B. C. the Athenians and their allies fought the Spartans and theirs in a terrible war that changed the Greek world and its civilization forever. - Last words
- (Click to show. Warning: May contain spoilers.)The crisis came because the more powerful state also had a leader who failed to convince his opponent of his will to use its power for that purpose.
- Blurbers
- Schultz, George P.
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- Languages
- English, Spanish
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- Paper
- ISBNs
- 6
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