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Loading... Verden som vilje og forestilling (original 1819; edition 2005)by Arthur Schopenhauer
Work InformationThe world as will and representation by Arthur Schopenhauer (Author) (1819)
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Sign up for LibraryThing to find out whether you'll like this book. No current Talk conversations about this book. 100 SCHO 4 Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung is the central work of the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer. The first edition was published in December 1818, and the second expanded edition in 1844. My version is the three volume translation by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, titled "The World as Will and Idea", which appeared in 1883-1886. The key to the work may lie in the various translations rendered as “Idea,” “Representation,” and “Presentation,” which are all acceptable renderings of the word “Vorstellung”, but one other thought is the notion of a performance or a theatrical presentation that is key in his interpretation. The main body of the work states at the beginning that it assumes prior knowledge of Immanuel Kant's theories. I am most interested in Nietzsche's appreciation of him. For Nietzsche, the reading of The World as Will and Representation aroused his interest in philosophy. Although he despised especially Schopenhauer's ideas on compassion, Nietzsche would admit that Schopenhauer was one of the few thinkers that he respected, lauding him in his essay Schopenhauer als Erzieher ("Schopenhauer as Educator", 1874), one of his Untimely Meditations. no reviews | add a review
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Purchase of this book includes free trial access to www.million-books.com where you can read more than a million books for free. This is an OCR edition with typos. Excerpt from book: 48 ) CHAPTER XXIV. ON MATTER. Matter has already been spoken of in the fourth chapter of the supplements to the first book, when we were considering the part of our knowledge of which we are conscious a priori. But it could only be considered there from a one-sided point of view, because we were then concerned merely with its relation to the forms of our intellect, and not to the thing in itself, and therefore we investigated it only from the subjective side, i.e., so far as it is an idea, and not from the objective side, i.e., with regard to what it may be in itself. In the first respect, our conclusion was that it is objective activity in general, yet conceived without fuller determination; therefore it takes the place of causality in the table of our a priori knowledge which is given there. For what is material is that which acts (the actual) in general, and regarded apart from the specific nature of its action. Hence also matter, merely as such, is not an object of perception, but only of thought, and thus is really au abstraction. It only comes into perception in connection with form and quality, as a body, i.e., as a fully determined kind of activity. It is only by abstracting from this fuller determination that we think of matter as such, i.e., separated from form and quality; consequently under matter we think of acting absolutely and in general, thus of activity in the abstract. The more fully determined acting we then conceive as the accident of matter; but only by means of this does matter become preceptible, i.e., present itself as a body and an object of experience. Pure matter, on the other hand, which, as I have shown in the Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy, alone constitutes the true and admissible content of the conception of substance, is causality... No library descriptions found.
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Google Books — Loading... GenresMelvil Decimal System (DDC)193Philosophy and Psychology Modern western philosophy German and AustrianLC ClassificationRatingAverage:
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