Geoff Hewitt

An interesting evaluation of the German failure to attempt an invasion of Great Britain following the fall of France. This book establishes a solid argument for reexamining the impact of the Battle of Brittan on Operation Sea Lion. The condition of the German surface fleet as documented clearly indicates that in the summer and fall of 1940 it was in no condition to protect a cross-channel invasion fleet. The balance of naval power in the invasion zone was clearly in the Royal Navy's favor. show more There can be little doubt as to the havoc that would have resulted from night time surface attacks against the invasion fleet, when air power would not be a factor. show less

An OK book obviously written about the author's pet subject. There are a few interesting pieces of analysis in here and some nuggets I didn't know, but the author's need to ram home his point in prose sometimes takes him away from the analysis that'd ram it home for him. A prime example is the huge analysis of Destroyers under air attack in Norway and at Dunkirk that isn't then translated into something like "hours of air attack needed to sink a Destroyer" that'd let him prove that even in show more ideal conditions the Luftwaffe couldn't have stopped the Royal navy from decisively intervening in any attempted invasion.
Also it should surely have been called "Adolph's Armada"... show less

A clear book detailing the forces allocated to stopping the German invasion, should it have happened in September, 1940. It is an entertaining book, for the RN would have contested the Channel viciously, and the German invasion would have been nowhere close to the D-Day effort. The Luftwaffe had not the skills to dominate the Channel though they may have had the numbers in daylight.