Marc Gallicchio

This is a detailed examination of how, at the end of WW2, the American policy of “Unconditional Surrender” was debated in government circles and finally applied to Japan. It focuses on the American perspective, with a necessary but relatively cursory examination of events in Japan.

Gallicchio argues that it always was a political matter. In 1945, those who maintained a strict line on Unconditional Surrender did so because they wanted the USA to have the power to reform Japanese society, show more and this came natural to them because they were mostly on the left of the political spectrum, including president Truman himself. They were liberal democrats associated with the New Deal and attached to FDR’s policy ideas. On the right wing of Washington DC, Republicans and conservatives were much more comfortable with the idea of letting Japanese society be, and more willing to compromise on war arms to obtain an earlier peace.

Gallicchio highlights the irony that not only have the perspectives on the war end been reversed since then, but both sides are largely ignorant of their own past. And there has been a lot of myth-making and some outright lies about the events, which he tries to demolish.

He describes in lucid detail a rather messy process of US decision making. In 1945, American insights in Japanese politics were very limited, which is understandable as it was a complex and dysfunctional system. Decisions in Tokyo were generally arrived at by lengthy and fraught negotiations between hostile factions, from which a consensus emerged that was sanctified by debating it in presence of the Emperor. Because this was so opaque, US policymakers tended to read their own prejudices into it, and that included men like Grew, who had been ambassador in Japan and supposedly understood the country better, or so he liked to believe. Thus, when American officers, civil servants and politicians gave an opinion on the best policy versus Japan, there was very little material evidence to judge the truth of it.

Gallicchio perceives that in those circumstances, Truman kept his own counsel, and that his instinct was to maintain the policy of Unconditional Surrender with minimal modifications. He was certainly willing to listen to those who advocated other approaches, but they failed to convince him to change the policy in any meaningful way. The US Army probably had the most influence on his decision making, and they tended to voice skepticism about the wilder ideas and hopes expressed by politicians. There wasn’t a strong enough case to make a policy change. When intelligence indicated that the Japanese Army was concentrating strong forces on Kyushu to fight a battle to the bitter end, this prompted a hurried consideration of the alternatives to an invasion of Kyushu, but this was a military not a political change. When the Trinity test proved the devastating potential of nuclear weapons, they were primarily seen as tools that could support the existing policy.

The decision making that lead to the use of nuclear weapons has often been seen as inspired by the emerging Cold War. Gallicchio argues that this was at most a secondary consideration. The reality for both the USA and Japan was, as general Marshall and ambassador Sato independently observed, that there was actually nothing that they could do to prevent Stalin from taking what the latter wanted. Therefore, it was less of a policy consideration than it later appeared to be.

In the end, it is amazing that the decision turned so much on the fate of the Japanese emperor, one man among millions. But for the senior Japanese military leaders more was at stake, as they reported directly to the Emperor, which in practice — as Hirohito was an ineffective leader — gave them a degree of independence and power that was only limited by the bitter competition between themselves. It was probably right to insist that, if the emperor was not altogether toppled from his throne, then at least radically redefining his role was essential to eliminate militarism. And the final compromise, using the emperor as a tool to modify the system, was one with a strong precedent, as it was exactly what the samurai of the Chosu and Satsuma domains had done in 1868.

In all, this is a detailed and strong analysis, but as it is one that focuses on just one side, it can’t be the only book that you should read on this topic. Especially as, as Gallicchio reminds us, this debate will probably continue forever. show less