William N. Still, Jr.

A necessarily sprawling history of how the USN tried to offer useful assistance from a standing start in a war that it had not planned to fight. This is less of an over-arching narrative and more a work you dip into for almost forgotten situational anecdotes, apart from the effort to get a viable escort force into operation. Be that as it may, Still's main conclusion is that there were useful lessons to be retained in regards to diplomacy, logistics, preparedness and ASW warfare but for the show more most part the USN failed to do so; see the early failures in the Atlantic Theater during the Second World War. show less

This book is worthy of a re-reading. Still chronicles the development of the Confederate navy, particularly the need to equalize the superior numbers of the U.S. fleet with armored vessels. This book provides details of the Confederate building program, supplies stirring accounts of naval actions, and, in the end, questions the consumption of resources versus the result obtained.

This book is much more than the title implies. It is not just why the South lost the war, but a detailed look at the entire Southern mobilization. It is a partner book to "How the North won", but in my opinion the better of the two.

This little book examines all of the resources available to the Confederate navy and questions why more was not made of them. Interesting, brief read.