Charles Robert Anderson (1943–)

A workman-like account of a workman-like general, one is given a portrait of an organization man who when faced with the need to display some imagination failed to rise to the occasion. The tragic irony is that Short was specifically given his command because of the perceived need to have in place an Army commander who would be able to conciliate Adm. Husband Kimmel, who had the reputation of being abrasive. Perhaps if Walter Krueger had received the command, as was due him in regards to show more seniority, the hard questions that needed to be asked prior to December 7 would have been brought to the fore, seeing as Krueger could speak "Navy" and had no interest in conciliation for its own sake. Of course, it's doubtful that anyone could have really overcome the nest of bad organization, bad assumptions, and bad attitudes that were the foundation of the disaster of Pearl Harbor.

As for my complaints about this book, I find it odd that a product of the Naval Institute Press could be published with the mistake that the RAF was responsible for the famous attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto, and that it was carried out with dive bombers; as opposed to the Fleet Air Arm torpedo bombers that carried out the mission.

I also find it odd that Christopher Gabel's book on the GHQ Maneuvers held by the U.S. Army was not used as a source, seeing as it would suggest that Krueger was the much more dynamic commander than Short, and that Krueger was much more adept at handling his staff; another possible flaw in Short's command style. show less

Short but excellent narrative of difficulties to be faced then and in future battles against the Japanese. Fanatic and tenacious, they were willing to fight to the very last man. Logistics and health issues were early to this campaign area and were exacerbated by inter-service squabbles. New equipment, strategy, and tactics would be needed and were slow to evolve. Outstanding analysis and summary at the end of the book. We learned a lot on Guadalcanal but the learning curve, particularly at show more the senior officer would be steep indeed. They were still weeding out ineffective generals and admirals until late in this campaign.

Brief, but quite good. overview of the strategic and tactical aspects of the earliest and longest land battle in the South Pacific. The learning curve was quite steep but the lessons learned were invaluable. show less

3463. The Grunts, by Charles R. Anderson (read July 20, 2001) This is a well-written account of a month in the field in Vietnam in May 1969 by a Marine, first published in 1976. The language is tape-recorder literal and filled with scatological obscenities, but somehow it did not bother me too much because it was obviously accurate--though I have read really great books of the kind which did very well without the literality: I think of With the Old Breed, by E. B. Sledge, which I read Mar 9, show more 2001, and which is probably the best book of its kind extant and which conveyed the time of a Marine in World War II as well as it has ever been done, I thought, and all the language in that book could be used in decent company. The Grunts does a lot of talking about why men acted as they did in Vietnam, and quite a bit of what is said sounds plausible. This book was well worth the nickel or dime I paid for it (at a rummage sale). show less

A very readable biography on General Walter C. Short. Naturally the book is centered around the events on 7th December 1941, but I also found it interesting how it dealt with his pre-war career and it provide a lot of information on the situation in the US Army prior to World War Two. I found that the has succeed in being fairly neutral in dealing with Pearl Harbor and Short's actions and the several different investigations of Pearl Harbor. A recommended book.