Niklas Zetterling

The latest book by Niklas Zetterling does not disappoint. The author looks at the Germans Blitzkrieg way of war fighting (if it can even be called that). Mr. Zetterling uses reports prepared by the Germans during the war (and found currently in the German and U.S. archives) as the meat of his book. These first-person accounts are truly fascinating, and they show the reader one thing, and that is that the Germans success during the early part of the war was not so much attributable to the show more so-called "Blitzkrieg" concept, but it was because of German reliance on individual initiative. In the book, the author shows time and time and time again where individual initiative, quite often outside of orders, led to the Germans overcoming seemingly daunting situations. On top of the individual initiative must be added the impetus for action. Many times a battle was won by the Germans because their units attacked first etc. etc. The author makes a point, several times during the book, to point out that mud made a huge impact on their operations to take Moscow in 1941. Many authors now tend to want to relegate the impact of the mud to a minor inconvenience that inconvenienced both sides equally, although since the Germans were much more mobile than the Soviets, it assuredly effected the Germans much more than the Soviets. Two other interesting side notes, the author points out that the overall (1941 to 1945) German to Soviet casualty ratio ended up being around 5:1 in favor of the Germans, although he says it probably was much higher than even that conservative number. He also trashes General Patton's counterattack in the Ardennes when he points out that Patton only used three divisions and those three divisions were sitting in reserve. They traveled on decent roads and met very little resistance. Compare this to Guderian's about face where he literally had to take his entire army and face it south and attack through the Soviet lines to meet up with AGS coming up from the south. All the while fighting off increasingly desperate counter attacks by the Soviets. Truly a formidable feat. Overall, another great book by one of the preeminent WWII historians. show less

As I'm reading through 'The Drive on Moscow' I'm somewhat confused as to where this volume actually fits into the history of the Eastern Front. More so, I'm confused about why it was written in the first place. The title speaks for itself; Zetterling and Frankson have decided to put together a volume detailing Germany's first 'great crisis of World War II'. But what separates this volume from a host of others that detail the exact same operations, highlight the same types of memoirs and show more reminiscences, and reach similar if not altogether the same conclusions? If a reader wants a journalistic account of the battle for Moscow, they can turn to Nagorski's 'The Greatest Battle' (although riddled with weaknesses, mistakes, and omissions, it's an easy enough read). If you're interested in the Soviet point of view, and a more academic work, see Rodric Braithwaite's "Moscow 1941" or 'The Retreat: Hitler's First Defeat' by Michael Jones. And if perhaps the German point of view is more interesting, you can consult the various monographs put out by David Stahel in the last few years.

Unfortunately, there is nothing in this text that separates it from other studies. There is the usual reliance on German general memoirs, sprinkled with a few frontline diaries to give the reader an impression of what the soldiers themselves overcame to reach Moscow. The text contains the same rehashing of the terrible weather the Wehrmacht had to overcome (both mud and then snow), the same logistical difficulties and mediocre Soviet resistance that really did little to nothing until somehow the Germans exhausted themselves with their long distance advances against the rains and snows of the east. Some Cold War era memoirs from the Soviet side make an appearance, with the usual reliance on Konev, Rokossovsky, Zhukov, Shtemenko, and a few others that provide absolutely no new or original information on the battle. The Soviet side, for all intents and purposes, still remains a mystery compared to the German side of things (even though some newer Russian studies are utilized). Minor mistakes are also present, as when the 316th Rifle Division is first said to come from Central Asia (pg. 83) and then from Siberia (pg. 171). If you've read about the German advance on Moscow (Operation Typhoon), then you've read the majority of this book already. If you're new to the topic, you won't want to start here as the amount of information provided is there for those already familiar with the Eastern Front. For those who are acquainted with the Eastern Front, you'll find little analysis, and no new or original research, but the appendices might prove useful if you're eager for detailed orders of battle and information on losses. So in the end, I'm back to where I started this review; I'm simply confused as to why this volume was written and for whom. show less

IMHO, one of the best books to come out on a very well known Eastern Front battle.THe Korsun (or Cherkassy) pocket was perhaps the last time the Wehrmacht gathered a large force of tanks equal in strength to the Russian force.
The narrative is well detailed and provides a good breakdown of the fighting force of the Germans and the Russians. The appendices are particularly useful, with a breakdown of the strength of every division and major fighting force,e.g., batallion,Stug Abteilung,etc.

The story of the battleship Tirpitz—Bismarck’s sister ship—and the desperate Allied efforts to destroy it . . .

After the Royal Navy’s bloody high seas campaign to kill the mighty Bismarck, the Allies were left with an uncomfortable truth—the German behemoth had a twin sister. Slightly larger than her sibling, the Tirpitz was equally capable of destroying any other battleship afloat, as well as wreak havoc on Allied troop and supply convoys. For the next three and a half years the show more Allies launched a variety of attacks to remove Germany’s last serious surface threat.

The Germans, for their part, had learned not to pit their super battleships against the strength of the entire Home Fleet outside the range of protecting aircraft. Thus they kept Tirpitz hidden within fjords... show less