Lewis Paper’s stated objective in writing this book is to tell the story of U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew’s attempts to prevent his country and Japan from slipping into a war which neither side ostensibly wanted. And the author does this very well, writing in a fluid, easy to read manner to relate Grew’s story from the early days of his career at the turn of the 20th century through the Pearl Harbor tragedy and afterwards. Page is even handed in his treatment of the many figures in this drama, save only for his obvious approval of Mr. Grew and his disdain for Secretary of State Cordell Hull.
As might be expected from the attorney and former law professor that he is, Mr. Page draws few, if any, conclusions. Instead, he lets the reader determine from the facts presented the whichever conclusion he is led to draw. Some of the questions that arise are these: Did either the United States or Japan deliberately seek a war with the other? Was President Franklyn Roosevelt anxious to leave no stone unturned to avoid a war? Did Japanese emperor Hirohito Michinomiya seek to incite war? Did Prime Minister Togo Shigenori, who was subsequently convicted of war crimes and executed, try to block negotiations? Was the Roosevelt Administration aware of Japan’s predilection for forceful surprise blows in war?
This book is primarily intended as a rendition of the story of a diligent, professional, and peace loving diplomat. But it is also a must read for those interested in the show more question of who knew what, who did what, and when, on the eve of Pearl Harbor. show less

This work is massive in scope, involving vast geographic areas and millions of men. It does not discuss the retreat from Moscow at the individual soldier’s level, but at the corps and army level. We are treated to the workings of the very highest-ranking German generals on the Eastern Front. David Stahel, the author, is a professional historian, teaching both at the University of New South Wales and the Australian Defence Force Academy. This is the latest in a number of books he has written about the German Army on the Eastern Front during World ll. His purpose in writing this book is to show that the German retreat from Moscow was a victory “tactically, operationally, and even strategically”, and not a defeat as is often claimed by other historians.
Retreat From Moscow is also a very detailed telling of the German high command’s three-way battle with the Communists, Hitler, and the Russian winter. It is packed with historical facts of which most people are generally unaware. Which German general on the Eastern Front could mostly be likened to U.S. General Omar Bradley, the “soldier’s general”? Which side’s generals were most afraid to contradict their ruler? What motivated Hitler to give the Halt Order, thus preventing his armies from making orderly and life saving retreats in the face of vastly superior numbers? Why did the Communists throw wave after wave of mass attacks against well-entrenched National Socialist armies? These and many other questions show more are answered here.
The author’s treatment of the Wehrmacht Generals is uneven. At times it seems as if the author has taken a break from writing and then come back in a different frame of mind. This is particularly true in his treatment of Field Marshal Kluge, the commander of Army Group Center. Stahel shows a particular animus towards General Heinz Guderian, but does not tell the reader why. This may have been developed in one of the author’s earlier works. There is an impression that perhaps things were said in Mr. Stahel’s earlier books that should have been repeated for clarity’s sake in this volume. Stahel blames Guderian for the German army’s failure to be prepared for winter warfare. This hardly seems fair, though, because Guderian was a blitzkrieg general who had no expectation of having to fight winter warfare. The author also appears ambivalent in his attitude toward the opposing forces. He illustrates some of the German’s inexcusable treatment of Russian civilians, but insinuates that reports of Russian brutality toward German prisoners were mere rumors. He never calls the Soviets “Communists”, but usually refers to the Germans as “Nazis.” The writer does show human understanding for the suffering of the Wermacht troops in the field, but very little for the generals. One might expect a professional historian to show a bit more detachment than our author does, but there may be a good explanation for this. He is an academic, after all, writing in an environment not known for its tolerance of deviation from expected viewpoints.
On the whole, this is a very good book, especially for professional historians and serious students of history. For casual readers, it could be one or two hundred pages shorter. It is to be heartily recommended, but not in its e-book version. Professor Stahel makes generous use of maps and footnotes, which can be extremely difficult to utilize in an e-book edition.
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