An intense look at how the French government went about the business of campaigning in the 30 Years' War and managed to hang on until the end without collapsing, despite an administrative structure that could not be reformed until hostilities ceased. This being the case, Parrott does not find a case of war creating the state and the state then waging war. It seems to be much more the case that while France made war in spite of the limitations of the social structure of the military classes, it is also the case that this structure of social obligation and tradition did keep the military from collapsing. This also ties in with the limitations with the study, which I thought would be accessible on the grounds that I've studied a fair amount of Early Modern European military history. In reality, you'll be much better off if you're an advanced student of Early Modern France, if for no other reason you'll be bilingual enough to read the numerous untranslated quotes and will have a better sense of the players involved. It's still an impressive piece of scholarship.

Actually, I do have one particular gripe. Maybe it's my fault that I only speak English, but a glossary of French-specific terms would make this work much more accessible. ( )

http://stromata.tripod.com/id327.htm ( )